9-2024

Modern Characteristics of Domestic Extremists: A Study of Extremists in the United States

Sherry H. Siller

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN

MODERN CHARACTERISTICS OF DOMESTIC EXTREMISTS: A STUDY OF EXTREMISTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment

Of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY CRIMINAL JUSTICE

BY

Sherry H. Siller

University of New Haven
West Haven, Connecticut
September 2024

MODERN CHARACTERISTICS OF DOMESTIC EXTREMISTS:
A STUDY OF EXTREMISTS IN THE UNITED STATES

APPROVED BY

David Webb (Sep 11, 2024 08:57 CDT)

David Webb, Ph.D.
Committee Chairperson

Christopher Sedelmaier, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Howard Stoffer, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Maria Tcherni-Buzzeo (Sep 11, 2024 16:11 EDT)

Maria Tcherni-Buzeo, Ph.D.
Director of the Doctoral Program

David Schroeder., Ph.D.
Interim Dean of the College

Nancy Savage (Sep 15, 2024 15:22 EDT)

Nancy Ortins Savage, Ph.D.
Provost

DEDICATION

To my mother, who has always believed in me. *Fun dayn moyl in gots oyern*.

ACKLOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to my chair, Dr. David Webb, who has always encouraged me to move forward and to not give up. He deserves an award for his endless patience. Thank you to my entire committee, including Dr. Christopher Sedlemaier and Dr. Howard Stoffer for all your time and kind words over the many years.

ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper was to perform exploratory research on multiple aspects of individuals radicalized in the United States. Previous research on this topic had often analyzed individuals using all or most of the accumulated data on this group over the entire period of "modern-day terrorism," while ignoring shifting changes in culture, norms, and economics in the United States. This study aims to close a part of that research gap by empirically analyzing a data sample of individuals radicalized in the United States who either were caught in the attempt or after the carrying out of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil from the PIRUS database (Profiles of Individuals Radicalized in the United States). This study explores the individual characteristics of these radicalized individuals and how they have shifted over time across an approximate 50-year period. Analyses for this study include chi-squares, loglinear analyses, ordinal logistic regression, t-test, and ANOVA. Several significant results were found. Findings indicate multiple demographic characteristics of the radicalized individual have changed in this time period, including ideology sub-type, level of education, military history, criminal history, types of catalyzing events, and mental health history. Implications and avenues for future research are discussed.

Keywords: Domestic terrorism, Demographics, Mental illness, Military history, Social Media, catalysts, Ideology, Extremism, Radicalization.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Modern Characteristics of Domestic Extremists: A Study of Extremists in the United States

CHAPTER I: Introduction

There are many unique terms associated with the study of terrorism. Much of this terminology is frequently conflated or used interchangeably, particularly in media. What is even more confusing is the distinguishable differences between how terrorism is defined by academics, by our government agencies and by the agencies of other countries. The general consensus in academia is that terrorism is an act of violence committed via illegitimate means with the intent to sow discord and create fear and anxiety within a population (Bruce, 2013). The purpose is to intimidate and to send a message to a wider audience (Crenshaw, 1992; Crenshaw, 2000). It is both a resistance to an authority and inherently political in nature. The element of a political or social objective must be present with the violence to be considered an act of terrorism and separate from traditional violent crime (Sandler, 2011). It is not the same as guerrilla warfare, which is more militaristic, though "terror" has been cited as a tactic (Crenshaw, 2014). Typically, these violent actions are committed by non-state actors on civilians and noncombatants (Silke, 2008; Simi, Windisch & Sporer, 2016). By using these tactics against civilians, fear often spreads wide and far; fear for one's safety, fear of others, and fear of scapegoating. People can act irrationally when afraid, which brings chaos and distrust, creating fissures in already fragile societies.

For law enforcement, the tactics most often used by terrorists present several unique problems specific to the United States. Freedom of speech laws in the constitution can make the line between rhetoric, hate speech or the incitement to violence grey and blurry. Law enforcement and government agencies specifically provide more legally concrete definitions for terrorism when compared to academia to clarify this line. Defined by the Code of Federal Regulations, it is

"the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives," (28 C.F.R. § 0.85). The FBI further develop this, distinguishing between domestic and international acts, depending on the origin of the individuals or group, location of operations and objectives. Domestic terrorism is defined as,

> "The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives," (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2005).

The definition for international terrorism contains the same basic information on violence and coercion for political or social objectives while also including that international terrorist acts either "occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum," (FBI, 2005). In more recent years, the FBI has made efforts to further clarify these two types and introduced a third: homegrown violent extremists (HVEs); self-radicalized citizens inspired by foreign terrorist organizations to take action within the United States (McGarrity, 2019).

Of primary importance to the milieu of definitions is that the commission of these acts are performed by non-state actors to send a particular political or social message. Non-state actors typically have no ties to government and are not working under the auspice of any government order in the commission of their acts. While there are acts of state sponsored terrorism committed across the globe, where the use of terrorists acts as proxies in an armed conflict for the

government, for the purposes of this paper, any discussion of terrorist groups or individuals will specifically refer to non-state sanctioned actors.

Extremism is also something of an abstract concept that falls within the larger umbrella of radicalization. It is sometimes used interchangeably with radicalization but there are distinct differences in the terms. Radicalization is the overall process, or series of steps, cognitively or behaviorally that leads to extremism. It is not *the* cause of terrorism because most individuals engaged in radicalized thinking do not commit acts of terrorism (Mandel, 2009). The radicalization process includes the many factors which, when combined together, produce the extremist (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). The root of the term, "radical," indicates changing the fundamental nature of something. Essentially, it is a neutral term for drastic change. There is a reason why many modern theories of criminology use the term. Extremism however, can describe political ideas that are fundamentally opposed to the core values of a society, or it can be some form of racial or religious ideology that advocates supremacy over all other races or religions (Neumann, 2013). Either form often includes ideologies that deny basic democratic principles or human rights to some group(s). It can be the methods to reach some idealized political or religious goal (Neumann, 2013). Additionally, the label "extremist" primarily denotes a negative and potentially dangerous connotation. Religious extremists for example, can often be the most dogmatic in their beliefs. The FBI adds a further caveat to distinguish the extremist: criminal activity that advances their ideology (FBI, 2010).

Group contexts can also cultivate extremist attitudes. Individuals tend to become more extreme over time when exposed to group attitudes, where groupthink becomes commonplace (Borum, 2011). This continues to be an important area of research, particularly in segregated online communities where it is easy to share like-minded ideas. It is also easy with such groups to

fall into in-group biases where any actions committed by fellow members are seen more positively if they aid the group's message or dismissed quickly if they do not, while anyone outside the group is seen more negatively and met with harsh criticism or rebuke.

While a discussion on all different ways terrorism can be defined can take up entire papers, for the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on attacks and attempted attacks made on United States soil, referred to either as domestic terror or homegrown violent extremism. Incidences of domestic terrorism in the United States have been on the rise in recent years and there are no signs to indicate a reduction in frequency. Hyper partisan rhetoric (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), coupled with stagnant wages for many workers (Desilver, 2018), increased tensions surrounding race and religion (Horowitz, Brown & Cox, 2019), and a rise in online communities that promote radicalization to violent action (Holt et al., 2015) have created a dangerous breeding ground for future terrorist events. This paper began with a discussion on the terminology of terrorism and continues with a focus on radicalization and the differences between domestic and international offenders. It will further explore where the literature stands on the problem of domestic terrorism, in particular focusing on two things: (1) The current characteristics of the violent extremist; and (2) the behavioral activities of individuals radicalized to violent action.

A History of Terrorism Research

According to Crenshaw (2014), the earliest works studying "modern day" terrorism can be traced back to the early 1970s with the distinction between terrorism and other types of political violence (Rapoport, 1971) and the relationship between terrorism and liberal democracy (Wilkinson, 1976). Over the next two decades research in the area was scant, with only a select few scholars actively studying the topic. Furthermore, a large majority of the published work was rarely empirical, containing no methodologically sound data collection on terrorists or terrorist

events. As a result, this left a body of literature that was largely comprised of literature reviews or written on a case study basis. Overall, the quality of this literature was very poor (Silke, 2007). That began to change in 2002 with the publication of the American Terrorism Study [ATS], prompted by the preceding decade's terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the Atlanta Olympics in 1996 and the government responses in Ruby Ridge and Waco (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). The ATS was unique in its methodology for data collection, providing a much-needed empirical look at the characteristics, patterns of behavior and tactics of American terrorist groups, collecting information between 1980 and 2002. More recently, several open-source datasets by research focused institutions like the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism have been made publicly available for research purposes and are updated regularly. This available data has allowed researchers to draw more empirically based conclusions within the field.

In the wake of September 11th research in the area of terrorism studies exploded, producing hundreds of papers on the topic and in particular, the threat of Islamist Jihadi terrorism. In the two years after the 2001 attack, nearly 60 percent of articles written in the main journals on terrorism were on Islamist terror groups (Silke, 2007). Many researchers speculated on the causes of Jihadi radicalization, on the characteristics and backgrounds of Jihadi militants and on the mental health of the violent extremist. Furthermore, much of this body of work took the format of literature reviews. Those that did use empirical data based their analysis on small sample sizes, case studies, secondary analysis, or archival data (Silke, 2008). Profile building and response development primarily came from individuals in the Middle East and Northern Africa (Sageman, 2004; Crenshaw 2007). Entire radicalization theories were developed based solely on

Islamic extremism while never mentioning how other forms of extremism would fit this model (see: Silber & Bhatt, 2007). With this shift in focus to Jihadi extremism and the building of character profiles based on non-Western country characteristics, a useful but incomplete understanding of Jihadi extremists had developed when attempting to apply this information in the West.

Purpose of This Study

With such a strong focus on the external Jihadi threat, domestic terrorism fell to the wayside of many researchers. Some authors have focused on the homegrown violent extremist (HVE), which is considered by authorities to be different from the domestic terrorist, though the individual may be a naturalized or native-born citizen of the country in which he commits an attack (FBI, 2019). Despite this move toward the study of Islamic Jihadi extremism, domestic terrorism continues to remain an emanate threat. In the year 2017, domestic terrorists were responsible for "a total of 45 attacks, disrupted plots, threats of violence, and instances of weapons stockpiling," (New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP], 2018a). Thirteen people were killed and 39 were wounded in these attacks, of which 91 percent were either anti-government or race-based attacks (NJOHSP, 2018a). In 2018, right-wing extremists were responsible for or linked to at least 50 deaths, according to the Anti-defamation league (Pitcavage, 2019). Some of these deaths cannot be confirmed as ideologically motivated, though the perpetrator had ties to right-wing organizations or had espoused white supremacy beliefs. There were 32 confirmed domestic terrorist attacks, disrupted plots, threats of violence and weapons stockpiling with a confirmed death toll of 20 and 25 wounded (NJOHSP, 2019a). These figures were quantified by NJOHSP (2018b) based on a definition of domestic terrorism as "violence committed by individuals or groups – including race-based, single-issue,

antigovernment, and religious extremist ideologies – associated primarily with U.S.-based movements," (p. 39). If this definition was expanded to include homegrown violent extremists espousing a Jihadi ideology, the number of confirmed attacks on U.S. soil in 2017 would increase to 49, according to data from the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2019). These are incident figures that have not been seen since the early 1980s and 1990s. Even in 2023, despite efforts by authorities, domestic extremists continue to attack soft targets, threaten minority communities (Jewish in particular), and coordinate with like-minded individuals with goals of intimidation and instilling fear in their perceived enemies (NJOHSP, 2024).

Previous research in this area has discussed some of the information on who these individuals are that engage in violent domestic terrorism. Mostly, they are men in their 30s, mostly white if their ideology is part of the right-wing; non-white if their ideology is anything else, and often radicalize after joining a violent group that a friend or family member introduce them to (Smith & Damphousse, 2002; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Simi, Windisch & Sporer, 2016). They are likely to be unemployed and have a criminal record (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015). Societal change and abortion rates were found to be predictors of right-wing terrorism, while group deprivation, identity conflicts and personality characteristics played a role among homegrown Jihadi terrorism (Piazza, 2017; King & Taylor, 2011). An important caveat of these empirical findings is that almost all the research that attempts to build character profiles or distinguish differences among domestic terrorists have used collected data that began in the 1970s. In 1970, in the U.S. there were over 350 acts of domestic terrorism (GTD, 2019). The number of attacks dropped dramatically by 1972 and fluctuated between just under 70 to approximately 140 a year across the rest of the decade. Most of these did not result in fatalities and most were carried out by individuals representing a number of different ideologies. Target types were also more dispersed

between businesses, government, private citizens, and educational institutions. The 1980s saw an overall decrease in the number of attacks per year but an increase in abortion related violence. The 1990s continued this trend with an even higher amount of abortion related violence but relatively few attacks on private citizens. As a result of these pattern changes, we have an incomplete picture of the domestic terrorist. This leads to the first of two research questions: Have the general offender characteristics of the domestic terrorist changed over time?
This research intends to address that question using multiple waves of open-sourced data.

One consistency in the behavioral patterns of domestic attacks is some type of preparatory behavior. Unlike traditional or generic criminal offending where most crimes are characterized by impulse and a distinct lack of planning, the planning of an action appears fundamental to any act of terrorism. These pre-incident actions may include both legal and illegal activities, such as purchasing weapons, purchasing bomb making materials, renting vehicles and communicating to others about their particular ideology (Smith, Damphousse & Roberts, 2006). There are less than a handful of studies that examine the antecedent behaviors of domestic terrorists. Of the studies that do, most rely on data from the American Terrorism Study which, while useful as a baseline, predates the interaction with technology we have today. Another study that does examine some of this pre-incident activity relies on interviews of a small sample size of self-identified former right-wing extremists (Simi, Windisch & Sporer, 2016). The information provided in the study is useful; however, given the small sample size and even smaller subsets to extrapolate data, it may be difficult to draw generalizable conclusions. This leads to the second question this paper aims to address: What are the typical antecedent activities of domestic terrorists prior to the commission of a terrorist act? It is possible that with a pattern of activities, law enforcement agencies may be able to better alert communities about the signs of radicalized behavior.

CHAPTER II: Review of the Literature

In 1999, the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated in a special retrospective report that in the previous 30 years, the vast majority of deadly terror attacks occurring in the United States had been perpetrated by domestic terrorists (FBI, 2000a). In April 2009, the Obama Administration released a report written by the Department of Homeland Security detailing a predicted rise of domestic terrorist activity. In particular, this report predicted a rise in recruitment among right-wing terrorists, stating that "the economic downturn and the election of the first African American president present unique drivers for rightwing radicalization and recruitment," (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009). The report further predicted a growth of this activity similar to that of the 1990s, facilitated by economic recession, the outsourcing of jobs, perceived lack of government action toward illegal immigration and the perceived threat to U.S. power by other countries. During this time, there was an increase in violent acts that targeted infrastructure, law enforcement, government facilities and banks (DHS, 2009). Current trends within the United States would suggest this report to be a fairly accurate assessment. While terrorism in the United States is not entirely limited to right-wing extremism, it continues to be a violence-prone movement that is growing, particularly with the constant use of social media platforms.

It is common knowledge at our present point in time that the United States has a long history of extremist activity. The perception of that activity is largely that of external actors with ill intent acting on American soil. That perception is largely misleading. From the birth of the Ku Klux Klan and the larger White Nationalist movement, to left wing groups such as the Animal and Environmental Liberation Fronts, to religious and single-issue extremists like the Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hassan and recent anti-abortionist shooter Robert L. Dear, the vast majority of the extremist actors who committed attacks on American soil were born and raised as United States

citizens and spent the majority of, if not all of their lives in the United States. Furthermore, between September 12th, 2001, and December 31st, 2016, there were a total of 85 violent extremist incidents committed by "homegrown" or domestic terrorists that resulted in at least one fatality (United States Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2017). These 85 attacks resulted in 225 fatalities. Far right groups were responsible for 62 incidents (73 percent) and 106 deaths, while radical Islamist extremists accounted for 23 incidents (27 percent) and 119 deaths[1](GAO, 2017). Between 2017 and 2019 there were 53 attacks by domestic terrorists and 12 disrupted plots across the country, resulting in 64 dead and 125 wounded (NJOHSP, 2018a; 2019a; 2020d).

Early accounts of domestic terror activity in the United States typically start with the actions of the Klu Klux Klan, however there were few laws at the time to prosecute their actions at the federal level. Legislatively, acts of domestic subversion could be prosecuted under the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918 Sabotage Act but these were meant for wartime usage only. There was no extension for the types of terrorist activity the Klan was doing during peacetime. It was not until the Civil Rights Movement and other cultural change movements during the 1960s and 1970s that legislation moved and the ability to prosecute domestic terror crimes became possible in various forms. Hate crime laws and the destruction of government buildings and infrastructure are some examples of this; though to this day there is still no federal law for the crime of domestic terrorism with firearms unless the act is related to a foreign terrorist organization (Savage, 2019). As an example, Timothy McVeigh was prosecuted for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing in federal court using a law that bars the use of "weapons of mass destruction." More recently, Dylann Roof, who killed nine African Americans in a church in Charleston, South Carolina was prosecuted on hate crimes and firearms

[1] 41 percent of the deaths attributed to radical Islamist terrorism came from a single event; the attack on the Pulse night club in Orlando, FL, on June 12th, 2016.

charges, despite an ideology steeped in white supremacy and a desire to "increase racial tensions across the Nation, and [seek] retribution for perceived wrongs he believed African Americans had committed against white people," (Bjelopera, 2017).

To contrast with this history of domestic terror activity, individuals who espouse radical Islamist or Jihadi beliefs, even when born in this country are not recognized as domestic terrorists by FBI and DHS authorities. These agencies use the term "homegrown violent extremist," (HVE) to describe a U.S. based terrorist as,

> "A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologicallymotivated terrorist activities…in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization," (Bjelopera, 2017, p. 9).

There are some semantics at play here. Both domestic terrorists and HVEs live the American experience. Their lives are generally that of any other American who grows up using the public education system, driving on the same roads, or utilizing the same types of available commodities and services. The distinction comes with the promotion of ideologies deemed foreign. Today, those ideologies are primarily of a radical Jihadist or Salafist origin. It is possible to make this argument with the other ideologies, though it is rarely done. The Neo-Nazi movement, given Nazism's origin in Germany, would be one such example. Another reason for the distinction between domestic terrorists and HVEs is that they can be prosecuted as terrorists far more easily under a statute that criminalizes the providing of material support or resources to one of 67 foreign terrorist organizations (18 U.S. Code § 2339B).

Many academic scholars do not necessarily make the distinction between these typologies in the same way. Instead, there is a focus on the differing trajectories, grievances and demographics of a radical Islamist compared to that of a right-wing or left-wing terrorist (Piazza, 2011; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Jensen & LaFree, 2016). This is important because there are considerable differences among these three typologies and what makes a particular individual susceptible to radicalization. Furthermore, from an analytical standpoint, when federal authorities are unclear about what constitutes an act of domestic terrorism and instead use hate crime or destruction of property charges, or levy state-level murder and illegal weapons use charges it reduces the scope with which policymakers and academics can investigate this as an overall phenomenon. It creates difficulty in developing adequate government responses, comparing attack types and threats, and it reduces the ability to allocate proper resources to act on the issue.

Ideologies of Domestic Extremists

Most extremism scholars break incidents of terrorism into different wings based on the ideology of the attacker(s). Each of these wings is a type of ideological umbrella, encompassing a number of similar but distinct belief systems. In similar fashion to general criminal offending, where the majority of individuals who live in high crime areas never commit any crimes, the majority of individuals who embrace one or more of these belief systems never engage in a violent act of extremism (Borum, 2011; Neumann, 2013). For categorization purposes, most extremists fall into one of the following four categories: the right wing or far right, the left wing or far left, religious extremists, and single-issue extremists. The FBI classifies the threats from domestic terrorists into four main categories: racially motivated violent extremism, antigovernment/anti-authority extremism, animal rights/environmental extremism, and abortion extremism (McGarrity, 2019). These categories are not mutually exclusive or all encompassing,

however most government agencies and academic scholars would agree that the majority of extremist incidents fall within one of these categories.

Far Right

Right-wing extremists have the longest history in the U.S. and the umbrella under which their ideological belief systems fall is wide. They are typically fierce nationalists, suspicious of federal authority and hold strong beliefs in sovereignty. They also typically hold strong supremacist views; that their "white race" is threatened, in need of protection from immigrants and that their perceived "way of life" is under attack (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Doosje, et al., 2016). They may hold beliefs about complex conspiracy theories muddled with the fear that their constitutional rights will be taken from them – the Second Amendment in particular (Kerodal, et al., 2015). The ideology of the far right favors a social hierarchy and is exclusivist. Depending on the group or specific ideology, they view non-white races, religions other than Christianity, gay people, feminists, the government, or any combination thereof as threats or things that degrade a country that belongs to them. They seek an idealized "utopian" future that favors their particular (often White and Christian) group above all others (Jensen & LaFree, 2016). The far-right also typically shows great distain for the federal government and the political left.

Over the last 10-15 years the Far Right has attempted to rebrand itself. In 2008 Richard Spencer, head of the white nationalist think tank the National Policy Institute, coined the term "Alternative Right," or "Alt-Right" for short and described the alt-right as

"a big-tent ideology that blends the ideas of neo-reactionaries (NRx-ers), who advocate a return to an antiquated, pseudo-libertarian government that supports 'traditional western civilization;' 'archeofuturists,' those who advocate for a return to 'traditional values' without

jettisoning the advances of society and technology; human biodiversity adherents (HBDers) and 'race realists,' people who generally adhere to 'scientific racism'; and other extreme-right ideologies," (Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], n.d. a, para. 11).

This rebranding was an attempt to sanitize and distance itself from the more obvious "look" of the white supremacist as someone with a violent temperament, shaved head, white-power tattoos, or Klan robes to something more palatable to the mainstream, polo-wearing conservatives. The appearance became more polished, and the language became more metaphorically intellectual, but the message was ultimately the same: multiculturalism is bad, gender equality is a ruse, cultural and racial heterogeneity are necessary.

White Supremacy and White Nationalism. According to a joint report released by the FBI and DHS (2017), extremists in the white supremacy movement continue to pose a lethal threat in the United States. This report singles out lone actors and small cells in particular, as the most concerning while also indicating that members of white supremacist subgroups, including racist skinheads and Klan members were responsible for more homicides than any other domestic extremist movement (DHS & FBI, 2017). Racial minorities were the most frequent target. Conspiracy theories run rife in this group of extremists who believe all non-whites are enemies and that society actively discriminates against them (Bjelopera, 2017). Anti-Semitism plays a reoccurring role in these conspiracies, where white supremacists and anti-government extremists believe the federal government is being controlled by "international Jewish interests," and the only reason the Civil Rights movement was successful was due to Jewish operatives behind the scenes (Bjelopera, 2017). They believe in complete racial separation and that they are discriminated against by society.

White supremacist extremists believe they must take extreme measures to recover ground lost to other groups, which must be reversed (Bjelopera, 2017). Many have cited the theory of violent "accelerationism" in recent years as motivation for violent attacks. This theory proposes that a collapse of society is both eminent and necessary and that white supremacists should embrace it by creating further discord (ADL, 2019a). Brenton Tarrant for example, who attacked two mosques in Christ Church, New Zealand, invoked accelerationism in his manifesto (NJOHSP, 2020a). Some white supremacist extremists believe a war between the races is necessary. A central belief in the neo-Nazi Creativity Movement, which began in the 1970s via the Church of the Creator, a racist group, is the inevitability of RAHOWA, an acronym for "racial holy war," (Bjelopera, 2017).

White supremacy and White Nationalism share the same underlying beliefs: that the white race is superior to others, that racial groups should be segregated, and the fear of losing ground to minorities. White Nationalists further believe that "white identity" should be *the* organizing principle of the countries that comprise Western Civilization (SPLC, n.d. b). They advocate for an end to all non-white immigration, both legal and not to preserve white hegemony. They favor the formation of a white ethno-state, the reversal of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (SPLC, n.d. b). The desire for this ethno-state is often veiled in language decrying the declining white birth rate and the victimhood narrative of black-on-white crime (SPLC, n.d. b).

Between 2000 and 2016 White Supremacist Extremists were responsible for 49 homicides and 26 attacks (FBI & DHS, 2017). This is more than any other domestic extremist group (where HVEs are not considered domestic terrorism). The racist skinhead subgroup of white supremacy extremists, identified by their shaved heads, combat boots, bomber jackets, neo-Nazi and white

power tattoos, are particularly violent (SPLC, 2012). An earlier FBI report from 2008 identified racist skinheads as responsible for at least 24 out of 38 violent acts attributable to White Nationalist Extremists between January 2007 and September 2008. Firearms were also the preferred weapon of choice with racial minorities being the primary victims (FBI & DHS, 2017). Additionally, several White Supremacist Extremists have adapted their tactics to the changing times. An NJOHSP (2019c) brief revealed these extremist groups were adopting strategies employed by foreign terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda which include the screening of prospective recruits and the spreading of online propaganda to encourage violence against minorities and inspire lone offenders.

Anti-Immigrant. While racial superiority and bigotry are not new phenomenon, particularly within the far right, the overwhelming number of extremists on the far right who espouse white supremacist ideology can obfuscate other areas in the movement that also raise concerns. Since the late 1990s, nativist, anti-immigrant movements have been on the rise. More specifically, anti-Hispanic hate crimes were on the increase, comprising 62.7 percent of victims for ethnicity/national-origin bias, up almost 11 percent from the year before (FBI, 1999; FBI, 2000b). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of anti-immigrant groups sprang up, with strong ties to white supremacy and all linked back to a single individual: John Tanton. Tanton was the originator of several prominent anti-immigrant organizations: the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), and NumbersUSA; all prominent anti-immigrant think tanks (Beirich & Potok, 2009). These organizations had offices in Washington D.C. for lobbying purposes and utilized xenophobic rhetoric and scare tactics to fuel anti-Latino sentiment. These movements are steeped in the idea of preserving America's culture and land as far back as the 1890s (Cagle, 2019).

Many modern-day anti-immigrant proponents are reutilizing environmental causes and climate change to push the belief that America's resources are finite, and immigration and border crossings will put too much pressure on society (Cagle, 2019). This type of eco-rhetoric is not new in any capacity. The German phrase "Blut und Boden," or "Blood and Soil," while most closely associated with its use by the Nazis, dates back to the 19th century. It is a reference to German nationalism and the idea of protecting the homeland via linking Germany ancestry to the land (Stephens, 2001). The language associated with this rhetoric is distinct. Jews existed for centuries as nomadic tribes and were frequently referred to as outsiders or invaders. Southern Europeans were considered inferior to the Nordic Europeans and considered invaders. Every new crop of immigrants that came to American shores in the 19th century were considered more inferior than the one before it. With waves of Catholics arriving from Ireland and Italy, many Catholic religious institutions were attacked (Bennett, 2001). This nativist movement largely settled down with the Civil War and only experienced brief resurgences during the Red Scare period, though it has never really gone away completely.

Anti-Government. The anti-government movement includes both sovereign citizens and militia extremists. The DOJ groups any unauthorized militias and sovereign citizens as antigovernment extremists, though membership in one of these militias or the expression of sovereign citizen ideology is not considered criminal (Bjelopera, 2017). Sovereign citizens believe that though they reside physically in the United States, they are separate or "sovereign" from it and so do not believe in or accept any government authority (Bjelopera, 2017). This includes the court system, tax agencies, motor vehicle departments, and law enforcement.

Sovereign citizens consider all these government entities illegitimate. They are generally individualistic, without any strong ties to a particular group. When they do gather, it is usually to

train, help each other with paperwork (such as those related to licensing), and to socialize and discuss ideology (FBI, 2011).

The sovereign citizen movement is a blending of conspiracy theories and legal theories, with a questionable understanding of the law that began in the 1970s. The original iteration of this movement began with a split from the John Birch Society (a far-right organization, dedicated to thwarting New Deal policy and ferreting out supposed communists in the federal government), and the birth of the Christian Identity group, Posse Comitatus (Berger, 2016). The name comes from the legal term, "power of the county," and their beliefs hold that only county sheriffs were the legal law enforcement in the United States (Berger, 2016). They also argue that the Constitution represents Christian law, or Christian Common Law. Early elements of this movement held many white supremacist beliefs, but this has not kept some Black Americans from adhering to the sovereign ideals in recent years (Bjelopera, 2017). For the sovereign citizen, "common law" is valid according to the Constitution and divine mandate and supersedes the current laws in the United States, which became obsolete with the passage of the 14th Amendment (Berger, 2016). The 14th Amendment guaranteed citizenship to all slaves after the Civil war and grants citizenship to all persons born in the United States and subjects them to the jurisdiction of the United States and the state in which they reside. Most sovereign citizens believe this Amendment shifted the nation away from states' rights and common law to a "Federal corporation that legally enslaved everyone," (Bjelopera, 2017, p. 29).

Sovereign citizens believe in a slew of financial conspiracy theories dating back to the creation of the Federal Reserve. These revolve around the public debt, the value of U.S. currency, and the "international bankers" (which is coded language for, of course, the Jews), who supposedly profit from America's misfortunes (Berger, 2016). In holding these beliefs that the

federal government is illegitimate, they often ignore all sorts of federal laws, avoid paying taxes, disregard permit requirements and destroy government issued identification. They also commit multiple types of fraud through the use of fake financial documents, fake currency, fake passports, driver's licenses, pyramid schemes, and so called "paper terrorism," (Bjelopera, 2017). Paper terrorism involves "forging documents (fake money orders and bad personal checks, for example), failing to pay taxes, phony tax filings, and presenting sham legal arguments in court. Sovereign citizens have filed fraudulent property liens against their foes," (Bjelopera, 2017, p. 46). Some will even hold illegal courts, issue warrants, and target officials with fake criminal indictments, often with the intention to intimidate, defraud, or coerce individuals, private institutions, or government entities.

Militia extremists can frequently overlap with the sovereign citizen movement, though they are two different entities. The militia movement started much later, in the 1990s, and largely in response to the bungled events in Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas. They are a collection of paramilitary groups formed as an armed resistance to federal authority. They view the federal government as invasive and an existential threat. They fear the confiscation of firearms by the federal government and tend to stockpile weaponry (Bjelopera, 2017). Some in the militia movement share overlapping conspiratorial beliefs with sovereign citizens and other far-right groups that a "New World Order" is controlling the U.S. government and media. In the last few years, some militia extremists have shifted focus from anti-government to anti-immigrant (NJOHSP, 2020e).

When militia extremists do find themselves on the illegal side of the law, they are often found trying to obtain fully automatic weapons or converting semi-automatic weapons to fully automatic. They have been found trying to buy or manufacture explosive devices (Bjelopera,

2017). Anti-government/sovereign citizen extremists were responsible for 51 violent incidents between 2008 and 2017. Thirty of these incidents were against government in some way (infrastructure, politicians, government personnel, etc.) while 21 were against police (PIRUS, 2018). Of these 51 incidents, 21 were successfully executed, with the rest caught after the acquisition of materials or during an attempt where execution failed. In 2017, militia members from at least 35 states traveled to the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Members claimed this was to provide security for the event, but no state or local authority authorized any such thing (NJOHSP, 2020e). In 2019, the leader of the United Constitutional Patriots party was arrested on federal firearms charges and stated the group was training to assassinate the wealthy philanthropist George Soros, former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, and former President Barack Obama. In the same year, two members of the White Rabbit Militia pled guilty to the bombing of a Minnesota mosque in 2017. The group also attempted to bomb an abortion clinic, but the device failed to detonate. At the same time, a Kansas based militia group was sentenced for a 2016 plot to bomb an apartment complex that many local Muslim residents resided in (NJOHSP, 2020e).

Data on the movements of extremists is still being studied for the duration of the Trump presidency. It is clear, however, just how much the divisive rhetoric in his speech and the policy proposals of his administration have affected the movements and actions of extremists in the country. Prior to the events of January 6th, 2021, Timberg & Dwoskin (2020), noted some will feel emboldened to act because they believe Donald Trump has engaged in tacit support of their actions. The truth of this prediction will be studied for many years to come, particularly as prosecutions related to January 6th, 2021, are still ongoing. The Trump presidency is a singularity in this regard because there are no other comparisons with past presidents to make. Lulls in

activity by these groups during the two Bush presidencies, however, suggest further analysis in this area is needed. At the time of this writing, several members belonging to militia groups The Three Percenters (named after the claim that only 3 percent of colonists fought against the British during the American Revolution), the Oath Keepers, and the Proud Boys were arrested and charged in relation to an attempted siege on the Capitol building in Washington, D.C. on January 6th, 2021 (Hsu & Weiner, 2021).

Black Separatism. The Black Separatist movement is generally understudied and frequently confusing. Database searches on this movement as a whole produce minimal returns. Only when searching individual extremist group names, does more proximate information appear. Empirical study of any kind on Black Separatist movements is extremely limited. The DOJ considers this movement a potential threat that could spawn domestic terror (Bjelopera, 2017). It can be difficult to trust DOJ resources on this particular subject considering the FBI's history targeting civil rights activists. An American Civil Liberties Union FOIA request revealed some questionable training material from the FBI that appears to juxtapose violence from Black Nationalism groups in the 1970s with modern day Separatist groups, as well as an Atlanta field office Intelligence Note which attempts to establish a relationship between the overall increase of Black people as a percentage of Georgia's population and the potential for increased Black Separatist extremism (German, 2012). In recent years however, violent incidents by Black Separatists are few and far between. Most engage only in constitutionally protected behavior (Bjelopera, 2017).

Black Separatist ideology is a more radical subsect of Black Nationalism, a complex multidimensional school of thought. Core tenants of Black Nationalism emphasize "racial solidarity, self-definition, self-reliance, and self-determination," (Block, 2011, p. 27). It

emphasizes black political power and economic and cultural autonomy "either within or from white America," (Brown & Shaw, 2002, p. 23). Black Nationalism encourages the building of and patronage of black owned businesses and the retention of some cultural connection to Africa. Black Separatism, however, seeks a bigger, physical separation between White and Black in America. As Brown & Shaw state, "Like other Black Nationalists, separatist nationalists see autonomy as preeminent, but they conclude that black independence must be territorial, juridical, and statist, or at least a symbolic representation of each," (2002, p. 27). Neither one of these ideologies are, on the surface, extremist, however several groups have emerged from the separatist movement that present a cause for concern. These include the Nation of Islam, the Black Hebrew Israelites, and the New Black Panther Party (NBPP), which is not to be confused with the Black Panthers of the 1960s.

What puts these groups on the far-right is their fierce adherence to nationalism and racial superiority viewpoints. It can, however, be difficult to distinguish these groups from general hate groups. They all espouse virulent antisemitic, anti-LGBT and anti-white beliefs. Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam, blames Jews for slavery, Jim Crow, sharecropping, and black oppression in general (SPLC, n.d. c). Nation of Islam (NOI) and Black Hebrew Israelites (BHI) both emphasize black superiority over whites, with BHIs believing they are one of the 12 Tribes of Israel. They consider Jews to be "imposters," (ADL, n.d. a). In 2019, several Jewish people were attacked or killed by either self-identified BHIs or those who had been connected to the movement at one point in time (ADL, 2019b).

The New Black Panthers Party (NBPP) has some closer ties to domestic terrorist activity according to Bjelopera (2017). Formed in 1990, they have been described as racist and antisemitic, whose leaders encourage violence against law enforcement, Jews, and white people.

They have also been described as “the largest organized anti-Semitic and racist black militant group in America,” (ADL as cited in Bjelopera, 2017, p. 32). At present, while the DOJ considers them a domestic terror concern given their rhetoric, they do not come close in threat level to that posed by White Supremacists or other far-right white identity groups. Between 2018 and 2019, only four individuals arrested on domestic terror related activity were identified or affiliated with Black Separatist movements. During that same time, 47 identified White Supremacists were caught in various stages of domestic plots, attacks, or weapons stockpiling (NJOHSP, 2019a; 2020d). Though Black Separatist groups have thus far been responsible for far fewer violent attacks than White groups, the NJOHSP raised their threat level to moderate in their 2020 assessment report for their hate-based rhetoric and the inspiration lone offenders appear to take from them (NJOHSP, 2020a).

Far Left

Leftist ideology in America can be characterized by several movements. The earliest of these movements can be traced to the “anarchist wave of terrorism” beginning in the 1880s and ending in the 1920s (Loadenthal, 2018). Anarchist violence swept across Europe, where individuals believed in carrying out direct attacks on heads of state, the capitalist class, and sites of opulence. The most visible representation of this was the assassination of the Tsar of Russia in 1881. In America, anarchist violence showed itself in the Haymarket bombing in Chicago in 1886, the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, and in the planting of bombs in the home of famous robber-baron industrialist, John D. Rockefeller (Loadenthal, 2018). The anarchist movement has seen a recent resurgence in the last few years, though there is no indication that this neo-anarchist movement overall actively supports or endorses violence (NJOHSP, 2020b). Anarchism proponents believe in a society existing outside the bounds of

"oppressive" laws and authorities. Sub-movements promote a more egalitarian viewpoint that is anti-racist, anti-capitalist, anti-globalist, and pro-environmentalist. There are no official leaders in this movement or any known central leadership or hierarchy. Extremists in this movement however, do advocate the use of violence to further these ideologies (NJOHSP, 2020b).

The leftist movement saw its biggest wave of activity between the 1960s and 1980s. This new left consisted of a number of anti-government organizations stemming from Marxist-Leninist philosophy and involvement in the Vietnam War (Loadenthal, 2018). With the advent of the Civil Rights movement and the failings of Vietnam, some saw a means for wider change. Few groups at this time advocated for the use of violence or terrorism. Of those that did, the Weather Underground is the most well-known. Active from 1969 to 1977, the group advocated for an ending to the Vietnam war, supported the Black Power movement and opposed American imperialism (Loadenthal, 2018). They engaged in jailbreaks, armed robberies, small arms attacks and at least 40 bombings that targeted government property (Loadenthal, 2018).

Perhaps most well-known on the left in modern American history are domestic groups centered on animal and environmental rights, with the two most prominent terrorist organizations being the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2014). Crimes of vandalism, theft, property destruction and arson are common, while direct physical violence against people is often eschewed (Bjelopera, 2017). Animal extremists believe that all animals – human and not – have equal rights to life and liberty. They are willing to inflict economic damage on those individuals or businesses they believe are abusing or exploiting animals via vandalism, threats, violence, harassment, arson, and bombings (NJOHSP, 2020c). Environmental extremists act similarly in their tactics. They believe that manmade threats to the environment are so severe as to justify violence and property damage

(NJOHSP, 2019b). Both adopt a leaderless resistance approach, and both have no formal membership. ALF and ELF have been responsible for millions of dollars in property damage over the years, though human casualties are rare (Bjelopera, 2017).

Religious Extremism

For religious extremists, violence is often considered part of a divine duty. Typically, these religious groups or individuals adhere to a very strict and selective interpretation of their religion in order to justify violence against "heathens," "sinners" or "infidels," (Doosje, et. al, 2016). They are separate from secular terrorists, as Hoffman (2006) explains, rather than trying to correct or fix a broken system, they "see themselves as 'outsiders' seeking fundamental changes in the existing order," (p. 89). Like right-wing extremists, many of these religious extremists believe a cleansing or removal of the individuals or institutions that represent a "threat" to their religion will bring about a better, more utopian society (Sageman, 2007). Furthermore, in one narrative on militant Islamism, Muslims will justify their use of violence as a reactionary measure for the constant attacks and humiliation by the West, Israel and corrupted local governments (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). For Christian terrorists, religious extremism is often intertwined with a larger, more prominent ethno-nationalism and anti-abortion violence (Hoffman, 2006).

Every religion, when looking through the lens of history has its bloody side. There are countless publications that enumerate the reasons why individuals engage in extremist violence in the name of their god or theology. Ultimately however, many justify their actions either through some verse of contorted scripture, because of some perceived wrong to their faith or people by some other group or state actor, or as necessary to root out some type of "moral corruption," or

"social evil." Religiously motivated terrorism has been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in modern history.

America has seen the birth of several religious movements within its borders. Many of these movements have been largely benign in their proclivity toward inflicting violence. Several others, however, are not. These most famously include several cult groups like Heaven's Gate, Peoples Temple, and the Branch Davidians. It also includes the wider Christian Identity movement, which is based on a doctrine called British or Anglo Israelism, developed by Richard Brothers. This theology proposed that the British are "lineal descendants of the 'ten lost tribes' of Israel," (p. 78) and over the course of a few decades as it made its way to America, became increasingly nationalistic and anti-Semitic (Borgeson, 2018). As Christian Identity began to replace British Israelism, so too did the belief that it was the Anglo-Saxon or Caucasian race that was the "true house of Israel," (p.78). Believers in this religion considered Caucasians of AngloSaxon, Germanic, and Scandinavian origin to be God's chosen people. The most popular denomination within this movement is the "Two Seed Theory." Minorities, according to believers of Christian Identity, are considered "pre-Adamic," meaning not descended from Adam, or "Mud People," (Borgeson, 2018). They are to be subservient on Earth to the "Adamic pure white race," (p. 80). They believe Jews are part of these pre-Adamic, Mud People and are biologically descended from Satan. This "Two Seed" belief focuses on the progeny of Eve, where Abel is a son of Adam, but Cain is the son of the Serpent (the devil). When Cain was cast out for the murder of his brother, his progeny are the Jews, descended from his fornication with the pre-Adamic (Borgeson, 2018). In addition, the Christian Identity theology is also an endtimes theology. They believe the world is in its final days. Like many evangelicals, they believe Jesus will return to Earth after a great battle between good and evil. Christian Identity extremists view this battle as a

racial one. There is considerable overlap with the Aryan Nation, neo-Nazis, and the KKK, as well as several paramilitary groups, including the Order and Army of God. The 1980s and 1990s saw Identity extremists murder U.S. Marshals, commit armed robberies, assassinations, shooting sprees, bombings, and multiple types of fraud and counterfeiting (ADL, n.d. b). Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh was a follower of the Christian Identity movement.

In America, the other theology that has resulted in the publication of thousands of papers, thought pieces, op-eds, and books in the sphere of terrorism has been Islamic terrorism. Islam, like Christianity, has several sects. Most well-known are the Sunni and Shia. Sunnis comprise more followers between the two. Only four countries hold Shia majorities: Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. In Lebanon, Shia are the largest religious group and in Yemen, Pakistan, and Turkey they are sizable minorities (Wright, 2018). The extremist sects of Islam seen in terror groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Taliban, and Hamas are Sunni Islamists. To be clear, Islamism is a belief that *sharia* law – that is, religious, Islamic law – should be the law the governs the country. This system has no divide between church (or mosque) and state. Islamists represent an extremist view of the religion, much like some evangelical movements like Christian Identity or Dominionism endorse theocratic rule and despise secularism (McVicar, 2013; Wright, 2018).

The view of Islam these terror groups follow is an extremely conservative one called *Salafism*. Believers seek a "pure" version of Islam, one they believe existed during its founding in the 7th century (Wright, 2018). They also believe in *jihad,* which means struggle in Arabic. In the context of these terror groups, it is understood as a fight for Islam. Salafi jihadists justify their violence against others – including other Muslims – as acceptable because they are *takfir.* Takfir is a way of referring to someone as a non-believer, infidel or apostate. In the case of violence against other Muslims like Shia populations, they are takfir because they are non-believers in the

Sunni extremist's "true" interpretation of Islam, and therefore violence is justified (Badar, et al, 2017). Additionally, Islamists will use violence as a strategy for self-defense where they feel they have been targeted, such as against Americans after the invasion of Iraq, or against any state that would stand in the way of creating a unified Caliphate (Hoffman, 2006). Americans who have joined this radical Islamist movement may draw inspiration from multiple Islamist terror groups and act most frequently as lone attackers but ultimately, their ideology falls within the bounds outlined above.

Single Issue

Single-issue extremists focus their concerns on one particular topic, as opposed to a more extensive ideology (Doosje et. al, 2016). When the idea of the single-issue extremist comes to mind, it is often that of the "lone wolf," the single attacker that no police department or municipality can adequately predict. In the past this conjured images of high-profile attackers like Eric Rudolph and Ted Kaczynski. These attackers can come from any end of the extremist spectrum but in more recent years lean toward either religious extremism, or anti-government extremism in their overarching ideology while being primarily motivated by a more singular factor, like abortion or the rejection of the U.S. government's legal system. Single-issue terrorism can sometimes be perceived or prosecuted as hate crimes. Attacks specifically targeting the gay community, for example, or women can overlap considerably with hate crimes. Prosecutors also have a lower burden of proof on hate crime charges than domestic terror charges which does not help researchers in understanding and identifying single-issue extremists. Typically, however, hate crimes are more directed at individuals, whereas terrorism implies a broader scope and motivation. Terror groups ELF and ALF can in some ways be construed as single-issue extremists. Their singular focus on environmentalism and warding off climate catastrophe do overlap

considerably with the notion of the single-issue extremist. Their strong beliefs in equal rights, anti-capitalist rhetoric, and their attempts to cause destruction primarily to infrastructure without casualties, however, can place them squarely within the left wing.

The most frequently cited single-issue form of terrorism is anti-abortion related violence. Abortion related violence has primarily targeted abortion providers and clinics via bombings, shootings, arsons, and acid attacks (Bjelopera, 2017). Violent attacks against abortion providers appeared to peak in the 1980s and 1990s, though they continue to this day (Wilson, 2021). Many of the attackers committing these acts are deeply religious and overlap considerably with religious extremists. Militant Christian terrorist organization Army of God (AOG) actively uses violence as a tactic to fight against abortion. Few members of AOG actually interact with each other, though they view themselves as a real army. They have a manual that acts as a how-to guide for attacking abortion clinics. It details methods for blockading clinic entrances, attacking with bombs, butyric acid, arson, and other illegal activities (START, 2012). AOG members deny what they do is violence or terrorism because they see their work as "Godly," (Bjelopera, 2017, p. 34).

The Radicalization Process

The term "radicalization" is mentioned many times in this paper. Much of the subject matter concerns the multiple modalities that may facilitate or impact the radicalization process. This section will explain what radicalization is, as previous literature has come to understand it. It will explain the multi-part process that exists which facilitates the radicalization trajectory. Lastly, this section will end with where the literature currently stands on subject of domestic radicalization.

Nothing about radicalization is impulsive. Rather, it is an inherently cognitive process, first and foremost. The radicalization process is distinctly social in nature (Jensen & Lafree, 2016).

Most working definitions roughly describe radicalization as a personal process or processes where a person develops an increasing extremity of beliefs that can be political, social and/or religious in nature whereby the use of indiscriminate violence is acceptable in pursuit of the attainment of a particular goal or goals (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). Several scholars conceptualize radicalization as a series of steps or stages that increase in severity. Moghadam (2005) uses a staircase metaphor while McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) use a pyramid. Hafez and Mullins (2015) stand out in this regard, suggesting that using the term "process" implies a neat linear order that produces an output (radicalization). They suggest radicalization is more akin to a jigsaw puzzle, embracing a multifactor, concurrent approach where the puzzle pieces consist of "grievances, networks, ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures," (p. 959). Their argument being that reality is too complex to embrace such a linear approach. Each puzzle piece should therefore be examined separately but also as part of a larger whole.

Importantly, radicalization to extremism contains cognitive and behavioral transformative elements and it is necessary to distinguish the two. Cognitive radicalization is primarily a psychological, cognitive process that happens over time and is far more widespread than any violent behavioral actions. Cognitive radicalization involves acquiring beliefs, values and attitudes that ideologically deviate thoroughly with those of the mainstream society (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). Behavioral radicalization involves the physical actions, legal or not, that can end with violent extremism or terrorism. According to Hafez & Mullins (2015) it is the combination of these cognitive and behavioral dimensions that usually precede violent action. There are far more individuals given to radicalized thinking than there ever will be subsequent behavioral action. Multiple possible reasons for why someone who cognitively radicalizes does not move forward toward terrorist action exist. Scholars studying the issue agree on this generally but remain

divided on what might push someone off the radicalization pathway. Life-course theories may offer some answers here, whereby criminal trajectories turn to more normative lifestyles with the introduction of positive influences and responsibilities (Sampson & Laub, 1992).

Much of the research on radicalization emerged in the wake of the September 11th attacks. To no surprise, this glut of studies primarily focused on the radicalization of Jihadi and "homegrown" extremists, often to the exclusion of other ideologies. A meta-analysis of studies on pathways associated with radicalization in the West identified only 17 studies producing original empirical research between the aftermath of September 11th and September of 2012, all of which were on Muslims, Islamist radicalization, or homegrown extremism (McGilloway et al., 2015). In a similar timeframe, less than a dozen empirical studies examen radicalization amongst other ideologies (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015; Smith et al, 2016; Jasko et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2020; Varaine, 2020). Many of the familiar models of radicalization in the West have little reliance on concrete empirical evidence. Silber and Bhatt (2007) for example, developed one of the most well-known models of radicalization, characterized in four stages: pre-radicalization, selfidentification, indoctrination, and "jihadization." In this sequence, the pre-radicalization stage is the point in the individual's life prior to exposure; while they were still "unremarkable," and living "ordinary" lives and jobs. Self-identification is Stage 2, whereby individuals being to explore Salafism. There is usually some type of catalyst (a crisis or other cognitive opening) to spark this movement toward ultra-religiosity (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Stage 3, Indoctrination, is the time in which the individual intensifies his beliefs and wholly adopts Salafism without question. This stage involves some level of militancy, or the recognition that action and change is required. In Stage 4, Jihadization, the fully indoctrinated militant accepts their duty as "holy warrior," who must participate in jihad. One of the biggest drawbacks to this model is that it self-limits the

concept of radicalization in all its stages strictly to Islamist extremism. It also neglects to include any psychological, social or group processes or behaviors that may impact the likelihood of radicalization. Further, though the model is grounded on case studies of several homegrown extremist groups and individual cases of homegrown extremism, it is characterized entirely on cases where individuals fully carried out or attempted to carry out their attacks through violent means without consideration for those who may share similar ideological beliefs but not carried out any violence.

Moghaddam's (2005) staircase model does take the psychological process into account. Moghaddam uses the metaphor of a narrowing staircase, where the staircase leads to higher and higher floors, and the terrorist act is sits at the top of the building. Individuals may remain at various floors depending on how many doors or spaces they see as open to them. As the individual climbs the staircase however, the number of choices open to them decreases. Moghaddam conceptualized a ground floor and five higher floors in this model, with the behaviors at each floor corresponding to particular psychological processes. At the ground floor, individuals are not yet radicalized. Perceptions are still rooted in fairness and relative deprivation. They see injustice but may not find an appropriate solution and so climb to the first floor. At this level, individuals are likely in an active mode, looking for solutions to increase their mobility, social standing, or economic surroundings. For those who still perceive grievance or injustice, frustration and anger begin to develop. Those more predisposed to physical aggression may proceed further up the staircase. At this stage, anger may be displaced onto an "enemy." Moghaddam states the most important transformation in this process takes place within those who reach the third floor. At this level individuals begin engaging with the morality of the terrorist organization. They begin to see the terrorist strategy as justified. At the fourth level, the individual moves into more rigid thinking,

viewing the terrorist organization as a legitimate entity, engaging an "us-vs-them" mentality, and ultimately being recruited into a terrorist organization. The last stage, at the fifth floor, involves the terrorist organization selecting individuals and training out of them any inhibitory feelings that could prevent them from committing the terrorist act.

Other authors have disregarded the idea of a fixed sequence of stages altogether (Sageman, 2007). Sageman identifies "four prongs" of radicalization: a sense of moral outrage; a specific interpretation of the world; resonance with personal experiences; and mobilization through networks. Each of these are not stages in a process, nor do they occur in a specific sequence. Sageman instead suggests they are recurrent and as long as they are present as part of the radicalization journey, the sequence in which they occur is irrelevant. One point that is agreed on throughout much of the literature, however, is that radicalization is a process that does not happen overnight. (Neumann, 2003; Horgan, 2008; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Aly & Striegher, 2012; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). Academic models may vary by length and complexity but in general, they agree that radicalization is a process that happens over some extended amount of time.

A commonality shared between these models is a particular willingness by the individual to embrace the messaging the terrorist organization offers. This willingness or susceptibility comes often at a time of vulnerability for the individual. Moghaddam's (2005) model mentions grievances. Many other scholars discuss economic, political, and xenophobic grievances (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010; Hafez & Mullins, 2015).

Grievances can stem from a multitude of sources; feelings of injustice, inequality or unfair treatment being common. A loss of status is also common, feelings of insignificance, poor career

aspects, all work at what Doosje, et al., (2016) call the "sensitivity phase" of radicalization as a part of the "quest for significance." Feelings of insignificance can lead to personal uncertainty during this phase. This vulnerability, as well as the awareness of one's own morality, create a prime recruitment vehicle for the terrorist organization who may either reach out directly or cast a wide net of propaganda that catches the eyes or ears of the individual.

Each of the models mentioned above have primarily used violent Islamist extremists as the basis for their sequences of radicalization. Additionally, many of these radicalized individuals were either born in the West or moved there at a young age (Bakker, 2006). Few are genuinely "foreign." These "homegrown extremists," represent two worlds, wherein they are both Western and not. This is particularly true for second and third generation immigrants. They are raised in and around Western culture but can frequently be xenophobically ostracized from it both socially and economically (Semyonov et al., 2006; Piazza, 2011; Victoroff et al., 2012). Furthermore, distinguishing treatment of this minority group between Western countries is largely untested, given the rare case numbers of terrorists in the West overall. When empirically analyzing cases, many studies of radicalization in the West have focused on Islamist minorities in Western Europe (Sageman, 2004; Nesser, 2004; Bakker, 2006). In post-Cold War Eastern European countries, where far-right radicalization is growing at an alarming rate, immigrants are not so readily available to scapegoat by the native citizenry. Rather, it is the country's own national minorities targeted by far-right, nationalist terror groups (Minkenberg, 2017). These radical farright groups, which possess many of the same ideological views as far-right groups in the U.S.

on white supremacy, white identity, and neo-fascism, proclaim their nationalism and nostalgia for the fascist movements of the 1930s and 1940s. In Poland, their radical far-right groups are marked

by their religious fundamentalism (Minkenberg, 2017), and yet there is no equivalently staged process of radicalization for these groups.

On the other side of the Atlantic, few scholars have focused specifically on the radicalization process in the United States empirically (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Klausen et al., 2016). It is only recently that some of these radicalization models are being tested on U.S. terrorists, both homegrown and domestic and with datasets larger than would qualify as case studies. Jasko et al. (2017) tested the quest for significance model on individuals radicalized in the U.S. from across the ideological spectrum, finding achievement-related loss of significance and loss of personal relationships were significantly associated with violent extremist behavior. Other authors in this area have utilized sociological and criminological theorical models on radicalization. Smith et al. (2016) examined role identity theory and framing theory as part of the radicalization process. Findings indicated that the stronger connection one had to a group (via time in group and number of meetings attended), the greater the number of preparatory crimes and terrorist incidents. Rank in the group was also significantly associated with preparatory and antecedent acts. These findings suggest the physical action of participation and sense of belongingness in the group serve to reinforce their cognitive dedication and in turn, make their behavioral actions more violent.

Jensen and LaFree (2016), tested five separate model types against a dataset of individuals radicalized in the U.S. Tested models included psychological models, including the quest for significance; social identity models, including groupthink, in group/out group bias, and black sheeping, which is when a group leader uses a group member as a display of what *not* to do; recruitment models, social movement models, including framing theory; and cost/benefit models, which include more rational, decision-making processes. Findings indicated that two conditions,

"cognitive frame alignment and community crisis are 'near' necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism," (p. 70). These results suggest that it is unlikely for radicalization to violence to occur without a cognitive realignment of an individual's perceptions or without the feelings of being a member of a collectively marginalized community. The authors also point out that while these are necessary conditions, they only act in a faciliatory manner. They do not ensure someone will radicalize to the point of violence. Further, the authors found that it is a sense of community crisis *and* the loss of significance that may accompany this crisis act as a condition for violent extremism, rather than the quest for significance alone. Findings also indicated that group-driven radicalization, where individuals became radicalized through personal relationships (but without psychological or emotional needs) were relatively rare. Still, there is room for further research. The authors only used a sample of 56 cases to draw their results from. They do not disaggregate by ideology, nor do they provide the demographic information for the cases chosen.

The majority of scholarly work in this area has stated over the course of multitudes of publications that radicalization is something that occurs over an extended period of time. It is a long process that can extend for months or years (Sageman, 2004; Horgan, 2008; Jensen & LaFree, 2016; Klausen, 2016). For example, in Klausen's (2016) study of Al-Qaeda extremists, those radicalized before 2010 typically took five to six years from cognitive opening to terrorist action. Those who radicalized in or after 2010 typically took less than two years. This time difference was not exclusively due to the increase in online radicalization, but the author was not able to establish a clear relationship between what other factors may have played an outsized role (Smith, 2018). There is little empirical data on the length of time it takes to radicalize American extremists but to say it is an extended gradual process. There is no equivalent study on far-right or

left-wing radicalization to Klausen's Al-Qaeda study. Simi et al. (2016) discuss recruitment and radicalization strategies by far-right extremists based on life history interviews of approximately 34 former members of violent white supremacist groups. Though the interviewees discuss how they were approached and how they recruited others, both of which frequently targeted young people, there was no direct indication of how long the timeline from initial exposure to fully radicalized member was. Even the FBI has admitted the difficulties associated with determining when someone first begins down a radicalization pathway. Their study on lone offenders examined offender statements, writings and statements made by those who knew them, finding that of the 36 cases where an estimation could be made, almost all of them (94%) were involved in their ideology for more than a year by the time an attack was made (Richards et al., 2019). Only two offenders carried out an attack within a year of becoming involved with an extremist ideology.

Demographic Conditions

Prominent authors in terrorism research have hypothesized that certain demographic conditions can prime an individual for radicalization. These include poverty, or low socioeconomic status, low education, employment status, marital status, community displacement, and state failure. It would be a mistake to try and characterize the domestic terrorist in the United States into a single set of characteristics, traits or living conditions. Given the variability of domestic terror groups on the left-right spectrum, aggregating all individuals who commit acts of domestic terror in the U.S. can lead to misleading conclusions about radicalization trajectories and potential offenders. The rarity of events can also make it difficult to establish changes in offenders over time when both events and offenders are aggregated and analyzed over a 40-50-year period. Additionally, because analysis on domestic offenders is relatively limited by small sample sizes,

researchers often must rely on data gathered from other Western countries with which we share the greatest cultural similarities. While this information is useful to the overall base of knowledge in the field, it cannot be denied that the socioeconomic conditions, heterogeneity of the population, levels of income disparity, country infrastructure, religious beliefs, and the cultural individualism present in the United States presents an environment that is not directly comparable to other Western countries. For this reason, it is necessary to take a deeper look at the demographic conditions of domestic terrorists in the United States.

Gender

Among general offenders, most criminal activity is committed by young men in their teens and early twenties. Over the last several decades however, the share of crimes committed by women has risen steadily. In 1975 women accounted for 15% of all arrests. In 1990 they accounted for 19% of arrests. The majority of these arrests were for prostitution or minor property crimes (Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996). By 2012, women accounted for just over 26% of arrests (FBI, 2012). Gender differences in terrorism have not presented with the same growth in female offending. Overall, one thing that can be agreed on across nations is that terrorists from all ideologies are overwhelmingly male. Most studies that collect demographic data on terrorists show an almost entirely male population in the 80 – 90 percent range. The American Terrorism Study [ATS] analyzed a sample of indicted terrorists operating in the U.S. between 1980 and 1996, finding a 90-10% male-female split among the total sample. Left-Wing terrorists were by far, the most egalitarian, with 20% of indicted individuals being female and far more likely to be in leadership positions. As leftist movements declined in the U.S. during the 1990s, so did the space for women in leadership roles, and in terrorism in general (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). Studies analyzing Latin American and European groups from the 1960s and 1970s found about

one-third of supporting roles were occupied by women (Hudson, 1999). Among the right wing, males accounted for 91% of terrorists and among international groups operating in the U.S., they accounted for 99% of individuals (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). In terms of group roles in the right wing, when women are involved it is primarily in supporting roles. With the right wing having strong beliefs in rigid patriarchal hierarchies, this information is unsurprising. Lone offenders are also predominately male. In a later study by Smith, et al., (2015), using data from the ATS, the authors found none of the lone offenders were female. The FBI found similar results in their study on lone offenders (Richards et al., 2019). Of 93 cases identified that fit their inclusion criteria, only a small (unknown) number were female and ultimately excluded from analysis for either lack of information or pending investigations.

A more through study of female terrorists by González et al. (2014), using the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) found 40 female perpetrators since 1990; 24 involved with the far right and 16 involved with leftist Environmental/Animal Liberation Fronts, with the belief that women were likely undercounted in the left-wing organizations. One of the interesting findings of this study was only a little over half of the women involved with the far right were ideological extremists, while all of those involved with the Environmental/Animal Liberation Fronts were. They also never acted alone. There is a similar gendered dynamic in general offending, where female offenders committed approximately 40% of violent offenses with another person (Greenfeld & Snell, 2000). With the change in female offending over the last several decades it is important to investigate if there are any meaningful changes in the way that women engage in terrorism. More social and economic opportunities exist today for women than at any prior point in history. This also increases the opportunity for crime; however, with major left-wing groups

who committed acts of terrorism in decades past quiet today, it is not clear where women are primarily engaging in extremist behavior.

Age

Age ranges of domestic terrorists, while typically younger, can vary some depending on group and ideology. While the typical age where young boys might begin engaging in minor acts of delinquency is 12 or 13, young men who commit acts of terrorism are older, usually in the later teens to early twenties (Silke, 2008). Russell and Miller's (1977) study found the average age of an active terrorist to be between 22 and 25 years old. This came from a sample of 350 terrorists active in different parts of the world between 1966 and 1976. Leaders were typically older, such as Argentina's People's revolutionary Army (ERP) leader, Mario Santucho who was 40 at the time of his death. Palestinian (PLO) leaders were also in their 40s and 50s (Hudson, 1999). More recently, Osama Bin Laden was 31 when he formed and became the leader of Al Qaeda in 1988 and Al-Zawahiri was 60 when he assumed leadership in 2011 after Bin Laden's death. In the U.S., ages of known terrorists were found to be a little older as a whole. Analysis from the ECDB found an average age for all extremists to be 28.9 years (Chermak & Grunewald, 2015). Both far-left groups and far-right had an average age of 28.4 years old and were primarily White. For left-wing environmental or animal rights extremists, Chermak and Grunewald only included those who had been arrested and charged in relation to violent crimes that were ideologically motivated. Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists had an average age of 31.2 years old. Importantly here, Chermak and Grunewald used only extremists on the far-right who had been arrested in relation to homicide cases. Klausen et al. (2016c), applied the age-crime curve theory of crime to Islamist inspired offenders from the U.S. finding some important distinction between ages of offenders based on the type of Islamist ideology (Hezbollah vs. Hamas vs. other Sunni Jihadi) over time. Both

Hezbollah and Hamas have older members over 40 who typically commit more nonviolent crimes. These two groups had older members overall, with median ages of 44 and 37, respectively. Younger offenders came mostly out of Sunni Jihadism, with some evidence of the emergence of an age-crime curve in the last 15 years, approximately. According to Klausen et al. (2016b), the age Sunni jihadists become foreign fighters has declined over time, converging with general violent offenders. Since 2008, 68% off Jihadists were between the ages of 17.6 and 28.6. This change post-2008 would suggest some demographic changes to the overall demographic characteristics among foreign inspired radicalization. Furthermore, Klausen et al.'s study would suggest that the type of ideology matters. Shia-based ideologies appear to either attract older individuals or keep members in their organizations for a longer period of time than do Sunni-inspired ideologies.

For women engaged in these movements, there was more variability in ages. On the far right, women ranged between 16 and 71 with a mean age in the mid-20s. Far left Environmental/Animal Liberation Fronts women were older on average, with a mean age of 30 (Gonzalez et al., 2014). Among the FBI's study of lone offenders, age ranged considerably, with the youngest offender being 15 and the oldest being 88. The average at the time of attack was 37.7 years old. Approximately half were between 18 and 34 at the time of their attack (Richards, et al., 2019). Importantly, these ages represent the time at which these individuals became known to authorities for terrorist actions. It does not represent the point at which they first joined a terror group, or the age at which they began their radicalization process. It also does not represent the age at which they may have committed their first criminal act. Simi, et al., (2016) took a lifestyle theory approach to analyzing terrorists, conducting in-depth interviews with former right-wing extremists in the U.S., finding the average age of entry to violent extremism was 17.6 years

old. This age falls closer in line with most criminological theories, which propose acts of juvenile delinquency typically begin in the early teens. Since one does not simply wake up one day and join a terrorist group, and the radicalization process is known to take place over a period of months or years, it is reasonable to suggest that early flirtations with radical ideology began several months prior to age of entry at minimum.

Race and Ethnicity

Issues of race and ethnicity in domestic terrorism are often tightly tied to ideology. In the U.S., the majority of far-right extremists are white. With far-right ideologies comprised largely of white supremacists, white nationalists, neo-Nazis, and racist skinheads, this is not particularly surprising. There are, however, a small number of non-white, far-right extremists. These typically include members of Black Separatist movements, such as Nation of Islam, Black Hebrew Israelites, and the New Black Panther Party. In Chermak and Gruenewald's (2015) study, non-white extremists on the far-right comprised only 2.9 percent. All extremists on the far left in the sample were white. Only 17.1 % of Al Qaeda inspired terrorists were white. The American Terrorism Study (ATS) offers different numbers on the racial makeup of American terrorist groups. Of indicted terrorists on the left, only 19 % were white, while 81% were nonwhite. On the far-right, 97% of the indicted terrorists were white. International groups provided the most even dynamic, with 57-43% white to non-white, respectively. International groups in the ATS included such groups at the Japanese Red Army, the Irish Republican Army, Libyan groups, Palestinians, and The Cuban National Movement (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). These diverging accounts of racial breakdowns among domestic terrorists are worth taking a closer look at, particularly on the left.

Of note here is that the ATS data came only from those indicted for crimes on federal charges. This missed individuals where evidence was weak or individuals in secondary roles who escaped prosecution but may have still been involved in group plotting. In contrast, Chermak and Gruenewald's (2015) Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) captures a more robust sample of offenders by including extremist violent crime charges from lower-level courts. These two studies provide a substantively different look at the racial makeup of left-wing and international terror groups. Where the ECDB sample used only Environmental/Animal Liberation Front groups to constitute the left wing in their study, the ATS included several left-wing groups with differing ideologies, such as Puerto Rican independence groups, communist groups, and religious Black groups, which likely accounts for the noted discrepancy on the racial makeup of the left-wing extremist spectrum (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). This inclusion shows both a wider variety of ideologies and how those ideologies tend to separate along racial lines.

The use of only environmental and animal liberation groups in more recent analyses and discussion may not paint the most accurate picture of left-wing activity in recent years given evidence these groups have only been responsible for three incidents between 2015 and the time of this writing. More recent reports indicate higher threat levels from decentralized anarchists, of which may be too recent to fully report demographic breakdowns (NJOHSP, 2020a). In general, it is difficult to draw any sort of cohesive picture of modern left-wing extremist movements because acts of terrorism on this spectrum have been exceptionally rare in the last two decades. Injuries and fatalities were rare among the left-wing ELF/ALF groups even at the height of their activity. They continue to be rare today. Most American left-wing groups maintain core beliefs that are antithetical to violence against others and may be one of many reasons why the literature in criminal justice circles on this area is scant.

Poverty, Socioeconomic Status and Economic Opportunity

Much of the previous research into root causes of terrorism has tried to find a consistent link between economic deprivation and terrorism. Social scientists have been trying to link a linear relationship between poverty and terrorism for more than 20 years. The empirical literature on this relationship has been mixed, providing a rather complicated picture. Economic turmoil has long been a predictor of state conflict and civil war (Alesina, et al., 1996; Newman, 2006). Countries facing lowered GDP and economic downturns will often quickly turn to slashing social safety nets meant to help those most in need. These safety nets are what typically provide a country's most endangered with a resilience to withstand such downturns. Stripping the capacity for providing public goods in a community compounds poverty, making individuals vulnerable to radicalization and engagement in violent conflict (Marks, 2016). Stripping these public goods also furthers economic divides as individuals struggle to meet basic needs. In fact, this fiscal conservativism has been found to be the opposite of effective strategy, where Burgoon (2006) found social welfare spending to reduce international terrorism in some countries. Egalitarian societies, where the socioeconomic status of individuals has a more even distribution had lower levels of terrorist incidents than those with higher levels of inequality (Lai, 2007).

The studies that have previously tried to suggest a link between poverty and terrorism have often tried to do so by testing poverty directly. Abadie (2004) and Piazza (2011) have both demonstrated this link to hold limited direct weight. Using GDP per capita to calculate country wealth, Abadie's study found that once the level of a country's political freedoms was accounted for, acts of terrorism were no higher in poorer countries than in wealthier ones. Abadie also used the United Nations Human Development Index and Gini Index in place of GDP for some models. These measure a country's inhabitants on factors of health, education, and income, as well as

consumption inequality, respectively. Piazza found similar indirect results; countries where economic discrimination against minority groups was higher, terrorism was more likely. Additionally, Piazza's findings indicate higher levels of domestic terrorism in countries with higher levels of economic development. This result is caveated by whether a country contained minority groups subjected to economic discrimination. For wealthier countries which did not systematically economically discriminate against its minority groups, acts of terrorism were lower. These results suggest sociological and political issues tied to economic growth and freedom have a dynamic effect on how much terrorism a country experiences. Country wealth, as measured by GDP, has little to do it seems, with terrorism. Rather, what these indirect findings suggest, is the probability of terrorist incidents being tied to the abilities of the individual or group to prosper socially and economically.

In societies with high levels of heterogeneity and economic inequality, "horizontal inequality" can also occur, or at least, the perception thereof. Horizontal inequalities "occur when members of ethnic, religious, or other identity groups have unequal access to public goods, opportunities and resources," (Marks, 2016, p. 1). Internationally, particularly in still industrializing nations, it is likely that many ethnic, religious, or other identity groups have an unequal access to public goods. In the United States, however, public goods, including the various social safety nets are available to any citizen meeting the needs criteria. The overall availability and qualifying parameters of those goods, however, is far more dependent on geographic location and the state one happens to live in, than it does being a member of a minority group. While there are federal minimums for some services, such as the federal poverty line, each state has a wide berth in the amount of services provided, eligibility standards, monetary assistance, as well as how each of these are implemented. This geographical inequality can fuel perceptions of an unequal

distribution of goods based on minority identity, however. In states where there are higher concentrations of minority groups, the perception of an unequal distribution of goods or the misuse of public assistance can strain already tense ethnic divides.

This macro view of poverty as measured by country indicators, like GDP has presented a number of varied findings over the years. Additional predictors of problems within the state must be present to show any relationship between poverty and terrorism. Greater income inequality, where wealth is unevenly distributed in a population, as demonstrated by Abadie (2004) and Enders et al., (2016), is one such example. Interestingly, the study by Enders et al., (2016) found this effect to disappear after 1993 when religious fundamentalists and right-wing nationalist/separatist groups became more prominent. It is unclear if this change remains today. Moghadam (2003), demonstrated that high levels of unemployment and poverty provided a suicide bomber recruitment buffet for Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank. Benmelech et al., (2012), found similar results using data on Palestinian suicide terrorists. Higher unemployment enabled more recruitment into terrorist organizations, likely for the death benefit payout these terrorist organizations offer to the families of the suicide bomber.

For the criminal justice researcher, we know that poverty in and of itself is not a cause for crime. There are far more people living in poverty than those who commit crimes. We know there are many predictors of crime, that when working in concert, create the environments and opportunity for crime to take place. Similarly, there are far more people living in poverty than there are terrorists and acts of terrorism. Like with general offending, there are many individual level predictors that when acting together can create the necessary pushes toward terrorism engagement. Where many social science researchers have tested country-wide phenomenon and found mixed results, at the group and individual level, an entirely different picture is presented.

Socioeconomics is far more multifaceted than originally thought by researchers in the terrorism field. The terrorist is not just a result of poverty or economic deprivation. At the structural level, there is a marked divide in the economic background between leadership and the rank-and-file. Many terrorist leaders came from middle-class backgrounds and had a variety of professional occupations, including doctors, lawyers, bankers, engineers, journalists, university professors and mid-level government employees (Hudson, 1999). Among Western separatist organizations, like the IRA or the (former) ETA, many in leadership lead relatively normal lives, with regular jobs. Many of the Western far-left groups of decades past had leadership composed of wealthy, middle-class college dropouts. Paramilitary and religious groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) are an exception to this, with their origins primarily composed of the working class (Hudson, 1999). Among Islamist terrorist organizations, leaders have mostly come from wealthy and middle-class backgrounds, while their rank-and-file members – those who often end up donning suicide vests or driving vehicle borne IEDs – are almost entirely poor or working class. Many come from refugee communities (Hudson, 1999). More complex missions that require higher levels of planning and deception, like the September 11th attack, were carried out by the educated and disillusioned middle-class, while being led by a wealthy religious extremist (Burgoon, 2006).

The class divide between leader and rank-and-file offers insight into who is susceptible to radicalization, who has the ability to bring more credibility to the organization, develop plans for the group, make the group more mainstream and, ultimately, who is expendable. As Bueno de Mesquita (2005) explains, the terrorist organization will screen for the highly skilled and most effective because they are more likely to succeed, though the individual with low ability and

education is more likely to volunteer. During a time of low opportunity, such as an economic downturn, individuals with skills and education find themselves struggling through unexpected circumstances they have no control over and may not fully understand. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) proposed a model that contends that this economic scarcity "exerts a positive influence on willingness to actually volunteer," (p.524). Depressed and without work, recruiters can maneuver their way into someone's life with promises of friendship, work, and networking. Economic downturns give the terrorist organization opportunity to recruit the presently despondent and distressed, who would otherwise be working and engaged in more socially normative activities. These individuals would normally be out of reach to the terrorist group but for this downturn. As such, the terrorist group will use opportunity where it presents itself. Assuming these are rational individuals, the offered opportunity must present itself as more proximately rewarding than normal engagement in the economy and in society. Under this model, as conditions around the individual deteriorate, interest in the message the terror organization offers should increase.

This class division appears to hold true in the U.S. as well. Many that were part of leftist organizations and in leadership held prestigious jobs and came from wealthier backgrounds (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). Once those individuals were imprisoned, the remaining leftists in the organizations were far less financially well off. Within the right wing, few held middle-class backgrounds. Of those who were employed, Smith & Damphousse (2002) appeared surprised at the disproportionate number working in the aerospace or aeronautical industry. This is less surprising once U.S. government documents revealed the details of Operation Paperclip, a covert effort to bring over 1,500 Nazi German scientists to the United States at the end of World War II in an effort to prevent their knowledge from going to the Soviet Union (National Archives, n.d.). Many of these scientists were pivotal to NASA space projects and to the technology that brought

the first Americans to the moon (NPR, 2014), however this new life in America did not mean these scientists suddenly left their beliefs about Aryan superiority back in Germany. While we will never truly know if this is why Smith & Damphousse saw such an effect in their data, this link provides reason to speculate.

Given the relative government stability of Western democracies in the last several decades, one important question to ask is how well these early studies on poverty and economics apply in a Western context. Many of the economic models examining the empirical relationship between poverty and terrorism for the last several decades have primarily focused either on non-Western countries or used aggregated global attack incidents (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Abadie, 2004; Piazza, 2011; Benmelech et al., 2012; Enders et al., 2016). The data on poverty from the Middle East, while useful, raises the question of similitude when trying to draw conclusions about terrorist actors in the United States or other Western countries. Instability in government, tribal-type lifestyles in some more remote regions, ongoing conflict, cultural and religious differences, and quality of life all present confounding limitations on direct comparisons to Western countries. Despite these differences, unemployment has been found to still be a significant predictor. In Germany for example, Falk et al. (2011), found a significant positive relationship between unemployment and right-wing extremist crime. Furthermore, the authors found this result to hold steady even when controlling for higher levels of young males in an area, immigrants, urban and rural population, and education. Importantly, results of the study indicate that there is some type of critical threshold that unemployment must exceed for the relationship to become significant. Though it is not clear what this minimum threshold is, the link between unemployment and extremist crime appears robust.

In the United States, ideological and geographic divides appear to have a relationship with economic opportunity and socioeconomic status. Empirical studies on these relationships are scant, with most researchers focused on the socioeconomics of countries in the Middle East and Africa. Poverty and economic deprivation in the U.S. look considerably different than in other parts of the world. The World Bank's figures for international extreme poverty are the equivalent to individuals living in a household with a per capita income of $1.90 (U.S.). Official (domestic) United States poverty estimates puts this figure at approximately $16.50 per person per day for a two adult and two children household (Ortiz-Ospina, 2017). Going by GDP, the U.S. has the largest economy in the world as of 2019 and is one of the wealthiest nations in the world (World Bank, 2020; Suneson, 2019), though it was surpassed in GDP by China in 2021 (Fu & Rissanen, 2024). Despite this enormous wealth, inequality is rampant. Median household income pre-COVID was only $63,179, a number that might be comfortable as a single person living in a mid-sized city or in a suburban area, but very difficult for a family with children in larger cities with higher costs of living (Semega et al., 2020). Post-COVID, wage numbers did increase to $74,580 (Guzman & Kollar, 2022). Where poverty in some developing nations may look like poor access to clean drinking water, plumbing and sanitation systems, shanty-style housing with no floors, and high levels of school dropouts, in the United States extreme poverty shows itself in the reemergence of diseases thought to be eradicated, like hookworm in rural areas of the Southeast. It is a disease that thrives in communities where the average income is $18,000 a year and which lack basic sanitation because residents cannot afford septic systems (Pilkington, 2017). It is the criminalization of poverty and homelessness through fines, late fees and minor public disorder arrests that is unique to the United States in the developed world (Alston, 2018). It is the inability to access 21st century infrastructure like broadband internet which has become essential for

children across the country to do their schoolwork and for adults to search and apply for jobs. All these issues create systemic, generational poverty. Over 41 million Americans (13.1%) were living below their state's poverty threshold in 2018, with approximately 18.7 million (5.9%) living below 50 percent of the poverty level. When looking at those Americans who make *just above* the poverty level (125% of the poverty threshold), that number rises to a staggering 55.6 million low-income Americans (Benson & Bishaw, 2019). This poverty is not evenly dispersed across the country either. Gulf states including Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Appalachia states Kentucky and West Virginia had the highest rates with over 16 % of the population living in poverty. This systemic poverty has an outsized effect on the minority populations who have been historically discriminated against. Yet we do not see from these groups anywhere near the same level of willingness to take up arms or commit terrorist actions against civilian populations or government institutions the way economically disenfranchised and discriminated groups have done in other countries. Rather, the ones who most frequently take up arms against civilians and government are the aggrieved White majority.

From a historical and cultural perspective, traditionally the (Christian) White male has remained at the top of economic and societal power structures in the United States. With rightwing terrorism comprising most of the attacks and attempted attacks in the U.S. the ATS notes that the majority of these individuals are at what could be considered, the bottom of the economic ladder, despite the historical norm. While a small number of right-wing group members came from middle class backgrounds, most were unemployed, impoverished, part-time workers or semi-skilled laborers (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). Geographically, the ATS notes this is as a distinctly rural movement, compared to the left, which was far more urban. Fearing urbanization and federal oversight, combined with a farm crisis in the 1980s that decimated the livelihoods of many

rural communities in the Midwest, distrust of government spread, leading to an expansive growth of the "sovereign citizen" movement, as it is known by law enforcement and terrorism scholars today. Economic struggles appear continuously in the literature with rises in right-wing violence. Structural changes in the American economy leading to rapid industrialization and the migration of Black Americans from the South to the North in the 1920s and 1930s saw a resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan (Wilkinson, 2011 & Quarles, 1999 as cited in Piazza, 2017), while states that lost farming jobs saw a rise in right-wing militia and patriot movements (Freilich & Pridemore, 2005). This information would suggest a strong correlation between economics and right-wing terrorism, but the empirical results are not so clear. Piazza's (2017) test of economic grievances using state poverty rate, manufacturing employment, and changes in the number of individual farms did not yield any significant results. Like with GDP however, it should be noted that based on previous studies which have used a larger scale unit of analysis (Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2011), results were also mostly negative or inconclusive.

Similarly, Freilich & Pridemore's (2005) earlier study did not find any relationship between poverty and more militia groups in a state using the percentage of those living below the poverty line, but they did find significant relationships relative to aspects of social disorganization. Clearly, these results would indicate some type of relationship between a rise in extremist groups and some levels of sociodemographic variables. Given the rarity of violent terrorism in the U.S. however, it is possible that state level indicators are still too broad a measure to adequately test socioeconomic predictors.

At an individual level, unemployment, poverty, and economic grievance cannot be overlooked. It is further possible that what we are seeing may be a case of outsized effect, whereby most individuals suffering economic hardships and unemployment will never engage in

acts of terrorism but of those that do, they are overly represented in the ranks of the unemployed and the economically aggrieved. The recent FBI study on lone offenders appears to indicate this, with more than half of their sample being neither employed nor attending school (Richards et al., 2019). Several offenders were supported either by family or state aid. Of those offenders with international ties or foreign ideologies, economic status was mixed, with many having jobs in sales or government (Smith & Damphousse, 2002). In appears particularly difficult to obtain socioeconomic and employment data at the individual level for those terrorists with foreign ideologies. A study on Jihadi terrorists from Europe found in their sample, which included many second and third generation Muslim migrants, that many come from the lowest socio-economic part of society, while a smaller percentage come from middle-class backgrounds (Bakker, 2006).

Education

In the United States, education has become one of the few ways young people are able to lift themselves out of a lower socioeconomic stratum. The days of being able to graduate from high school and easily find a well-paid (often union) industrial or manufacturing job are gone. The ability to save enough capital to start a business without being either independently wealthy or earning enough income elsewhere to save for one has also become exponentially difficult with the rising costs of living. The median income in the United States for those without a high school degree is only $24,530 (United States Census [USC], 2018). This is barely enough to live on as a single person, let alone with a family when current median rent nationally is just over $1,000 per month and over $1,500 per month if living in one of the top 15 metropolitan areas. (USC, 2017). For those over 25 with a Bachelor's degree, income jumps to approximately $54,628, yet only 32.6% of people in the United States have a Bachelor's degree or higher. Education offers opportunity for many and can create paths to more fulfilling lives and careers. It is not however, a

guarantee of that future. Agnew's General Strain theory proposes that the inability to reach one's desired goals is a principal reason why individuals engage in criminal activity (Agnew, 1992). Similarly, the frustration-aggression hypothesis stipulates aggression and other violent behaviors are a reaction to inabilities or interferences with goal-directed behaviors (Gurr, 1973). Levels of education coupled with poor access to opportunity, social unrest, and political disenfranchisement provide a microcosm for radicalization to grow and fester. Trends in the terrorism literature show a unique link between education and those who engage in terrorist activity that stands in strong contrast to traditional criminal offending.

There is a particular mythos that surrounds the characteristics of the terrorist. Poverty and education often share relationships with one another, and traditional criminal offending would suggest that low education lends itself to higher probabilities of offending. Terrorists do not necessarily follow such a pattern. As discussed in the earlier section on poverty, many terrorist leaders were found to be from wealthier socioeconomic backgrounds while rank-and-file foot soldiers were typically poorer and held more labor-oriented jobs. Similarly, terrorist leaders are typically better educated than the rank-and-file members, often earning high level Bachelor's or Master's degrees. Many studies indicate inverse correlations between higher education and criminal offending (Selke, 1980; Batiuk, Moke & Roundtree, 1997; Ford & Schroeder, 2011), yet it has baffled researchers over the years trying to explain why individuals who hold high education and well-paying jobs join terrorist organizations. Krueger and Malečková (2003) suspect the reason is ultimately a passionate support of the movement. Passion and belief in a cause is a powerful motivator; so powerful, according to Kruger and Malečková, that even the end of poverty as we know it and universal secondary education would not change such beliefs.

Higher education and higher socioeconomic status offer someone the ability and time to pursue other interests outside basic survival and the meeting of food and shelter needs. Education can also make injustice more visible and recognizable in everyday life. If an individual's day-to-day living is entirely consumed by working, with only enough time for the most basic of tasks, including child rearing, household tasks, and sleep, there is little freedom to pursue active engagement in outside ideology. Furthermore, even if the individual might sympathize with such an ideology, the responsibilities to a household may well prevent someone from such tasks like researching the movement, reaching out to other sympathizers, or preforming any tasks related to the ideology in question.

Of Western terrorists in general, few are entirely uneducated or illiterate, with approximately two-thirds of group members having some form of university training (Russell & Miller [1977], as cited in Hudson, 1999). With more education came more responsibility and positions of leadership in terrorist groups. Comparatively, in Sageman's (2004) survey of Islamist extremist groups, over 60 percent had some form of higher education. Among Palestinian suicide terrorists, the number of terrorists with higher education degrees far surpassed the equivalent rate in the general population (Benmelech et al., 2012). Additionally, for every 1 percentage point the unemployment rate increased within the Palestinian population, the probability of a suicide terrorist having at least some academic education increased by 1.37 percent. Information on Jihadi terrorists raised in Europe is a little less clear. Bakker's (2006) study was limited by missing data in this area. Of the 242-person sample, education data could only be found for 48 of them. Most (42) had finished secondary education, while 15 finished college or university. An additional 18 individuals were under 20 years old, still students, and therefore could not have completed their university education at the time they were arrested.

Data on the demographics of terrorists in the United States has been, overall, easier to collect than it has in other countries. From this, we can more easily make distinctions and establish meaningful differences between proponents of different ideologies over time. Additionally, as an economically wealthy and developed nation, educational standards and expectations for employment can be considerably different from other nations. In 1990, approximately 75% of individuals in the United States aged 25 and older had completed high school. By 2015, that number had risen to approximately 85%. In that same time frame approximately 20% of people in the U.S. aged 25 or older held a college degree in 1990, rising to just over 30% in 2015 (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). Of those sampled by Smith & Damphousse (2002) in the ATS, 22% had a GED equivalent or less and 26% had college degrees. Relevant here is collection time of the sample. College degree holders were overrepresented in the sample, compared to the general population. ATS demographic characteristics represent those indicted members of terrorist groups between 1980-1996. Cultural changes around educational attainment between 1996 and present day are seismic. There has been a steady trend of increasing education in the U.S. and that appears reflected in the data sources on terrorism as well. In examining more recent demographics, Chermak and Gruenewald (2015), found very low numbers for individuals without a high school diploma. The only individuals without a high school diploma were rightwing extremists, at 6.6% or 2.7% of total extremists studied. In a somewhat contradictory finding, after September 11th, the attainment of at least some college declined across the ideological spectrum by 10% or more, moving from 29.2% to 19% for the far right, 84% to 66.7% for the far left, and 72.2 % to 35.3% for the Al-Qaeda affiliated movements, though these findings did not reach statistical significance. It is unclear what prompted this widespread decline, though the 153-231% increase in tuition since the 1980s is a likely culprit (Kelchen, 2016). When comparing these figures along with educational attainment, lone offenders appear to have higher

educational attainment than the general population and comparable rates to the fariright in Chermak and Gruenewald's study. Approximately 38% of lone offenders had either some college or an Associate's degree by the time they committed their attack. Another 23% held a Bachelor's degree (Richards et al., 2019). There is no further breakdown of education level by ideology; however, of the ideologies mentioned in the study, the majority fall within the spectrum of the far-right.

As America continues to face tumultuous economic ups-and-downs that affect job and educational opportunities it is necessary to further observe if these educational trends among extremists continues. America has one of the most highly educated populations in the world and American extremists have already shown some demographic differences compared to other parts of the world and in years past. Having a high school diploma no longer means what it did 30 or 40 years ago. Today, with increasing amounts of entry level jobs requiring a Bachelor's degree, it is viewed now as the high school degree was 40 years ago. Few studies examen the changes in individual characteristics of domestic extremists over time and with those that do exist providing such varied results, further analysis is necessary. Each of these studies have sampled from either successfully carried out attacks, violent extremists, or those already indicted, and only one separated data using a historical event time component. With educational standards rapidly changing and more radicalized individuals being apprehended in the process of planning their attacks new questions about the demographic characteristics of the domestic extremist continue to emerge.

Military History

In 2009, when DHS published its initial report on attempts by right-wing extremists to recruit returning military veterans into their ranks a political backlash ensued. The Republican controlled congress at the time demanded an apology from DHS and for then- Homeland Security

Secretary Janet Napolitano to rescind the report (Johnson, 2017). DHS caved to this pressure, the unit studying right-wing extremism was disbanded and law enforcement training on the issue stopped. In the aftermath, right-wing extremists continued their expansion in the United States and recruitment of returning Afghanistan and Iraq war veterans grew, particularly in the wake of a falling economy in the post-2008 economic recession.

The attempt to recruit military personnel is not a new phenomenon for the far-right. Paramilitary training is a feature of many far-right groups of varying ideologies (Smith et al., 2006). In the years following September 11th, an FBI intelligence report found military experience to be present throughout white supremacist groups. Additionally, though they constitute a small percentage of known white supremacist extremists, they frequently hold leadership roles (Counterterrorism Division, 2008b). The knowledge these individuals bring with regards to firearms, explosives and other tactical skills should not be overlooked as a threat to national security. Information on training and technique is valuable; however, of even more value is if these individuals are presently serving either in military posts or as active-duty law enforcement. The access to private or secret intelligence can provide these extremist groups with advance knowledge of what law enforcement and government agencies know about them and their movements. Furthermore, recruiting these individuals either into these organizations or placing members into city or federal government positions provides their members with high levels of power over a surrounding citizen population. On a frightening note, the FBI has been investigating the infiltration of far-right extremists (and white supremacists in particular) into active-duty military and law enforcement for over a decade (Downs, 2016). In 2014, two Florida police officers were fired after an FBI informant exposed them as members of the Ku Klux Klan.

More recently, in 2017, an active-duty marine was uncovered to be a member of the Atomwaffen Division, a secretive Neo-Nazi extremist group allegedly responsible for at least five murders since 2017 (Brooks, 2020). Atomwaffen founder, Brandon Russell was a member of the Florida Army National Guard. Russell had also praised Osama bin Laden and the culture of martyrdom in ISIS and Al Qaeda and as something to "admire and reproduce in the Neo-Nazi terror movement," (Brooks, 2020; Makuch & Lamoureux, 2019). Police also found homemade explosives and fuses during an investigation at his home. These explosives were of the same type used in the 2005 tube station bombing in London (Brooks, 2020).

Many new White Nationalist and Neo-Nazi extremist groups have risen in the last several years. Atomwaffen specifically targeted members of the armed forces, and its members were encouraged to enlist to acquire specialized military training. According to the roommate of Brandon Russell, he joined the national guard with the intention of acquiring the skills he would need to prepare for a race war (Brooks, 2020). The Oath Keepers, a paramilitary, antigovernment group, was founded by former army paratrooper and Yale Law graduate, Stuart Rhodes. The group specifically targets police and military veterans for their ranks (Lucas, 2021). Several members are facing charges as of this writing for their role in the attack at the Capitol on January 6th, 2021 (Lucas, 2021). While it is not known exactly how many members of the armed forces such groups have recruited, the active threat they and other far-right groups pose continues to grow as more service members are discovered via their online social media activities. Several active-duty army soldiers were arrested for conspiring to commit the murder of antifascist activists. These service men were active members of "The Base," a militant Neo-Nazi organization that emerged in 2018. The group is not without its own sense of irony, it seems, as

"The Base" is quite literally the English translation of Al-Qaeda. Additionally, in 2019, several servicemembers were under military investigation for their association with Identity Evropa, another white nationalist hate group. These servicemembers were not infantry soldiers but highranking officers, including a lance corporal, a master sergeant, and an army physician (Brooks, 2020). Given this information it can be difficult to draw any strong causal statements between military service and the joining of a terrorist organization when the radicalization time sequence is unknown for the majority of cases. Furthermore, in the United States, many on the far right appear to devote some significant time to the development of paramilitary extremist groups or cells and emphasize training with weapons, incendiary materials, and how to interact with local law enforcement.

The persistence of right-wing extremists to insert their ideology into the military and other armed service careers is unique when compared to the other prominent ideologies present in the United States. No left-wing ideology makes it a goal to infiltrate the armed services, nor is it a primary goal of religious extremists or single-issue terrorists. In truth, military personnel and buildings are often the target of much terrorist violence. Outside discrimination and minoritybased violence, among the far right, government and political targets were the most frequent targets between 1990 and 2012 (Perliger, 2012). Government facilities and personnel were also the most frequent target of Lone Wolf offenders (Richards, 2019). Sovereign citizens and militia extremists have a particular animosity toward any representation of government. Comparatively, on the far-left, people are rarely direct targets. When there is a government target, it is more likely to be related to infrastructure or commercial enterprise (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; NJOHSP, 2017b).

While it remains unclear just how widespread extremist ideology like white supremacy is within the armed services, those who commit extremist acts of violence remain relatively low. When looking empirically at who commits the most extremist violence, those with military experience comprise a fairly small number, as Chermak & Gruenewald (2015) point out. Only 6.7 percent of their sample of violent extremists had any military experience. More interesting still was seeing comparable raw numbers of individuals with military experience affiliated with Al-Qaeda inspired movements relative to their far-right extremist counterparts (AQM: n = 155, 16.8%; FR: n = 637, 4.7%). Even the authors were surprised with this result, expecting more military ties on the far right. This is quite an interesting result. While Al-Qaeda inspired terrorists may have more military experience than other ideological extremists, there appears to be no data pertaining to these homegrown extremists attempting to recruit or convert other service members while *actively* serving in the armed services. For this movement, the recruitment of service members is likely not a primary goal, as many see government and military personnel as enemies of their people, beliefs, and ancestral homelands (Klausen, 2016). In such cases, active service members who become radicalized are simply useful tools, either with the ability to use their skills and training to fight for the cause abroad, or to provide direct access to military buildings that citizens cannot access in order to carry out an attack.

Few studies examine what factors produce the circumstances that draw military veterans at disproportionate numbers to extremist ideology. Simi and Bubloz (2013) suggest two potential pathways. The first is the involuntary exit, which characterizes those individuals who attempt advance in a military career but are unable to do so. This can be through failures in training or dishonorable discharge. This inability to succeed shares a strong bond with the grievance trajectory of radicalization, whereby the inability to succeed can be seen as a personal failure. This

personal failure often results in frustration and anger at an unjust system rigged against them. Timothy McVeigh is one such example of this typology. The second pathway Simi and Bubloz (2013) propose is an inability to readapt to civilian life after leaving military service. The authors term this, "Reflected Appraisals and Identity Incongruence." In this situation the individual is unable to adjust the identity they maintained or achieved during the course of their military service with their treatment in the civilian world. They may feel disrespected or unappreciated, creating social stress, a bitterness toward society and an affinity with others in similar situations. In their exploratory study of far-right extremists, the authors conservatively estimated "at least 31 percent" of their subjects had military experience (Simi & Bubloz, 2013). This is far greater than the veteran representation in the general population, which comprises approximately 7 percent of U.S. adults (Bialik, 2017).

Not all extremists with military experience necessarily find themselves recruited in extremist organizations directly. Some will self-radicalize on their own or using the internet. Of lone offender terrorists studied by the FBI, just over a third had served in the military (Richards et al., 2019). Most (42%) were honorably discharged. An additional 10% of cases attempted to join the military but were rejected. A catalyzing event can also trigger acts of extremism. Chermak & Gruenewald's (2015) study is rare in that it compares and contrasts the characteristics of ideologically motivated violent extremists using the events of September 11th as a data collection before-and-after point. Of the multiple demographic characteristics studied, military experience showed significantly different results across the ideological spectrum before and after the events of September 11th. Prior to the events of September 11th, 7.7 percent of violent far-right extremists had military experience. Surprisingly, after September 11th, that percentage dropped to 3.1 percent. It is not clear what caused this drop. On the far left there was also a significant

change. Prior to September 11th, only .8 percent of the sample had any prior military experience. After the attack, the number jumps to 12.3 percent. This was the only significant demographic difference recorded in the data for the far left when comparing extremists before and after the events of September 11th. The authors do not theorize possible reasons for this particular outcome, given the wide array of possibilities unaccounted for. Geographically, considering the attacks occurred primarily in progressive, left-leaning cities, directly impacting two cities with tens of millions of people, this could be one possible explanation. Additionally, there is also a significant difference between Al-Qaeda affiliated extremists and their military experience before and after September 11th. Prior to September 11th, this group had a mean of 3.5 percent with military experience. After, this number jumped to 24.5 percent. This was one of several demographic shifts for the Al-Qaeda affiliated extremists which also included higher numbers of black perpetrators and being younger.

The relationship between military service and the outsized probability of radicalization when compared to the general population remains understudied and not particularly well understood. Chermak and Gruenwald's (2015) study shows that shifts over time are possible. It is possible that it takes a catalyzing historical event to facilitate that change, however, it is also possible that other cultural shifts may play a role as well. With the growing number of federal officials and hate watch groups coming forward to sound alarms about the infiltration of extremists into the armed services analyses with more inclusive data may be able to shed some light on this subject.

Marriage and Children

Life-course theories in criminology suggest there are particular "turning points" in everyone's life that steer an individual's life trajectory toward socio-normative or maladaptive

behaviors (Sampson & Laub, 1993). These turning points can include events like finding new peer groups in childhood, graduating high school or college, getting one's first career-oriented job, losing a parent or loved one, finding a stable relationship, and having children. Turning points can result in immediate behavioral changes, or slower modifications depending on the strength and impact of the event. Sampson and Laub (1993) argue that in traditional offending, crime and delinquency is more likely to occur when an individual's bond with society is weakened or broken. Actions and social structural factors that betray the bond one has to parents, peers, and society which reinforce maladaptive behaviors, such as physical or sexual abuse by authority figures or peers, finding deviant peer groups, using drugs, being arrested, or losing a loved one are frequent predictors of crime and deviance. Desistence from criminal offending trajectories often comes with the addition of responsibilities whereby the risks to continue that lifestyle become too great to balance with the anticipated rewards. The introduction of new social controls at this point help to hinder further contact with individuals or environments that stunt or stand to jeopardize the current standards of living or relationships a person has built. For the domestic extremist, the pattern appears different. Variability can be seen across the ideological spectrum and, given the older age at which many domestic extremists move to commit their extremist action(s), desistence does not necessarily come with the traditional turning points, if a turning point comes at all.

Trends in the United States show a population that is waiting longer with each generation to hit particular life milestones, including marriage and childbearing. While it might have seemed odd to be unmarried by age 30 in the 1970s, when the median age at first marriage for men was 23 and 20 for women, that is no longer the case. In 2019, the median age at one's first marriage has risen to 30 for men and 28 for women (United States Census, 2020). Americans are waiting longer to settle down, form permanent relationships and have children. The typical image

of the domestic extremist as someone who lives alone and is incapable of finding a relationship or achieving particular social milestones is no longer easily squared into present day cultural shifts related to family life. While the lone wolf offender may be more likely to live alone without steady relationships, this profile is not universal (Horgan, 2008b; Richards et al., 2019). Different movements and ideologies produce different types of domestic offenders with different lifestyle patterns.

Many extremist groups target young people in a fashion not dissimilar to street gangs. Young people who are vulnerable, alone, potentially in unhappy homes, and without many friends are frequently prime targets to fill their ranks. They are also more likely to be single and without many responsibilities or connections by virtue of being young. Extremist groups create a sense of belonging and need within the group. In a study examining the applicability of life-course theories to the recruitment and radicalization of far-right extremists, Simi et al., (2016), pointed to the search for acceptance and belonging, a thrill of the forbidden, protection and, significance quests as reasons for entry into violent extremism. This study, a rare anomaly in the terrorism literature, managed for its sample to conduct long-form interviews with far-right extremists, and as such, provide a rare glimpse at the early lives of these individuals in their own words. The sample size here is small and as a result, conclusions must be taken with some caution, however, the context of such interviews is in no way diminished in value. Many interview excerpts refer to the feeling of family and belonging when discussing the extremist groups they were a part of. They also reported chaotic living conditions, abuse and neglect in the home, factors which create a primed environment for deviance. Extremist groups and gangs act similarly in this context, creating a welcoming and safe environment for those they recruit.

Many studies examining the personal histories and home lives of terrorists have found most of them to be single or unmarried. This has held over a variety of organizations and countries (Russell & Miller, 1977; Lyons & Harbinson, 1986; Krueger & Malečková, 2003; Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Abrahams, 2017; Richards et al., 2019). Digging deeper into the types of offenders and ideologies, however, yields some results that are not so decisively clear cut. For example, several studies on Jihadi militants have mixed results on marital status. Bakker's (2006) study of Jihadi terrorists in Europe found marital status evenly dispersed between married, divorced, and single in his sample. Only in one particular network of plotters, where all the would-be terrorists were younger, were they all single men. Additionally, 25 had children. Bakker mentions reliable family data could not be gathered for the entire sample and as a result, it is likely there are additionally people in his sample labeled as single who may not be. In a later study specifically examining the radicalization of youths in metropolitan areas of the United States, 43% of the sample was unmarried, while 37% were. An additional 14% had an unknown marital status (Abrahams, 2017). These figures suggest that while it is true that the majority of terrorists are without relationships in their personal lives, it is not at a level which would immediately draw notice or suspicion, nor could it be easily relied upon as a profile indicator. In a study of deceased Hezbollah militants from Lebanon, 39% were married, while 55% were single. Here again though, age has a role to play. Of the studied militants, 41% were between 18-20 years old and 42% were between 21-25 (Krueger & Malečková, 2003), ages where there is a strong cultural shift away from marriage. In the United States, even higher rates of marriage were noted among Al Qaeda inspired extremists with 46.2% being married. This sample was older however, by approximately five years, with an average of 31.2 (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015). Comparatively, in one study on extremists, far-right extremists in the United States were more

frequently single (M = 34.6%), and fewer indicated ever being married (*M* = 26.5%). They were also on average, slightly younger, with a mean age of 28.9 (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015). Of interest here, on the far left in the United States, only 6.3% were married, while 69.8 % were single. In age, they were approximately the same as those on the far right (M = 28.4). Importantly, this sample included only animal and environmental extremists who had been arrested and charged for an ideologically motivated violent crime.

Each of these groups fall outside the curve of typical criminogenic activity, according to age-graded theory. Little empirical attention is paid to spouses, children, or other typical social bonds the extremist maintains that would, in normal circumstances, encourage desistence from criminal behavior. For male extremists in particular, being unencumbered by the obligations of a relationship or children appears to be a boon. They are less distracted by obligations outside the group. For female extremists however, it is often a key element to joining the group. For female Jihadi extremists, marriage was an important step in the overall radicalization process. In one study of homegrown radicalization, marriage features in nearly all the cases that involved women (Klausen, 2016). Additionally, for many women on the far right, recruited either by boyfriends or other women into the group, relationships are often the predominant reason for staying in the group, even when faced with domestic abuse or misogyny (Reeve, 2019). For the female true believers who cling to ideological extremism, they often do so despite the extreme patriarchal hierarchy that exists within most of these groups. Both far-right white nationalism and religious extremism, be it Christian or Islamic, believe in the adherence to traditional gender roles, the subservience of women to men, and that women's primary function should be in the home. Despite the need for women in these movements, the few that do take leadership positions are often subjected to degrading treatment by its own members (Darby, 2017; Bowman, 2017). These groups want women in their movement as followers, as recruiters, and as fundraisers for their

gatherings. They lend a certain credibility to both the groups they belong to and to the movements writ large as being something other than a gathering for angry, dissatisfied men.

There is relatively little information on whether marriage or children act as any moderating influence for the extremist the way they might for the traditional criminal offender. Healthy marital relationships have long been a predictor of desistence from crime (Forrest, 2014), yet, according to one study, domestic extremists were more likely to be married than gang members, and more likely to have children (Pyrooz, et al., 2018). This seemingly contradictory finding needs further exploration, particularly in light of changing country demographics and shifting cultural viewpoints toward marriage overall. Early demographic descriptors of the terrorist suggest an offender unencumbered by relationships or children, yet from the above data, that is not entirely accurate. In fact, post-9/11 more extremists on the far-right were reported as in relationships or married than prior (Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015). This phenomenon did not hold for the far left, or for Al Qaeda inspired extremists. On the other hand, the lone wolf offender may be an area where the marriage-children dynamic could be more accurately applied. The lone wolf has been characterized by many researchers as being more socially isolated (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011; Hamm & Spaaj, 2015). In a study on lone actors across the United States and Europe and encompassing the entire ideological spectrum, 50% of the sample were single individuals who had never married (Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2014). Nearly 19% were either separated from a spouse or were divorced. About a quarter were married, while only a few were in relationships but had not married (24.5% and 6.6% respectively). This is a lower rate than normal, given that 70% of the lone actor sample is over the age of 30. In a comparative study of homicides committed by lone extremists and far-right extremists in the United States the numbers provided more contrast. Of lone offenders, nearly 43% were single, while 37.1% were separated,

divorced, or widowed, and 17.1% were married. On the far right, 40.5% were single, while 16.7% were separated, divorced, or widowed, and 16.7% were married. Additionally, approximately one-quarter of lone offenders had children, while only 18.5% of far-right extremists were parents (Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013). More lone offenders were also reported as living alone, as compared to other far-right extremists (46.2% to 24.4%, respectively). In the FBI's study of lone terrorist offenders, approximately 25% were either married or partnered, while 48% were single. A further 23% were divorced or separated (FBI, 2019). Within the FBI study, while 33% of the offender had children, nearly two-thirds had either no contact or minimal contact with their children at the time of their attack. Additionally, lone offenders were significantly more likely to be socially isolated or alienated via divorce or separation than other domestic extremists (Gruenwald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013). Without an additional time indicator, it is not possible to say if the breaking of this relationship was a catalyzing event, however further study on the social relationships between different types of extremists is necessary.

Mental Health

For many years scholars have refuted initial claims that the individuals who commit acts of terrorism are mentally ill or otherwise mentally incapacitated in some way. To argue that a terrorist must be mentally ill to commit such massive acts of heinous violence is an argument that, on its surface makes sense. It fills a particular cognitive narrative, suggesting that no "normal" person could do such a thing. It is a comforting narrative because it suggests that something "other" can be blamed as a casual factor. It fits the Just-World Hypothesis; the cognitive bias that one's actions if good, will bring a morally fair response and reward, while all evil actions will, eventually, be properly punished (Lerner & Montada, 1998).

Research on the links to mental illness has varied in quality over the years. Research from multiple fields attempt to establish links between psychopathologies and terrorists, including psychology, political science, sociology, and criminal justice. Most often, no such link revealed itself in the data. Freedman (1979) noted that, "A psychological profile of a model terrorist cannot be drawn. The personalities are disparate. The contexts and circumstances within which terrorism, both political and ecclesiastical, has been carried out are diverse in chronology, geography and motive," (as cited in Kelly, 1998, p. 116). The problem with addressing psychodynamic issues in the terrorist, as Freedman rightfully points out, is that the building of a profile will fail when researchers continue analyzing in aggregate form. One cannot take a model built around the feelings, economic situation and education of Islamic diaspora (for example) in a Western European country and apply it to all terrorists. In the sciences, when running an experiment, one of the most fundamental concepts at the base of establishing if a change occurred is holding all other variables constant (to the extent possible). In trying to create this broad understanding of a terrorist's mental health many researchers seem to overlook this important component when attempting to establish a relationship between the two. Where culture, stigma and access to care play a role in the assessment and diagnosis of a mental health problem, it would be a disservice to lump individuals from different countries, with different lived experiences and different access levels to services together for analysis. Additionally, compounding the issue is the status of the terrorist as a member of a rare population. While extremist thinking may well be more common than anyone realizes, the move from thought to deadly action is still a rare event. Furthermore, many terrorists are killed during or shortly after the commission of their act, making personality assessment more of a postmortem evidentiary evaluation. Given these limitations, to have enough power for statistical analysis it may be prudent for a researcher to aggregate incidents, despite the

loss of more detailed information. It is, therefore, no real surprise that the literature vacillates on this issue of mental illness.

For many, mental illness is often an invisible burden, with few outward signs. Receiving treatment is often left until absolutely necessary, particularly in the United States where institutional barriers are high. This includes the availability of providers, the high cost of care, and the willingness of insurance carriers to cover treatment. These institutional barriers are unique to the United States as a modern, industrialized nation. Where most industrialized nations have some form of universal healthcare for its citizens, the U.S. does not. This presents an added burden of cost for many vulnerable Americans that other countries do not see. Seeking mental health treatment is already stigmatized on a global scale. Adding high costs, co-pays, and deductibles to this creates further barriers that prevent people from seeking care, potentially leading to an even higher rate of individuals suffering with mental illness going without diagnosis or treatment.

Modern societal reactions toward mental health suggest an issue is only serious if it impairs functioning, and if it does not, discussing it can be perceived as weak, complaining or laziness. In a survey of Americans from the early 1990s, 71% of the population believed mental illness resulted from emotional weakness, while 45% thought a mental illness could be willed away. Many also considered it an issue of self-control while others worried that they were violent (Morrison, 2000). There are some small signs of improvement in this regard. In a more recent study on New York State residents, higher levels of education overall predicted fewer stigmatizing attitudes (Gonzales et al., 2017). Additionally, both political affiliation (non-liberals) and social disorganization predicted higher rates of stigmatization. Among medical students, psychiatric rotations have been shown to reduce stigma toward the mentally ill (Economou, et al, 2017). Additional trainings on stigma reduction have produced similar results among multiple healthcare

providers (Lien et al., 2019). Unfortunately, there is still a long way to go. Police officers, for example, who are often first on scene for incidents involving individuals with mental illnesses, have very little training offered beyond a few hours of coursework at the academy. Many departments have recognized this and implemented the Memphis Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model to educate and inform officers on how to handle encounters with people who are mentally ill. Sadly, this training is not universal across the country, and even with training, there was no significant correlation between undergoing the training and attitudes toward individuals with a mental illness (Montano & Barfield, 2017).

Cultural considerations about mental illness must also be taken into consideration as well. There are many cultures around the world which have very narrow viewpoints on mental illness, frequently seeing it as shameful for a family to admit. In Arab families, for example, chronic mental illness in a family is often met with embarrassment, isolation, and a loss of reputation (Dalky, 2012). In a qualitative study on African Americans, respondents indicated cultural beliefs about resolving matters at home and with the family as a barrier to seeking treatment, as well as embarrassment, shame, and lack of support (Thompson et al., 2004). Respondents also indicated a general mistrust of psychotherapy when seeking treatment. This mistrust tended to come from a disconnect between the therapist and client, where most of the therapists were older white males without any of the knowledge of the lived experiences in the black community. In America, racial and ethnic minorities only account for about 16 percent of psychologists as of 2016 (Lin et al., 2018). This is near double what it was in 2007 (9 percent). Given this stigma around mental illness, around seeking treatment and around the ease of access to it, the diagnoses of mental health issues are likely to be severely undercounted in the general population. Additionally, even if someone does decide to seek treatment, there is no guarantee that a doctor will be able to give

an accurate diagnosis. One national survey suggests that only about a third of all mentally ill people received assessment or treatment (Narrow, Reiger, Rae, Manderscheid, & Locke, 1993; Thornicroft, Rose & Kassam, 2007). Another study on primary care physicians found doctors failed to detect major mood and anxiety disorders in over 60% of cases (Vermani et al., 2011). With these figures in mind, it would be reasonable to suggest that the mental health status of the terrorist is still up in the air.

In trying to understand this issue of mental illness in the terrorist it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions when even the very healthcare providers and first responders who are supposed to be trained on this issue have trouble recognizing the signs and biases associated with the outward displays of cognitive and behavioral problems. Additionally, diagnostic criteria for certain illnesses can and do change over time and it is up to the individual practitioners to stay up to date with changes in their respective fields. For example, diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia changed in significant ways between the publication of the *DSM-IV-TR* in 2000 and the *DSM-5* in 2013 and may well change again with future revisions. This has particular significance in criminal justice circles where severe mental illnesses like schizophrenia are overrepresented in interactions with police when compared to the general population (Abudagga et al., 2016). With this in mind, trying to explain psychodynamic motivations behind an action, and as is often the case with terrorism research, from a distance, can result in some erroneous conclusions. Most clinical psychologists would call it an ethical violation to make psychological declarations about an individual they never met. For terrorism research, which attracts scholars from multiple disciplines, many of whom have no extensive background in psychopathology, there seems to be no such ethical concern. There is also a disconnect between the general poor reporting of mental

illness and diagnosis standards within the general population (and by consequence the would-be terrorist) and the behavioral and demographic differences present between terrorists overall.

Many of the early scholars on terrorism were quick to address the issue of mental illness. The late 1970s and 1980s saw them as sociopaths and narcissists using terrorism as an outlet for violent impulse or egoism (Pearce, 1977; Pearlstein, 1991). By the 1990s, National security became a major policy issue and it made sense for policy makers to want clear and digestible answers to the growing number of terrorist threats. However, like many reactionary policy decisions, terrorism was no different. The desire for a "terrorist profile" was strong and the researchers that came forward to fill the gap often filled their profiles with attribution errors, pathological disturbances without having ever performed an assessment, and personal biases, particularly toward the nature of female terrorists (Crenshaw, 2000). Female terrorists were singled out for their likelihood to be mentally ill by several researchers who frequently attributed external factors like trauma in childhood as reasoning for their present maladjustment (Crenshaw, 2000). Much of this early work has been dismissed for its many errors, with some dismissing mental illness in terrorists entirely (Atran, 2004; Pape, 2005), while others advocated for a more integrated approach (Lankford, 2016).

In a report by Hudson (1999), the authors noted there was a general agreement by psychologists who studied the subject that there was no one particular terrorist mindset. In actuality, the report indicated how little was actually known about the terrorist mindset and attempting to explain terrorism from a purely psychological perspective ignores important socioeconomic and political factors that may motivate someone into radicalized action. The personal pathway model suggests the terrorist comes from an at-risk population, marred by early socialization and self-esteem problems who wants to belong and is frustrated by their inability to

obtain goals or a place in society (Shaw, 1986). The obvious problem with this model is its broad scope and applicability to any number of millions of individuals with self-esteem issues. The model further fits well within the scope of modern strain theories but does not really distinguish how the pathway to terrorism group affiliation is distinguished from any sort of modern gang affiliation. Indeed, many of these early models propose pathways into terrorism based on very small group analysis and case studies from across Western Europe and specifically eliminate the lone offender from analysis, going so far as to suggest there is no such thing as the isolated terrorist – "that's a mental case," (Hudson, 1999). On the one hand, it is true in that no one exists in a vacuum. Everyone's thoughts and ideas come from collectively gathered knowledge and experience up to that point. On the other hand, many of these early scholars could not have predicted the rise of social media, its ramifications on individuals' mental health or the potential for its use in radicalization.

One issue that is apparent in the early writings on mental illness in terrorists is the narrow scope by which many seem to define what constitutes mentally ill. Most frequently, scholars raise the issues of psychopathy and narcissism (see: Post, 1990; Pearlstein, 1991), two distinctly rare personality traits. Estimates suggest approximately 1-3% of the general population exhibit psychopathy (Johnson, 2019), and 6.2% for narcissistic personality disorder across the lifespan (Stinson et al., 2008). Given the size of the current U.S. population, statistically, this would indicate several millions of people have such personality characteristics. Additionally, when considering factors previously mentioned, such as the appropriate sociological and political environments, statistically, this still leaves what is likely a fairly high number of potential socially primed individuals with a personality disorder. Yet repeatedly, researchers fail to find such a link between these disorders and terrorists and instead report the rather dull normality of the terrorist

(Crenshaw, 1981; Silke, 2003; Victoroff, 2005). Horgan (2003), and Silke (2003), further suggest that there is no evidence to indicate pathological personalities at a greater prevalence rate than exists in the general population.

It is an odd phenomenon that so many researchers specifically focus on the rarest of mental disorders and say little to nothing of more "conventional," disorders such as those on the depression spectrum, stressor/trauma related disorders or anxiety related disorders, which are far more common in the general population. By the early 2000s, many researchers were taking a more empirical view of the terrorist mentality and the presumption of an underlying personality profile shifted as a result. With pathological disorders unsupported in the literature and a new wave of researchers jumping into the field after September 11th, this empirical work primarily focused on Islamic terrorism, Al Qaeda and the suicide terrorist, making the assumption that there was no relationship at all between mental illness and engaging in terrorism (Gill & Corner, 2017). This would be an incorrect assumption, given the narrow scope of earlier work. Nevertheless, several notable works conflate statements from both Horgan and Silke who specifically address psychopathy and narcissism to mean mental illness in general with no acknowledgement that both mental health and mental illness span an enormous range. Gill & Corner (2017), emphasize this point in their analysis of 40 years of research on the relationship between mental illness and terrorism. Moghaddam (2005), for instance states, "there is little validity in explanations of terrorism that assume a high level of psychopathology among terrorists," (p. 161) and uses the metaphor of a narrowing staircase to describe the psychosocial ascension to terrorist action. While this metaphor is discussed further under the section on radicalization, the dismissal of clinical psychological factors is a faulty assumption when the spectrum of diagnosable disorders has been nowhere near fully tested. To say that "most terrorists

are not mentally ill," and that terrorism "is a result of a radicalization process in steps that can happen to 'normal' people," (Doosje, et al., 2016, p. 79) misses an important point: if radicalization can happen to "normal" people, it is also within reason to suggest more people are radicalized than accounted for, and more importantly, not all radicalized individuals go on to commit a terrorist act. If that is the case, then it is probable to assume extraneous, unaccounted for variables at work.

The early 2000s saw an increased focus on a specific terrorist type: suicide terrorists. Suicide terrorism has been a widely used tactic of terrorist groups for several decades, primarily in the Middle East and North Africa. Suicide bombers became a topic of wide study and fascination after September 11th with people wanting explanations for what would make someone willingly take their own life for a cause. Studies examining suicide missions and suicide terrorist characteristics have found several reasons why individuals, groups and communities embrace suicide-style tactics, including: the quest for significance (Kruglanski, et al., 2009), resistance to foreign occupation (Pape, 2005) honor, status, personal loss, social status (Bloom, 2005) exposure to violence, monetary support for one's family, and displacement (Stern, 2003; Kruglanski, et al., 2009). For the religiously based suicide terrorists, the choice to commit the act and to use suicide as the tactic was found to be far more ideological in origin. In a society where martyrdom is elevated, foreign occupation and tribal violence are real threats, the tactical choice is more in line with political and sociological events, and cultural beliefs that exist in the area. An international meeting of experts in Oslo (2003), concluded the following:

> "Neither do suicide terrorists, as individuals, possess the typical risk factors of suicide. There is no common personality profile that characterizes most terrorists, who appear to

> be relatively normal individuals. Terrorists may follow their own rationalities based on extremist ideologies or particular terrorist logics, but they are not irrational," (as cited in Borum, 2007, p. 5)

The larger issue with this conclusion, however, is how these scholars are operationalizing their understanding of mental illness. For some suicide terrorists, particularly those in displaced communities or those who have witnessed extreme violence, there is no recognition of trauma related illnesses as a mental health issue or of other severe pathologies, such as schizophrenia or major depressive disorder. Furthermore, cultural stigmas can often prevent individuals from seeking treatment and obtaining a clinical diagnosis (Lankford, 2016). This can be especially true where the emphasis is placed on being a martyr and not suicidal or mentally ill. Gill and Corner (2017) also note that many of these studies:

> "Fail to acknowledge that being a bomb-maker may be different than being a bomb planter; that being a foreign fighter may differ from being a terrorist attacking the homeland; that being a terrorist financier may be different than being a gunman; and that being a lone-actor may be different than being a group-actor" (p. 235).

This argument would suggest that, at least at an organizational level, personality and skill set have some role to play. This may also be evidenced in the individual who chooses to use a firearm to commit their act versus someone who decides to build a bomb or ram a vehicle into a crowd.

With the focus shifted to religiously based Islamist terrorism in the early 2000s, much of the analyses on these terrorists were conducted using samples gathered from countries in the Middle East, including: Israel, Palestine, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, as well the countries of Chechnya and Sri Lanka. Characteristics of individual bombers is scarce at best given that those who

successfully enact their plans are not alive to be interviewed. From the available data however, the overwhelming conclusions drawn were that of no mental abnormality among terrorist actors. This belief has carried over into the literature examining homegrown terrorism in the West. The literature takes a more focused analysis of the cognitive and behavioral radicalization trajectories suggesting social, political and ideological issues stemming from alienation, racism, xenophobia, anger, and ideological resentment toward a country that views their religion as "other," as root causes for radicalization (see: Kirby, 2007; Sageman, 2007; King & Taylor, 2011; Aly & Striegher, 2012; McGilloway et al., 2015). Few mention mental illness even in passing. Fewer still make any distinction between the individual raised in the West who commits acts domestically, compared to individuals who commit international terrorism. These same articles discuss feelings of isolation, alienation, anger, persecution, and resentment which, if engaged in a clinical setting may be diagnosed as symptoms of a depression spectrum disorder according to the DSM-5. Though given the gendered stigma of associating acute mood disorders with a predominately male group that culturally considers mental health issues shameful, it is no wonder the mental health of these individuals is so rarely mentioned.

Media today also paints an interesting picture of terrorism depending on who the terrorist is identified to be. When mass casualty events happen, media organizations are far quicker to frame brown-skinned, Muslim perpetrators as terrorists over their white, Judeo-Christian counterparts. A content analysis of five years' worth of *New York Times* and *Washington Post* articles revealed Islam being mentioned 93.8% of the time when "terrorism" was in the headline (Hoewe, 2012). Historical events play a role here, with data collection beginning only a few years after September 11th and coinciding with a general upswing in terrorism events perpetrated by Islamist radicals, however a subsequent analysis of terrorist events between 2011 and 2016 found

significant differences between how news outlets reported the five out of 11 terrorist acts that were committed by (U.S. citizen) Muslims motivated by international groups. The remaining six acts without international ties were not initially reported as terrorism but as isolated incidents committed by "troubled individuals" or as hate crimes, despite meeting the definition of what constitutes terrorism (Powell, 2018). News articles focusing on terrorism committed by domestic actors spent more time interviewing families, getting to know the individual, dissecting troubled personal lives, and looking for reasons behind the act, according to Powell's (2018) analysis. They were described as alienated, angry, mentally ill loners and faced far less coverage overall. In total, in the two weeks after each event, Powell's (2018) methodology revealed three times as much coverage for the five acts committed by Muslims (645 articles), compared to the six acts committed by non-Muslims (237 articles).

The narrative in the United States, at least in media, of white domestic extremists as disturbed loners bolsters a stigmatizing view of the mentally ill as unpredictably violent and reinforces racially and ethnically charged stereotypes that suggests only certain groups commit terrorism in the name of ideology, while others are simply mentally disturbed. While the mental stability of these particular offenders should not be dismissed, we cannot so easily write off others of varying ethnicities, religions or origins as committing their actions based on strict ideological grounds. In the West, recruiters for fringe extremist groups like ISIS, like The Base, and others, target disenchanted young people, both educated and uneducated, the unemployed and the socially alienated who have largely given up on mainstream society (Hudson, 1999). While the terrorist may likely cite an ideological motive for their attack, extreme ideology, like the radicalization process, takes time to develop. This is particularly relevant for the lone wolf-type offender.

Lone offenders present several unique problems. Frequently unpredictable, with no obvious ties to larger terrorist organizations, these individuals have been responsible for some of the deadliest mass casualty events in American history. Numerous studies on lone offenders have provided important insight into this typology. For example, in a comparison between mentally disordered lone actor terrorists with non-disordered terrorists, those with disorders were more likely to experience a recent stressor prior to their attack (Corner & Gill, 2015). This finding was supported in a separate study of lone offenders by Hamm & Spaaj (2015). In a study of 98 lone wolf terrorism events, the authors found triggering events in 84% of pre-9/11 cases and 71% of post-9/11 cases. Additionally, compared to members of terrorist groups or organizations, lone wolves were more prone to mental illness overall. In an FBI report on lone offenders in the United States, 25% of identified cases were formally diagnosed with one or more psychiatric disorders prior to the commission of their act (Richards et al, 2019). The report makes an important point in noting that many case materials do not contain medical or mental health records, impacting the researchers' ability to draw conclusive results, suggesting the likelihood of an undercount in diagnosis, treatment, and adherence to medication. Of those that did have a diagnosis, mood disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder were most prevalent, followed by schizophrenia. Only one individual had been diagnosed with a personality disorder. This is consistent with other studies on terrorism suggesting the link between personality disorders and terrorists is tenuous, at best. Post-attack clinical analyses revealed an additional 13% with a psychiatric disorder, with six showing signs of psychotic disorders and two showing signs of personality disorders. A further 35% of cases were suspected by friends, family, associates, or mental health professionals of having an undiagnosed mental disorder. Friends and family are typically the first to notice any problems or aberrant behaviors in someone and try to intervene. In 22 of the cases, someone who knew the offender reported expressing concern over the offender's alcohol or drug use. At least

50% of offenders studied showed signs of prior drug use and a further 40% expressed some form of suicide ideation. Perception related issues were also documented, including persistent paranoia, irrational delusions, self-grandiosity, and auditory hallucinations.

While it is important to give some weight to the findings in this FBI report, it is also important to remember the relatively small sample size and probability for error. Many cases that were originally identified for inclusion were later excluded for insufficient information. These numbers on lone offenders indicate that although the original hypothesis of personality disorders and narcissism do not bare support, the absence of mental health problems in the terrorist is an equally problematic conclusion. Lone offenders do appear, at least at surface level, to have considerable mental health problems, however, given the small sample sizes, this typology needs further investigation. The larger scope of mental health problems among every typology of terrorist requires further investigation.

Criminal History

Many terrorist networks use or have used criminal activity to support their political or ideological goals. Drug trafficking, for example has been widely used by terror groups from Spain to Afghanistan (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). Human trafficking has also become widely attractive to many terror groups, and the modus operandi of ISIL, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) as a means of supporting their operations (CTED, 2019). Many U.S. based groups use similar means to finance their operations. Financial crimes in particular, are an avenue in which terrorist groups perpetuate at high rates to fund their operations. For example, many sovereign citizen extremists have been convicted of running fraudulent insurance schemes, phony diplomatic credential schemes, money laundering, and tax evasion (FBI, 2011). A study on the far-right financial crimes found tax avoidance schemes to be

the most common financial crime committed (59%). Filing false liens against public officials was also common (10%), as was check fraud (9%), investment schemes (5%), and banking fraud (4%) (START, 2015). Violent crime to support the ideological cause but not *for* the ideological cause is also an avenue of support (Ljujic, et al., 2017). Individuals who were criminal offenders prior to their radicalization often find new pathways to radicalization upon incarceration. Prisoners are in fact, prime targets for recruitment into extremist organizations (Mandel, 2009; Chermak et al., 2013; Giovanni, 2015). Indeed, extremist groups that work within prisons may have an outsized proclivity toward the use of violence (Caspi, 2010 as cited in Chermak, Freilich & Suttmoeller, 2013). Individuals with this criminal history attracted to the message of these extremist groups are not so dissimilar to the newly recruited gang member in their desire for belonging and willingness to commit extreme acts.

There is a fascinating dichotomy among extremists. On one side, a violent history would fit neatly in our collective perceptions of what creates a terrorist, and for some of them, that perception is correct. For others, however, their willingness to go to ideological (and criminal) extremes might be surprising when considering their high educational achievements and middle-class upbringing, particularly for those in leadership positions. Criminological theories show a consistent negative relationship between crime and education. Yet, extremism manifests itself in many ways. Violent extremism, as a subculture, according to Simi et al. (2016), can include both "bandits ['common criminals'] and revolutionaries ['terrorists']." Simi and his colleagues suggest the distinction between common criminality and violent extremism is illusory as much interpersonal crime involves some form of terror for the victim. Furthermore, the extremist is not static, but evolving and can move from more basic criminality to terrorism. This is again, not dissimilar to how a criminal might learn more efficient means of committing a crime over time.

In Simi's sample of extremists, there are many overlapping background factors, such as childhood abuse and juvenile delinquency that also coincide with typical criminogenic backgrounds. In previous years, it has been very difficult to study this aspect of the terrorist offender. Much of the research has focused either on the attack, behaviors immediately surrounding the attack, or present state of mind and living circumstances. As a rare population, this makes sense; one works with what one has to work with in terms of data. It is a difficult population to reach and interview, made even more difficult by the high rate that die in the commission of their act. Today however, the means with which to discover background information on these offenders is more readily available, making this an area ripe for further study.

Position in a terrorist organization is not the only distinguishing feature that is likely to be a predictor of a criminal history. Ideology often plays a role, as does whether the individual is a part of a wider group or organization, or if they are a lone wolf. For example, in a study of lone offenders across the United States and Europe, 41% of the sample had previous criminal convictions (Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2014). Offenses ranged widely from threats to life, to first degree robbery, to assault, firearms offenses, drunk driving, obstructing law enforcement, vehicle theft, black mail, drug possession, counterfeiting, vandalism, and the use of explosives. More than a fifth of the sample also had a history of substance abuse. Many of the sampled individuals began their radicalization journey while in jail or prison. The FBI's study of lone offenders found 70% of their sample were arrested at least once as adult prior to their attack (Richards et al., 2019). Additionally, 52% of the sample were arrested more than once as an adult. This is higher than the lifetime prevalence of ever being arrested as an American male, which is estimated to be 43% (Barnes et al., 2015). In cases where information on the adolescence of the lone offenders was available (65%), a little over a quarter (26%, n = 9) had at least one arrest prior to age eighteen

(Richards et al., 2019). Most of those juveniles were later arrested as adults for other (non-terrorism) offenses. Several of the lone offenders (29%) had been arrested for at least one violent offense and for alcohol or substance use offenses (33%). Case evidence and interviews also showed 83% of the sample had a history of hostile or aggressive behavior, such as making threatening statements or having a volatile temper. While prior violent or volatile histories were not present in all cases, many exhibited violent behaviors or a proclivity to violence in their personal histories. If one were taking a risk assessment approach, this history of violence is often an indicator of willingness to commit future violence.

Comparatively, on the far-right, a history of violence is not particularly out of the ordinary. In fact, those primarily motivated by white supremacist ideology are far more likely to engage in criminal activity prior to radicalization than others. (Jensen, et al., 2020). When examining crimes of homicide exclusively, 34% of far-right (non-loner) offenders had a previous violent arrest, with 51.1% of the sample having some type of prior arrest history (Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013). For lone offenders who expressed far-right ideology, 22.8% had a previous violent arrest; however, 61.7% had some type of prior arrest history. The literature is scarce here. Few studies examine the criminal history of extremists and rarely do they dive any further than if the individual had an arrest history, preferring to focus on the criminal actions preformed in the name of their ideology. It is unclear if any of these backgrounds have changed over time or if the increased recruitment of military personnel has made a difference with regard to prior criminal history.

While there is a paucity of literature on the prior criminal history of extremists, jail and prison as a recruitment vehicle is somewhat more expansive. This should not be surprising given the criminological focus of gang development and gang recruitment while in jails and prisons.

This recruitment strategy is of particular concern in Western Europe where second generation immigrants are overrepresented in prison populations (Wacquant, 1999; van der Gaag, 2019). While typically, first generation immigrants are mostly law abiding, with goals of assimilation and better economic standing, the children of these immigrants often have a more difficult time. Feeling neither native to their new country or close to their country of origin which they may have never visited, many feel marginalized and resentful. Couple this with economic disenfranchisement, racial discrimination, and unsupervised youth who have no responsibilities, and the propensity for deviance will rise. Data across Europe have indicated for decades that the incarceration of foreigners has risen by double digits despite representing only a few percentage points of countrywide populations (Wacquant, 1999; Cuthbertson, 2004). This exposure to crime and by consequence, to prison provides a new environment with new peers where individuals can share both their resentments for their country of birth and share commonalities of cultural or religious significance based on their religion or country of ancestral origin. Bakker's (2006) study of Jihadi terrorists in Europe found nearly a quarter of their sample had some criminal record. A more recent study of 27 European Jihadi terrorists gathered from Dutch police records, found half the sample to have been previously involved in some violent crime(s) (Ljujic, van Prooijen & Weerman, 2017). Furthermore, there is growing evidence to suggest that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are recruiting petty street criminals into their European networks and encouraging them to continue their criminality to fund their ideological extremism (Lakhani, 2020). Comparatively, in the United States, the Islamist or Al Qaeda inspired extremists were less likely to have a prior arrest than their right-wing counterparts (29% to 53.4%) and left-wing extremists had the lowest rate of prior arrests at 26.9% (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015).

Pre-radicalization criminal activity among individuals radicalized in the United States, whether violent or non-violent, has been shown to be the strongest predictor of postradicalization violent extremism when ideology is controlled for (START, 2018). In one sample of violent U.S. based extremists, nearly 44% had a prior criminal history. They also had higher rates of violent criminal histories (55.6%) than non-violent extremists (START, 2018). Aggravated assault was the most common type of prior criminal act, followed by drug related crimes, simple assault, and the illegal use or possession of a firearm, respectively. It is difficult to establish here from the information available whether these individuals would have continued a traditional criminal offending pattern had they not been radicalized. There is also a question here of whether the extremist activity they later engaged in was just another vessel for an already violent temperament. There is also some evidence to suggest that arrest patterns among extremists have changed over the years. Prior arrest history across the ideological spectrum rose in the years after September 11th (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015), though it is not clear why. This may simply be due to changes in local police practices or changes in policy such as the widespread use of zero-tolerance policing. Regardless, this requires further scrutiny and analysis.

Social Media and the Internet

When Facebook first launched its college networking site in 2004 with the intent of connecting friends and classmates, presumably few thought in the years since that it would develop into the massive networking empire we know it as today. Nor would we have thought it could be responsible for the widespread use of disinformation and propaganda the likes of which has led to an ethnic cleansing in Myanmar (Mozur, 2018), violent attacks on refugees in Germany (Müller & Schwarz, 2020), and social discord between American citizens (Devine, 2017). Facebook is not the only social media site responsible for spreading disinformation or

propagating hate. While Facebook has been the largest and most widely used social media network, with 69% of U.S. adults using it, over the last two years YouTube has surpassed it, accumulating a userbase of 81% of U.S. adults (Pew Research Center, 2021). Instagram maintains the next largest share with a user base of 40% of U.S. adults, with Snapchat at 25%, Twitter at 23%, Whatapp at 23% and Reddit at 18% (Pew, 2021). Additionally, Facebook retains ownership of Instagram and Whatsapp, for a controlling influence over the social media landscape.

Nearly three-quarters of Americans (74%) use Facebook daily, more than any other social media site by at least 10%, while 51% of Americans use YouTube daily (Pew, 2019). When it comes to sourcing information, 43% of Americans get at least some of their news from Facebook, while 21% get their news from YouTube. Twitter holds a smaller share with 12%. (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Despite this ease of access, only 34% of American adults say they prefer to get their news online (Geiger, 2019). Comparatively, television news remains the more popular option for now, with 37% of U.S. adults relying on their local news most often for information. About 30% of adults reported relying on Cable TV news and 25% reported national evening network news (Shearer, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the divide is largely generational.

Individuals who are 50-64 are five times more likely to get their news from television than 1829-year-olds (Shearer, 2018). In the 65+ age bracket, 81% get their news most often from television. For those 18-29 and 30-49, only 16% and 36% respectively, get their news mostly from television. These age groups primarily rely either on social media or news websites. A Pew study found that those who rely on social media for their news – specifically their political news – had lower levels of political knowledge, were less likely to answer fact-based questions correctly, and were less likely to understand key news stories (Mitchell et al., 2020). It is not clear however, if this study controlled for age with these conclusions. Though young people comprise the bulk of

social media users, they are also less knowledgeable on political and current events as a matter of course (Alexander, 2020), which could in part, explain such results. In a separate study of where Americans get their news from, Reddit, Twitter and Facebook stand out as having the highest portions of users exposed to news with 73%, 71%, and 67% of their userbase respectively (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). While Facebook maintains the lowest share of users exposed to news, their userbase is so large that far more Americans get their news from Facebook than from any other platform.

Demographically, there is considerable diversity in terms of which platforms Americans choose to use. When discussing social media as a whole, as Mitchell et al. (2020) does, the nuance of platform selection is lost, as is how those self-selecting individuals navigate their platforms of choice. For example, though the majority of young people prefer social media to print or television, platform preference can indicate a variety of differences. Facebook, for the most part, has lost its appeal to many teens 13-17 (Gramlich, 2021), and those social media news consumers 18-29 (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Critically, Facebook no longer dominates the social media landscape among young people, being down to 51% of the 13-17 age group who said they use it in a 2018 survey. This is a dramatic drop from the 71% of teens who said they used it in a 2014-2015 survey (Gramlich, 2021). More importantly, only 10% of teens say they use Facebook most often. Both Snapchat (35%) and YouTube (32%) have replaced Facebook as the platform used most often, though TikTok has been gaining ground in recent years. This reduction in Facebook use as a platform preference is also true of the next age bracket, those 18-29. Of all the social media sites studied for news consumption (Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, Snapchat, and Reddit), only LinkedIn scored lower than Facebook (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). For the 30-49 age bracket, platform choice is more evenly dispersed. This age group appears to be the most

adaptable to platform change, having been in their teens or young adulthood during the emergence of social media and weathering the transformation of technology from analog to digital. For those over 50, Facebook remains the preferred choice (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Those with a college or beyond education showed some platform preference for LinkedIn (61%), Reddit (46%), and Twitter (41%). Men also showed an overwhelming preference for the forum-style social media platform, Reddit (72%) for news consumption when compared to their next highest preferred platform, LinkedIn (64%) and YouTube (51%). This is considerably different from the top three preferences among women: Snapchat (63%), Facebook (61%), and Instagram (59%). Lastly, race also indicates some platform preference, with Non-whites preferring to use Instagram (60%) or Snapchat (55%), while Whites preferred Facebook or Twitter at near equivalent rates (62% and 60%, respectively).

Another facet of interest when diving into how Americans consume social media and digital information in general is the concern over accuracy. As of 2018, approximately two-thirds (68%) of U.S. adults get news on social media sites (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Of those news consumers, 57% *expect* the news they see on social media to be largely inaccurate. There are some ideological fault lines with this percentage. For those identifying as Republicans, 72% expect the news they see on social media to be inaccurate, while only 46% of Democrats and 52% of Independents say the same (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). As social media erupted in use, so too has the spread of information between the micro and macro social circles of individuals. With this information spread, disinformation and misinformation spreads as well. Gone are the days when far-fetched conspiracy theorists, anti-science, anti-government militants, religious zealots, and racial supremacists were hidden on out of the way message boards that took dedicated searching to find. In today's internet landscape, anyone with a Facebook account, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, and so on can share links to any website, however dubious or reputable the website may be.

Anyone can share their personal comments, views, and opinions along with these links. In an analysis of the "Politically Incorrect" /pol/ board on the imageboard website 4chan, using 8 million posts and 216 hundred-thousand conversation threads collected over 2.5 months, researchers found users tended to favor right-wing news sources and heavily relied on YouTube for the sharing of streaming media content. Wikipedia and Twitter were the most shared site links after YouTube. Rounding out the top 10 were links to the Daily Mail, a British-based right-wing tabloid newspaper, and Breitbart, an extremist far-right news and opinion site (Hine et al., 2017). Both sites are listed as questionable sources for their poor fact checking, extreme bias, and consistent promotion of propaganda by the media watchdog group, MediaBias/FactCheck.

While it has long been the case that any individual with an internet connection can post links and comments to various other sites via message boards, through chats, and using private messenger platforms, it is only recently that all these activities have been combined via singular platforms that blend our family life, friend circles, and even work life together with personal opinion, entertainment, hobbies and world views. With this combination and the posting of a variety of content into a singular feed that often includes both personal, lifestyle, and news content it has become increasingly difficult for individuals to determine differences in content. Many also do not or cannot take the time to further investigate or scrutinize the information posted on these personalized feeds (Pearson, 2020). Furthermore, anyone with the inclination can, with a small investment, some fancy lighting and time to copy edit, make their YouTube channel, website, or Facebook page appear as legitimate as any local news or health website. Malicious actors are well aware that the more legitimate they can appear, the more likely it is they can spread their messages, grift, assert specific ideologies, and push specific types of propaganda. Many make it their goal to mimic popular websites with similar graphics, writing styles and professional-looking

layouts to create cognitive hooks that draw new people into reading their content while initially disguising their true intent (Hankes, 2017).

It is important to recognize why these actors spread such misinformation and disinformation and what it does to the individuals who see and engage with it. While much of it is done for simple profit; clicks that eventually lead to ad revenue and purchases, a sizable amount has additional, darker intentions. Hate groups and extremist organizations frequently use what appear like benign news articles, YouTube channels, or Facebook pages to hook individuals into clicking on their content. The Three Percenters, an anti-government militia movement that arose in 2008-2009 as a response to the election of Barack Obama and the financial crisis grew exponentially through the use of Facebook groups to spread their ideas about "tyrannical government overreach," (ADL, n.d. c). Self-identified members of this group have been arrested while attempting to bomb a bank in Oklahoma City meant to mimic the Federal building attack by Timothy McVeigh (Fernandez, 2017), and after the successful bombing of a mosque in Minnesota (Sankin & Carless, 2018). Anwar al-Awlaki, the deceased lead English-language propagandist for Al-Qaeda was directly responsible for the development of highly polished videos and magazines promoting the cause of Jihadism which radicalized many, including Pulse nightclub shooter Omar Mateen in Orlando, Florida, San Bernardino,
California shooter Syed Farook, and others who were less successful in carrying out their attacks (Shane, 2016). At one point, a search for his name on YouTube returned over 70,000 videos and included everything from his earlier life's work preaching as a mainstream Imam to his later years with Al-Qaeda (Shane, 2017). With the slow-walk by YouTube not removing his videos until 2017, long after his death in 2011, it enabled other extremists, including ISIS leadership to use them in their own propaganda and to prop al-Awlaki up as a martyr for the Jihadist cause.

The Islamic State (IS) created a remarkably unique and innovative propaganda network using social media. They used YouTube and Twitter to bypass traditional media and spread their message around the world. They used young people familiar with computers and video editing to produce highly stylized videos of beheadings and other violent actions (Aly et al., 2016). They had dedicated Twitter accounts to tweet about their actions and propagate their operations, as well as Western fans to retweet the accounts and spread their message in English. Their propaganda held additional narratives beyond what news media covered, including: mercy, collateral damage caused by their enemies, military gains, and a sense of belonging (Aly et al., 2016). Furthermore, Westerners who were able to make the journey to the Middle East were used to recruit and encourage others to follow in their footsteps.

It is not just the single videos by extremists or the local militia Facebook groups on their own that need to be a cause for concern. Extremist content has existed online since the earliest days of the internet and long before the emergence of social media. Web forums played host to some of the earliest extremist content where users could interact with one another. Web forums, also known as message boards, were centralized locations focused on a variety of specified topics. The earliest boards as we might envision them today, were developed in 1994 and based on the old bulletin board system (BBS) first developed in 1978, and featured user-generated content, "pinned" posts, and private messaging (Lee, 2012). Only one year later, in 1995 was what is largely considered the "first major 'hate site,'" Stormfront.org, unveiled to the world (Levin, 2002). The site was owned and operated by Don Black, a former Grand Wizard and national leader of the Ku Klux Klan. Black is an avowed white nationalist, whose activities in the white supremacy movement date back to the 1970s when he was a member of the Virginia-based Neo-Nazi National Socialist White People's Party (ADL, 2012).

The Stormfront motto was "White Pride Worldwide," and claimed to have more than 300,000 registered users as of 2015 (SPLC, n.d. d). The site propagated holocaust denial, white nationalism, white supremacy, and Islamophobia. One of the reasons for Stormfront's widespread success in the decade before social media began its ascendance was, in addition to being the first of its kind, the ability for the forum members to interact and communicate with each other. As a means of radicalization, Stormfront changed how the game was played. Where typical hate sites of the past served as a one-way stream of information, such as *The American Free Press*, an online and print "newspaper" that peddles holocaust denial and conspiracy theories, Stormfront always served as a message board with a goal of communication between members and the development of an online-based white supremacist community (SPLC, n.d. d). The site featured many renowned members and posts by icons in the white supremacist and Neo Nazi movement, including David Duke, Willis Carto, and William Pierce. The forum even included international sections divided by region to include members from South America, Europe, Australia, and Russia in an effort to connect individuals with similar far-right ideologies across the globe (Bowman-Grieve, 2009). Additionally, users often shared personal experiences on the site, detailing how they became involved with far-right ideology, what sites they frequented, and how they exchanged information with other users (Bowman-Grieve, 2009). This provided more knowledge about the movement itself, served as validation for other members, and created a sense of identity for individuals looking to be a part of a movement. According to a report by the Southern Poverty Law Center, between 2009 and 2014 ten men who frequented the Stormfront forum, collectively making over 6,500 posts to the site were responsible for nearly

100 bias-related homicides (Beirich, 2014). This includes Norwegian domestic terrorist, Anders Breivik, who set off a truck bomb in front of a government building killing eight, before boarding a ferry and shooting 69 members of a Workers' Youth League summer camp.

While Stormfront may have been the first of its kind, it was not the last. Many web forums and sites have played host to hate speech, cultural or ideologically based grievance, terrorist propaganda, and conspiracy theories that erroneously blame minority groups for societal ills from the 1990s to the present. Leftist extremist organizations like ELF and ALF were early adopters of the internet, creating dozens of websites with news, methods of legal activism, and downloadable sabotage manuals. Though their ideologies were vastly different from Stormfront, or the also recently started neo-Nazi site, National Alliance, owned by William Pierce, their methods of pushing propaganda and urging individuals into violence through a leaderless resistance models are similar (Levin, 2002). In the late 1990s and early 2000s however, something began to change. More people than ever before had first time access to home computers and the internet at affordable prices. It was not just for the professional class any longer. Teenagers, many for the first time, were left home alone with nothing to do and unlimited access to a new technology. *Something Awful*, a comedy-based website started in 1999 featured blog entries, articles, digitally edited pictures, and humorous media reviews, became something of an internet cultural phenomenon (Gault, 2020). It hosted web forms using the vBulletin system and featured some of the most grotesque things on the internet that users would post to shock each other. It was a space where, "the extremely online—mostly white, male, nerds back then—gathered in the early days of the internet. It was also a place with a lot of Nazis," (Gault, 2020). While the site started with humorous intentions which perpetuated for some time, eventually as users began to disperse onto other, newer platforms, including the newly created

4chan (developed by a *Something Awful* forum member), content devolved into more race-based "memes," and white supremacy. As the later half of the 2000s progressed and web forums declined, sites like 4chan and Reddit picked up much of that userbase.

4chan is an imageboard website started in 2003 that hosts a variety of content. It maintains boards dedicated to a wide assortment of topics, from games and music to anime, politics, and sports, among many others. It is not a site that requires registration to post content or reply. Anyone can start a new thread or post without creating an account and they can choose to simply remain "Anonymous" when doing so. The anonymous user tag is autogenerated for anyone who does not choose their own username. It is this anonymity and the ephemeral nature of the content that seems to promote both the best and worst the site has to offer. The site's most active board, the "random" board, known as /b/ has been described as the "life force of the website," by the creator of the site and is responsible for some the most widespread and impactful internet cultural phenomena of the last 15 years (Bernstein et al., 2011). This includes many of the humorous cultural memes of years past, including the "rage comic," "LoLCats," "Rickrolling," and "Advice Animals," (Dewey, 2014). It is also responsible for bigger cultural phenomena that has had major affects in the real world, including the "Anonymous" hacktivist group which carried out several highly visible protests against the Church of Scientology, DDoS attacks against Mastercard and Paypal in support of Wikileaks, fake bomb and shooting threats, and "Gamergate," a misogynistic harassment campaign started in 2014 against female journalists and other outspoken feminists under the guise of exposing "unethical games journalists," (Bernstein et al., 2011; Dewey, 2014; Romano, 2021). Gamergate served as something of a watershed moment for later movements and a doorway into the far-right that would largely come to consume many aspects of the 4chan website. The media that covered the Gamergate controversy tried at the time to write the event off

as the workings of a few disaffected young men and internet "trolls," but according to Robert Evans, a journalist specializing in extremist communities, it was the first organized, strategic attack against a set of individuals born out of a decades-long campaign by white supremacists to recruit disaffected young men online and amplified by the use of Twitter and hashtags (Romano, 2021). Furthermore, arguments surrounding Gamergate involved the perception that diversity, tolerance, feminism and other "politically correct" politics were being forced on the general public. By arguing against this, far right communities could hide behind their concept of "political correctness" and free speech to mask their actual racism, misogyny, and anti-Semitism (Dafaure, 2020).

From an outsider's perspective, the subculture of the site and content on many of 4chan's boards can be immediately off-putting and offensive. The language used, particularly on the /b/ board and the "Politically Incorrect" /pol/ board, is intentionally racist, sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic (Bernstein et al., 2011; Hines et al., 2017). With the initial purpose of these boards to shock and disgust and be a haven for free speech, as the original 4chan creator stated, the site was quick to attract posters on the far-right espousing hate, social conservatism, racism, and bigotry. For individuals who espouse such vocal ideological extremism, starting with the use of humor, memes, and "shock" posts inure other posters and passive users to this type of language and imagery over time. These memes, as well as other structural linguistical patterns have created a cross-platform, easy to follow pattern of identifiers to use when discussing various outgroups. For example, using triple paratheses (((*x*))) to denote or mark someone as a Jew/Jewish (Salazar, 2018). As users begin to share these memes and adopt the language of the group, those who utilize multiple platforms, such as Reddit (a popular crossover platform from 4chan but with more moderation), Facebook, and Twitter effectively cross-pollinate them across their multiple accounts

for more to see and share. From there, through the convalescence of social media algorithms feeding individuals things they think they will like based on prior clicks and views, and the chatter from users who like, share or retweet, and comment on each of these items or in localized forums, a type of positive feedback loop emerges. These feedback loops can quickly descend into online group-based echo chambers, whereby confirmation biases abound, viewpoints not in line with the group norm are quickly stifled, regarded as incorrect, or are removed entirely (Bright, 2017; Quattrociocchi et al., 2016).

From a social psychological view, the echo chamber is not so different from the way a cult indoctrinates its followers. Within the echo chamber any voice not seen as part of the group is actively distrusted or discredited (Nguyen, 2020). In many cases, other voices are omitted altogether. The echo chamber isolates its members from all other sources through a filtering process whereby other voices or sources never penetrate what has become a closed system. The echo chamber may create its own language, abbreviations, or alternative meanings of words or phrases that emphasize the insularity of the in-group, while simultaneously reinforcing who or what the out-group is. As social media algorithms grow evermore connected through the acquisition of smaller companies and the tracking of online activity, the online echo chamber can grow tighter without one even realizing it as individuals tend to seek out views that correspond with their own or reenforce existing beliefs (Karlsen et al., 2017).

Individuals share news from places that correspond with their own ideologies even if the news story is not an ideological one (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). They also see news and other posts from friends, people, or pages they follow that they are more likely to be ideologically aligned with. Bakshy et al. (2015), found that among Facebook friendships where ideology is shared on a profile, approximately one-fifth of an individual's friends hold opposing ideologies, suggesting

that those individuals who primarily get their news from Facebook or other social media sites are less likely to see opposing or alternative information or evidence. Social media sites use algorithms to create a tailored user experience. Ultimately, these sites are businesses and tailor their sites to create and maximize engagement on their platform. In doing so, news feeds and homepages become tailored based on what an individual clicks or views, who that person interacts with, what material they share and what websites they visit. All of this has consequently led to the narrowing scope of what the user sees. Unintentionally, it has also had the added effect of narrowing the scope of those individuals who are already ideologically inclined. Research on social movements and their digital beginnings indicate that within these curated spaces and groups, collective identities can and do form, which in turn creates a unique sharing of intragroup information and resources with a shared sense of solidarity and beliefs (Melucci, 1995; Hara & Huang, 2011). The more exposure one has to these beliefs and the reinforcement of such beliefs, the more difficult it becomes to break through with countervailing information. For example, in one study on the echo chamber effect, researchers attempted to provide arguments and evidence debunking several conspiracy theories. Results demonstrated that debunking was ignored by 99% of those studied and had the undesired effect of reinforcing the very conspiracies the researchers were trying to correct (Quattrociocchi, et al., 2019).

In the literature on radicalization, online radicalization, or radicalization through the use of the internet is not a new concept. Database searches on these concepts return tens of thousands of results dating back to the early 2000s. Empirical studies, however, are more limited. The echo chamber as a group construct is likewise, not particularly new. The development of the echo chamber has its roots in cognitive and social psychology, confirmation biases and groupthink. von Behr et al. (2013), discuss the digital era of radicalization at length. Research in this area has

focused on analyzing mostly websites and closed-network virtual communities, such as Stormfront (Gerstenfeld, et al., 2003). Analyses focused often on the group or organizational level and how groups used the internet as a facilitative tool. More recently, many studies have moved to analyzing how extremists spread their message online (see: Klausen et al., 2016b; Kalpalis et al., 2018) and the linguistic content on various social media platforms (see: Mathew et al., 2019; Grover & Mark, 2019). Furthermore, research over the last decade has predominately focused on the threat posed by radical Jihadi terrorism and recruitment by Al Qaeda and ISIS via social media while neglecting the online recruitment efforts by domestic extremists (see: Smeaton et al., 2009; Thompson, 2011; Klausen, 2015; Chatfield et al., 2015; Ferrara et al., 2016; Kalpalis et al., 2018).

As the territorial power of Al Qaeda and ISIS diminished in the Middle East and news coverage of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria wound down, the number of attacks on Western soil by Jihadi inspired extremists likewise declined. Perhaps sensing the cultural shift, academic research on the topic has renewed its focus on the domestic extremist. Where social media research on extremist threats focused mostly on Twitter and Jihadi radicalism, few studies have examined how extremist messaging spreads on other social networking sites, including Facebook, YouTube, Reddit, and Snapchat. Given that Pew's research on social media use indicates less than a quarter of Americans are on Twitter, this is a significant oversight. Furthermore, few studies to date have analyzed how extremists have utilized other social media networks with empirical validity. Only Bernstein et al. (2011), and Hine et al. (2017), empirically analyze far-right activity on the 4chan imageboard. Zannettou et al. (2018), were the only ones to analyze the userbase on the fringe, far-right network, Gab, which emerged in 2016 as an alternative to Twitter and welcomed users banned or suspended by other popular social networks. Grover and Mark (2019) analyzed warning behaviors of radicalization on an alt-right Subreddit. Studies on YouTube's algorithms and their pathways toward radicalization are somewhat more

plentiful, analyzing both domestic and foreign ideologies (O'Callaghan et al., 2015; Bermingham et al., 2009; Ribeiro, 2019).

Few of these studies dive at any great depth into who the users of these platforms are and how they interact with the content. Part of this is an issue with available data. A researcher can only analyze something that is or can be made quantifiable in some way. This includes text analysis, link sharing, likes, view totals (if available), most common websites shared, and types of topics discussed. It can be very difficult to pull user data from these websites directly, given both the ephemerality of the content and the anonymity of those posting the content. Additionally, only one study to date has analyzed how groups spread their message cross platform. Phadke & Mitra (2020), examined how hate groups use multiple social media platforms to promote their extremist ideologies. The authors found that these groups use each of these platforms differently and to achieve different goals. Twitter was used primarily to educate and for promoting group status, while using Facebook for radicalization and recruitment. Even this study, however, is targeted at analyzing group level behavior, rather than the individual who, given Pew's research on American's social media use, frequent multiple platforms at different stages of their lives and for different reasons.

To dig into where data is available on how individuals interact with the various social media platforms is to be met frequently with case studies and outdated modalities of communication. While Von Behr et al. (2013), correctly identify gaps in the literature on radicalization in the digital era, their own analysis is limited only to case studies of 15 British based extremists. At the time these individuals were arrested for their crimes, several of the social media platforms were still in their early years or did not yet exist. Only very brief information on each individual's background is provided. Gill et al. (2017) utilize a larger dataset of 223

convicted United Kingdom-based terrorists. Their dataset is more substantive and provides larger amounts of demographic data, as well as information on the types of online content each terrorist searched for, downloaded, or disseminated. The authors tested several communication methods, including email, forums, chatrooms, and "other," finding only forums to have any significant result across ideologies. Far-right attackers were more likely to use extremist online forums than Jihadi-inspired extremists. Social media platforms were not mentioned.

With the speed at which technology is changing and the increased cultural penetration of social media in the lives of Americans, many studies focusing on digital technologies can become rapidly outdated. Furthermore, given the dearth of empirical analysis on how the radicalized individual navigates the social media landscape, further analysis in this area will be continually needed.

Moving Forward

There is no question that despite the glut of publications in the area of terrorism studies, there is still much to be studied. Recent efforts to gather well-sourced, empirical data indicate both how far the field has come, and how far there still is to go. Literature on the subject has often reported conflicting results study-to-study regarding issues of mental illness and socioeconomics. The overall poor understanding of mental illness, particularly early into the study of terrorism in the 1970s has led to mischaracterizations of would-be offenders. Furthermore, the failure to adequately adapt to changes in the science of psychology and brain function has left room for faulty conclusions while the wider aggregation of data with a failure to account for societal and cultural shifts has open the door for fundamental attribution errors. Meanwhile the higher order units of analysis used as variables for poverty or socioeconomics tend to ignore more localized economic and lifestyle changes in countries or regions over time.

As such, this leaves room for a deeper exploration on the characteristics of the terrorist.

Prior research in this area is insightful and has paved the way for new exploratory work. However, the laser-like focus on Islamist extremists over the last twenty years has left a chasm open for new exploration into domestic extremism. Additionally, with the fast-paced rise of social media, the environment in these digital spaces is constantly changing. Empirical studies will always be playing a game of catchup in this regard and new studies in this area can always offer valuable insight.

The present study is inherently exploratory by nature and seeks to examine how structural, demographic, and technological shifts have altered the characteristics of the domestic terrorist, if at all. To the author's knowledge, after a lengthy review of the literature, an analysis of how the American domestic extremist has changed over time has never been done before with such a broad array of characteristics, or while including would-be attackers whose plot either failed in the act or were captured prior to plot execution. Therefore, this study offers many implications for the future of terrorism research and is an important contribution to the field.

With the rise of social media, people are both more interconnected and farther apart than they ever have been. Social media has forever changed the landscape with how individuals access information and made it easier than ever for malicious actors to reach vulnerable individuals. Technological changes and rapid cultural changes are a reason to believe that what we presently know and understand about the domestic extremist is not a fixed set of attributes. If current cultural and political polarization trends continue, there is a reason to believe ideologically based violence will increase. If this assumption holds true over the long term, understanding what combination of characteristics may trigger such violence can provide the tools for smarter policies and practices in the future.

CHAPTER III: Methodology

This research aims to study what changes have occurred over time among American extremists. It further aims to study the visible behaviors immediately prior to a domestic terror attack. The purpose of these questions is to better understand trends in attitudes, behaviors and demographic characteristics. It also aims to understand how the process of engagement in these radicalized activities has changed with the advent of 21st century technology. The internet's ability to provide easy access to the most extremist publications, web forums that foment radicalized group think, or real-time, streamable access to video content of someone committing an act of terrorism from any corner of the globe via apps like Snapchat and TikTok has changed the very nature of how extremist ideology is disseminated and understood.

While empirical analysis in this field is growing exponentially, a majority of studies analyze extremist actors or events in aggregate (when not utilizing a case study approach). Typically, these studies will start at some point in the last several decades (usually the 1970s) and analyze a complete set of characteristics between that point in time and the present. There is a simple logic to this approach. It provides for more robustness in the data; something that is particularly important when working with what are rare events. A caveat to this approach, however, is that by analyzing the totality of events together a researcher may miss smaller, more micro-level changes that occur. Economic and cultural shifts within the country can have effects that are lost when studying the data in aggregate.

Research Questions

R_1: Have the general offender characteristics of the domestic terrorist changed over time?

R_2: What are the typical antecedent activities of domestic terrorists prior to the commission of a terrorist act?

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses correspond to R_1:

H_1: There is a shift in sub-ideologies within the right wing. White supremacy will consistently remain the largest sub-ideology, but anti-immigrant specific ideology will increase over time.

To test this hypothesis, PIRUS variables *Date_Exposure*, *Radicalization_Far_Right,* *Radicalization_Single_Issue,* and *Ideological_Sub_Category* will be used. The date of exposure represents the time at which an individual or individuals became known to authorities during the commission of their attack or were caught in the preparation stage of their attack and for the purposes of this study, represents the primary time component of the study. *Date_Exposure* will be used here as the time dimension variable. This variable will be recoded to express dimensions of time by decade. The ideological sub-category as a variable best represents an individual's radical beliefs to the extent with which the information is publicly available. This variable offers more detail than the larger, aggregated ideological umbrellas of "far right," "far left," "single issue," or "Islamist extremist." As Piazza (2017) demonstrated, societal changes like abortion and more women entering the workforce have an effect on the probably of right-wing terrorism.
Other studies have demonstrated localized effects on increases in militia group presence (Freilich & Pridemore, 2005), and white supremacy groups (Blazak, 2001) where manufacturing towns were distressed. This hypothesis aims to understand if there is a larger ebb and flow of ideologies beyond white supremacy and linked to cultural shifting.

H_2: The number of anti-government extremists present in a given time is positively related to a Democrat presidency.

This hypothesis follows in the footsteps of Piazza's (2017) findings of a positive relationship between right-wing terrorism and a Democratic U.S. President. Piazza used data from the GTD for the time period of 1970-2011. During this time, only one Democrat president served two terms (Bill Clinton), at a time in the 1990s which saw a rise in militias and antigovernment movements. Jimmy Carter served one term from 1977-1981, and Barak Obama was still in the middle of his first term at the time of Piazza's data collection. The hypothesis will provide further perspective on America's anti-government extremists and either provide further confirmation that right-wing attacks increase during the term of a Democrat presidency or indicate that perhaps, the increase was a fluke of the 1990s and has not repeated.

To operationalize the concepts for this hypothesis, PIRUS variables *Date_Exposure*, *Radicalization_Far_Right, Radicalization_Far_Left, Radicalization_Single_Issue, Radicalization_Islamist,* and *Ideological_Sub_Category* will be used. A dummy variable to indicate the presence of a Democrat as U.S. President will also be created, where 0 equals a Democrat is not in office and a 1 equals a Democrat is present.

H_3: The duration of the radicalization period is getting shorter with each decade since 1970 for all extremist ideologies.

Radicalization, as many authors have shown, is a gradual thing. Cognitive radicalization typically occurs prior to any behavioral action. No researchers have been able to say with precision how long this takes, given the individual differences associated with each person who does fully radicalize. What researchers have been able to say however, is that it can be as short as a few months or last for several years. Klausen (2016) pointed out differences in his study of Al Qaeda terrorists radicalizing over a shorter time period after 2010, wherein radicalization time

reduced from 5-6 years to approximately 2 years. No equivalent findings have yet been replicated on a U.S. based sample.

To operationalize the concepts for this hypothesis PIRUS variables *Date_Exposure*, *Rad_Duration, Beliefs_Trajectory,* and *Behaviors_Trajectory* will be used. This duration variable represents an ordinal scale detailing the span of time between the first evidence of radicalization and exposure (the time at which a plot or threat came to public or attention). Additionally, the two trajectory variables represent whether an individual's beliefs and/or behaviors radicalized incrementally or via key moments (represented by a dichotomous choice).

H_4: There has been an increase in extremists from lower socioeconomic strata over time.

It is widely regarded in the literature at this time that poverty, in and of itself, has only a very weak direct link to terrorism. GDP was the often chosen and referenced concept to represent economic status (Abadie, 2004). The problem with this, however, is that GDP is not a true measure of economic status for the individual, nor is it an indicator of economic wellbeing for an individual or small community. It is simply too large a unit of analysis, even when reducing GDP to the state level, as Piazza (2017) demonstrated in his study on determinants of right-wing terrorism in the U.S. Other models proposed different indicators. Internationally, Bueno de Mesquita (2005) observed economic downturns; when opportunity was low, willingness to volunteer in a terrorist organization was higher. Piazza (2017) tried to replicate this using the farming crisis of the 1980s and subsequent destitution of agricultural towns and reduction of total farms in the Mid-West as areas of low opportunity. There were no significant findings. Perhaps this too is still thinking too big when terrorists are such a rare population.

To operationalize my concepts of socioeconomic strata, ordinal level variables

Social_Stratum_Adulthood and *Social_Stratum_Childhood* from the PIRUS dataset will be used. These variables represent a more holistic view of socioeconomic status at the individual level and are categorized with ordinal level indicators of low, medium, and high. These variables do not have concrete cutoffs like the federal poverty level does. For this variable, "low" indicates someone who receives welfare, lives close to the poverty line, is regularly unemployed or works a blue-collar job at best, and lives in subsidized housing. "Middle" indicates someone who does not receive welfare, lives in a lower-middle or middle-class neighborhood, has steady professional employment, owns or holds a mortgage, or has a college degree. "High" indicates someone with a high-income, white-collar job, lives and owns a house in a middle- or upper-class neighborhood, can afford luxury items, has a college degree or is self-employed/entrepreneur. *Date_Exposure* will be used here as the time dimension variable. This variable will be recoded to express dimensions of time by decade.

H_5: Over time, the amount of education held by the extremist has increased.

Overall, in America, education in the population has increased. For the extremist however, a different sort of phenomenon can be observed. Higher levels of education have been documented among terrorist leaders (Smith & Damphousse, 2002; Kruger & Malečková, 2003), but less so among the common foot soldiers. Traditionally, there is an inverse relationship between education and criminal offending (Selke, 1980; Batiuk, Moke & Roundtree, 1997; Ford & Schroeder, 2011). Despite this overall increase, Chermak & Gruenewald (2015) found a decrease in educational attainment post September 11th. This finding was most notable on the far right. It is unclear what prompted this, but it deserves further scrutiny.

To operationalize the concepts for this hypothesis, the recoded variable for

Date_Exposure will be used, as well as PIRUS variable *Education.* Education is coded as an ordinal level variable.

H_6: The more education held, the higher the likelihood for a successful attack.

Following H_5 and given that terrorist leaders overall have higher rates of education, this hypothesis represents a further examination of how education interacts with radical belief and action. To operationalize the concepts for this variable, PIRUS variables *Education* and *Extent_Plot.* This *Extent*_Plot variable is an ordinal level variable which represents a scale of increasing severity in violence from "nebulous plot," meaning general ideas only, threats made, but not planning or preparation, to "successful execution of plot."

H_7: The data will support the Obama era report of an increase in radicalization of former military, particularly by the right-wing.

The 2009 report released by DHS did not detail what specific sources were used to reach their conclusions that right-wing extremists were gaining new recruits. Reading the report, it is reasonably clear however, that some standard country-wide economic indicators were included as predictors for whatever assessment models were used. These indicators likely included real estate foreclosures, unemployment levels, economic downturn information in the wake of 2008 financial crisis, and data for credit loans. They also likely used some firearms sales data with the unfounded fear among some groups that new firearm restrictions would be imposed under the Obama administration. The basis for this appears to be the similar economic and political climate of the 1990s when right-wing extremists surged during the Clinton administration. Adding in the returning veterans who would have faced a poor labor market and the election of the first Black president created a pool of economic, racial, and social fears ripe for exploitation.

In 2009, the report was specific in its belief that military veterans would be a target for recruitment. Since that time, few studies have examined military history as a predictor of radicalization. Of those that did, military history was used as a simple demographic component, in the same way employment or economic status would be. It was not tested in a longitudinal design beyond the Chermak & Gruenewald (2015) study. This hypothesis aims to narrow that gap in the research. To test this hypothesis, PIRUS variables *Date_Exposure*, *Military,* and a recoded ideology variable will be used. The date of exposure will also be recoded into brackets to account for the time dimension. *Military*, is currently coded as a categorical variable where 0 equals no U.S. military history and 1 through 6 account for different statuses related to a history in the military (active vs. inactive).

H_8: Older extremists are more likely to report alcohol and drug related problems.

One of the more established findings in the terrorism literature is that terrorists tend to be older than the traditional criminal offender. Islamist extremists tend to be the oldest with an average of approximately 31 (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015), though far left and far right groups were not far behind with a mean age of 28. Lone offenders varied considerably in age with a mean of approximately 37 (Richards, et al., 2019). Little research has studied the effects of substance use or abuse or history of substance use within extremist samples. That may be understandable in some circumstances where for religious reasons an individual may not imbibe drugs or alcohol, however given its high comorbidity with mental illness and its frequency of representation in criminal populations, it is an overlooked area for exploration.

To explore this hypothesis PIRUS variables *Age* and *Alcohol_Drug* will be used. Age is represented as a continuous variable, while *Alcohol_Drug* is coded dichotomously based on evidence that an individual has a history of drug or alcohol abuse.

H_9: There will be a preference as to the means with which someone radicalized for those with a mental illness, compared to those without.

The exploratory nature of this hypothesis makes it difficult to hypothesize any directionality or likely preference. To the author's knowledge, no study has been performed to indicate a preferred method of radicalization. Additionally, by preferred method or "preference," the author is indicating a higher frequency of occurrence and not necessarily referring to a conscious choice of radicalization method. Furthermore, because the literature on mental illness and terrorism is so divided in its findings, any new attempts to study the relationships between the two is both needed and warranted.

To test this hypothesis, PIRUS variables *Psychological*, *Internet_Radicalization, Media_radicalization, Social_Media, Clique_Radicalize,* and *Prison_Radicalization.* The variables measuring internet, media, and social media are all categorically coded in the same manner where 0 equals no known role played in radicalization, 1 equals some role played but not the primary means of radicalization, 2 equals the primary means of radicalization. For the internet radicalization variable, data is limited in range from 1995 to the present and for social media, data is limited in range from 2005 to the present. The clique and prison variables represent more interpersonal, socialized means of radicalization. Both variables are categorical. The effect of prison is included in this hypothesis because radicalization in prisons has been studied before (Richards et al., 2019; Wacquant, 1999; van der Gaag, 2019), and individuals with mental illnesses are overrepresented in prisons and jails. No one has, to the author's knowledge, tested the relationship of mental illness and radicalization vis-à-vis prison.

H_{10}: There has been an increase in the recruitment to terrorist groups and/or extremist ideologies from individuals with criminal records.

There is evidence that prison is providing a vehicle for radicalization (Richards et al., 2019; Wacquant, 1999; van der Gaag, 2019). This is particularly visible in Europe among second generation immigrants. A criminal history on the far-right is also not out of the ordinary (Jensen et al., 2020). Non-ideological arrest histories are also not uncommon in the U.S. (Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013). What is less clear is if this observation has always existed, grown, or decreased over time. It is also unclear if one ideology or another is more likely to radicalize in prison or if all ideologies have similar rates of occurrence. To test this hypothesis PIRUS variables *Date_Exposure, Previous_Criminal_Activity,* and the four ideological radicalization variables will be used. *Previous_Criminal_Activity* accounts for non-ideologically motivated criminal activity and is categorically coded.

H_{11}: Older users will be more passive consumers of radicalized content on social media.

While social media's role in the radicalization trajectory is of interest to many scholars and is undergoing constant new analysis, there are still many large gaps whereby individual characteristics and methods of interaction with media and content are not understood. The overall trend within social media is that it skews toward a younger demographic. This trend, however, is not universal across individual platforms, as Sherer & Matsa (2018) demonstrated. Additionally, it is not clear how individuals are interacting with the extremist content they see. Phadke & Mitra (2020) examined how groups used social media to spread their message and Gill et al. (2017), discuss dissemination of extremist content via multiple platforms, it is still unclear how the targeted individual interacts with this content. We must therefore ask what individual differences exist between those who passively see this content versus those who actively engage with it, repost it, or create their own. This hypothesis aims to address one of those individual differences.

To test this hypothesis, PIRUS variables *Age* and *Social_Media_Activities* will be used. *Social_Media_Activities* is a categorical, ordinal-level variable that accounts for multiple types of activity engagement online (see Table 1 for a full description).

The following hypotheses correspond to R_2:

H_{12}: There is a higher likelihood of a catalyzing event preceding an attack or attempted attack for those with a mental illness compared to those without.

Personal crises and major historical events like September 11th have been shown to be catalyzing events that can push someone toward extremism (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015). Of course, most individuals face some major personal crises in their lifetimes and do not go on to commit acts of terrorism. Likewise, millions of Americans witnessed the events of September 11th and did not engage in any acts of extremism or terrorism. Evidence today shows there is rarely no one singular event that triggers an act of terrorism but a multitude of individual events and characteristics all fitting together like a puzzle that can make someone more susceptible to extremist messaging and engaging in violent attacks.

Mental illness as it was previously studied, wherein something must be wrong or deficient in the person to commit such a wonton act of violence, or the individual must be suffering some personality disorder is now known to be a defunct proposition. What is understood about mental illness, is that individuals can react to seemingly ordinary events in ways that are disproportionate to the event(s) itself. This hypothesis aims to test that assumption in the context of terrorism.

To test this hypothesis, PIRUS variables *Psychological, US_Govt_Leader, Foreign_Govt_Leader, Event Influence, Education_Change, Change_Performance, Abuse_Adult, Kicked_Out, Standing, Angry_US* and *Trauma* will be used. The *Psychological* variable will be

measured as a dichotomous yes/no variable for the presence of or history of mental illness. *US_Govt_Leader* is a dichotomous variable that asks if the individual's radicalization was connected to specific actions by the United States government or by particular U.S. leaders. *Foreign_Govt_Leader* asks the same question but in regard to a foreign government or foreign leader. *Event_Influence* is a categorical variable that asks if a specific event precipitated or accelerated radicalization (see Table 1 for full list of events). *Education_Change* is a categorical variable that asks if the individual was a student, if there was a change in academic performance around the time of their extremist activities. *Change_Performance* asks the same question but for work performance. *Abuse_Adult* is a categorical variable that asks if there is evidence of abuse either verbally or physically. *Kicked_*Out is a dichotomous variable that asks if the individual was ever known to be marginalized, ostracized, or dismissed from any social, cultural, religious, or political groups or organization. *Standing* is a categorical variable that asks if the individual experienced a diminution of social standing prior to radicalization. *Angry_US* is a dichotomous variable that asks if the individual was angry with the U.S. society or did not accept the moral validity of the American social value system. Examples of this could be opposing specific policies like late-term abortions or burning or desecrating symbolic items like flags or bibles. The *Trauma* variable is a categorical variable accounting for whether the individual was ever exposed to a traumatic event which involved serious injury or threatened death. Traumatic experiences, like mental illness can frequently be comorbid with substance abuse and PTSD is well-established risk factor for substance use disorders (Breslau et al., 2003).

H_{13}: Individuals on the far right are more likely to engage in violence or violent activity prior to an attack than any other ideology.

Criminal histories are not entirely out of the ordinary for domestic terrorists. Many have engaged in illegal financial schemes to fund their operations or did their radicalizing in prison. Studies on the criminal histories of terrorists are rare, however. Rarer still are the studies on violent criminal histories. Jensen et al. (2020), and Gruenewald et al. (2013) offer some findings on the violent histories of white supremacists and crimes of homicide respectively. Still, the area does need further exploration.

To test this hypothesis, PIRUS variables for the four primary ideologies will be used. These four variables are each coded dichotomously in the dataset. To operationalize violence and violent activity, PIRUS variables *Previous_Criminal_Activity* and *Previous_Criminal_Activity_Type* will be used.

H_{14}: More extensive radicalized beliefs will have a positive relationship with social media interactions.

There have been several studies on the "echo chamber effect" and how this effect can increase the intensity of one's beliefs to the determinant of dissenting opinions. Few studies measure this radicalizing effect on the quality and quantity of online postings. There may be some simple logistical issues for this gap. Many social media profiles and groups are set to private and as a result, gathering open-source data on posts and interactions is limited. Despite this, research does show that in general, in the context of an event, excitement and passion interact to have a positive relationship on social media use (Wakefield &Wakefield, 2016). For example, a study on sports to understand consumer behavior, media consumption, and social media behavior have found that passion had the strongest influence on social media activity (Wakefield, 2016). Scales for passion in this study operationalized concepts of obsessiveness, relationship quality, social

identity, involvement, media consumption and social media use. These scale items are not dissimilar to how a researcher might also measure dedication to a gang, clique, social circle, or extremist group. In extrapolating the finding that more intense passion influences social media use, this hypothesis tests whether more "passionate" beliefs will have a similarly positive relationship with social media interactions. To test this hypothesis, PIRUS variables *Radical_Beliefs, Social_Media_Frequency,* and *Social_Media_Activities* will be used.

H_{15}: Individuals with lower social standing in society will be more engaged with social media.

Social standing is a complex construct that can be determined by several different things. In the common vernacular use of the term, it is one's status, rank, position, or social class in a society. That "society" can be a small, micro-society, like a high school student body, a club or social group, a neighborhood, or office environment. It can also refer to the general hierarchy of wealth or class in society as a whole. It has been used in theories of radicalization in the past as one of many factors that can prime an individual. Moghaddam (2005) refers to it in his staircase model of radicalization.

Employment can act as a proxy for social standing. Unemployment has been linked to radicalization, across ideologies in Europe (Bakker, 2006; Falk et al., 2006). In the United States, the FBI study on lone offenders also indicated more than half their sample had been unemployed (Richards, et al., 2019). In addition to the financial impact of job loss and, unemployment can have a strong emotional impact as individuals reevaluate their situations. Long term job loss can result in feelings of shame, guilt, fear and anger, while financially, the downsizing to accommodate such change can also be emotionally daunting. This reduction of job and economic

status has had some robust findings. Additionally, lower educational attainment and social circles can also reduce one's ability to climb that social and economic hierarchy. Without the rigid structure of work and/or school environments, or social engagements all jockeying for the limited amount of time one has on any given day, that unstructured time is open for engagement with other activities. Increasingly, it appears like that time is being consumed by social media platforms.

To test this hypothesis, the following PIRUS variables will be used: *Standing*, *Kicked_Out*, *Relationship_Troubles*, *Platonic_Troubles*, *Social_Statum_Adulthood*, *Employment_Status, Work_History*, *Education,* and *Social_Media_Activities*. *Standing* is a categorical variable that asks if the individual experienced a diminution of social standing prior to radicalization. Timing vis-à-vis radicalization may be an issue when analyzing this variable, which is why other variables are included as proxies for multiple forms of social standing. *Kicked_Out* is a similar variable but asks the question dichotomously. *Relationship* and *Platonic_Troubles* are both dichotomous variables that ask if the individual had trouble finding or maintain romantic or non-romantic relationships. The employment and work history variables are categorical variables that ask about job status or history in different ways.

Data Analysis

Prior to testing any hypotheses, the data will be sorted to exclude any radicalized individual who attempted to leave the country to commit their attacks or successfully completed an attack outside the borders of the United States. To do this the data will be sorted using the PIRUS *Loc_Plot_State* variable. This variable accounts for the U.S. state or foreign country where the first publicly known extremist plot or activity was centered. This could include where the person was arrested, where they were trained or where they intended to attack. The data set has

this variable divided into two or three additional variables in the cases where this information contained more than one location. Any case where the variable indicates a location outside the United States, its counties or territories, it will be eliminated from all further analysis. Out of 2,226 cases, 27 cases were missing location data and 108 attempted to or successfully committed an attack outside the us. Of the 27 cases, nativity, group membership or affiliation, and radicalized ideology were used to determine the likelihood of their attack being committed on U.S. soil. A total of three were eliminated from these 27 cases wherein no indication could be found as to whether the intended target was on U.S. soil or not.

Given the nature in which the data was collected, and the variables studied, there are some limitations to the types of statistical analyses that can be run. The primary methods for analysis of the largely categorical data represented in the PIRUS dataset will include a combination of chi-squares, log linear analyses, and ordinal logistic regression. For the hypotheses that do contain interval level data, a t-test will be used. A log linear analysis is an expanded version of the chi-square that accounts for multiple variables when observing for interaction effects. The ordinal logistic regression is a type of logistic regression that permits the use of categorical dependent variable with more than two factors.

Data Source

To answer these research questions and hypotheses, secondary data retrieved from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) dataset, "Profiles of Individuals Radicalized in the United States," (PIRUS) will be used. This dataset contains entries from as early as 1948 until the end of 2018. To date, this cross-sectional dataset is the largest known database on individuals radicalized in the United States (Jensen et al., 2016). It

includes 112 variables for approximately 2227 violent and non-violent extremists. The data team sourced the references for these 112 variables from:

> "Newspaper articles, websites (e.g. government, terrorist group, watchdog groups, research institutes, personal information finder sites), secondary datasets, peer-reviewed academic articles, journalistic accounts including books and documentaries, court records, police reports, witness transcribed interviews, psychological evaluations/reports, and information credited to the individual being researched (verified personal websites, autobiographies, social media accounts)," (Jensen et al., 2016, p. 9).

For the purposes of the research in this paper, hypotheses and data analysis will focus on incidents from 1970-2018. This period can be considered the "modern era" of terrorism due both to the sharp rise in the number of incidents from the far-left and far-right during this period and the more defined understanding of what constitutes the planning or action of a domestic terror event. It is also the generally agreed upon time period for which most modern terrorism studies are conducted, as suggested by notable scholars in the field (Crenshaw, 2014; Piazza, 2011). Data from PIRUS includes both successful and failed attacks, and attacks that were stopped during a planning stage. It is a "deidentified cross-sectional, quantitative dataset of individuals in the United States who radicalized to the point of violent or non-violent ideologically motivated criminal activity, or ideologically motivated association with a foreign or domestic extremist organization," (START, 2018). Collection and coding for the dataset occurred in several stages. The researchers used open-source collection products to gather preliminary information on some 4,000 individuals across the ideological spectrum for inclusion. Researchers then coded each case to determine whether it should be included in the dataset using a specific list of criteria that met

their definitions for radicalization and location. Researchers then coded the relevant information for a random sample of individuals who met the inclusion specifications. Random sampling was used in an effort to maximize representativeness of the dataset for all the points in time the project aimed to cover (START, 2020b).

The dataset is not completely comprehensive, but a representative sample of individuals who have radicalized in the United States. It does not contain a complete set of individuals who have radicalized in the United States. Furthermore, it contains information only on individuals who became known to police or other authorities through behavioral action. Due to the nature of collecting information via open-source techniques, the extensive period of time for which the data was collected and reporting trends, the data may not be completely representative of radicalization for every point in time (START, 2020b). Missing data is also an issue for this dataset. Coders of the data were instructed to be conservative in the recording of values for items that were more personal or sensitive in nature such as mental health, coding them as missing, rather than a value for "No" if a source did not indicate anything for that item. Several methods of handling this missing data were explored in a study using the PIRUS data by Jensen, et al. (2016). The authors tested their hypotheses using the data first without addressing the issue of missing data, then with variable reconstruction, regression-based multiple imputation, and maximization imputation based on expected maximization calculations. Findings indicated that the majority of their tested variables that were significant remained significant when accounting for the missing data. Additionally, several variables that were previously not significant became so under each of the methods for handling the missing data that the authors chose.

Criteria for inclusion into the PIRUS dataset was particularly stringent. Each individual had to meet at least one of the following five criteria:

1. “Arrested/Charged: The individual was arrested for committing an ideologically motivated crime. This includes arrests or their equivalents outside the United States.

2. “Indicted: The individual was indicted for an ideologically motivated crime. This includes indictments or their equivalents outside the United States.

3. “Killed in Action: The individual was killed as a result of his/her ideological activities. This includes being killed during the commission of an attack, including suicide, being killed during an attempted arrest/detaining by security forces, being targeted by security forces (even if not the primary target), and being killed in an unmanned aerial vehicle strike.

4. “Member of Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO): The individual is or was a member of a terrorist organization designated by the United States Department of State. Note: "Member" is defined broadly. This includes official members, individuals that the US government or another government claimed were members of a DTO (even if the group itself did not acknowledge the membership), and individuals which credible media sources link to the group (but

   not those based on pure speculation). It also includes individuals who claim membership in a DTO even if the group itself did not acknowledge membership.

5. “Violent Extremist Group Association (VEGA): The individual is or was associated with an extremist organization whose leader(s) or founder(s) has/have been indicted for an ideologically motivated violent offense. Note: "Association" is defined broadly. This includes official membership, membership claimed by a

government, and self-identified association (even if the group does not acknowledge it). It also includes active participation in group activities, such as protests and newsletter subscriptions. "Association" does not include less active participation in group activities, such as signing a petition or listening to a speaker from the group at a public event," (START, 2020b).

In addition, each individual must:

6. "Have radicalized in the United States,
7. Have espoused or currently espouse ideological motives, and
8. Show evidence that his or her behaviors are/were linked to the ideological motives he or she espoused/espouses," (START, 2020b).

The PIRUS data include cases primarily divided ideologically under the "Big Four" – that is, Islamist, Far Right, Far Left and Single Issue. The principal investigators defined these ideologies in the following way:

> **Islamist** – "Jihadism" [is defined] "as a militant methodology practiced by Sunni Islamist-Salafists who seek the immediate overthrow of incumbent regimes and the non-Muslim geopolitical forces which support them, in order to pave the way for an Islamist society which would be developed through martial power. Although there are a number of Islamist-Salafist thinkers who do not advocate for violent military strategies to achieve their goals (e.g., Muhammad Nasiruddin alAlbani), in the US context, the individuals we classify as 'jihadists' are most commonly connected to, or inspired by, violent Islamist-Salafist groups that have their roots in the onset of 'global jihadism' of the 1980s, including al-Qaeda and its affiliated

movements. There are a number of ideological tenets commonly elaborated by Islamist-Salafist groups, including the imposition of *shari'a* law with violent jihad as a central component, the creation of an expansionist Islamic state, or *khalifa*, and the use of local, national, and international grievances affecting Muslims, which are aired in an overtly religious context.

Far Right – "There exists a broad range of far right beliefs and actors (often overlapping movements), including both reactionary and revolutionary justifications of violence. In its modern manifestation in the United States, the ideology of the far right is generally exclusivist and favors social hierarchy, seeking an idealized future favoring a particular group, whether this group identity is racial, pseudo-national (e.g., the Texas Republic) or characterized by individualistic traits (e.g., survivalists). The extremist far right commonly shows antipathy to the political left and the federal government. As a result of this heterodoxy, this category includes radical individuals linked to extremist religious groups (e.g., Identity Christians), non-religious racial supremacists (e.g., Creativity Movement, National Alliance), tax protesters, sovereign citizens, militias, and militant gun rights advocates.

Far Left – "The far left in the United States is essentially class-oriented and consists primarily of individuals and groups that adhere to belief systems based on egalitarianism and the mobilization of disenfranchised segments of the population. With roots in the leftist student movement and radical prison reform movement of the late 1960s, traditional far left extremists generally sought the overthrow of the capitalist system, including the United States government, in order to replace it

with a new, anti-imperialist economic order that empowers members of the "working class". The traditional left included groups that maintained a distinct racial identity (e.g., Black Panther Party), which were motivated by a mix of economic grievances and race-based issues. Today, the far left is more commonly identified by followers of animal-rights and environmental protection issues. While not all animal rights or environmental groups are inherently leftist in orientation (for instance, there are Green Fascists), the vast majority of these individuals and groups identify with leftist political positions and have thus been included in the far left category for the purposes of this project.

Single Issue – "Single issue extremists are individuals who are motivated primarily by a single issue, rather than a broad ideology. Examples in the PIRUS data of single issue extremists are individuals associated with the Puerto Rican independence movement, anti-abortion extremists that were not motivated by traditional far right issues (anti-government, race superiority, etc.), members of the Jewish Defense League, and extremists with idiosyncratic ideologies (e.g., Ted Kaczynski)," (START, 2020).

Though primarily radicalization had to occur in the United States, the dataset also includes those who radicalized in the U.S. but either left to carry out attacks abroad or were apprehended with the intent to carry out attacks abroad. For the purposes of this study, those individuals are excluded from analysis. Only individuals who carried out or intended to carry out attacks on U.S. soil were kept in the dataset for analysis. Removal of these cases primarily affected individuals under the Islamist ideology. Any entries where the incident remained unclear as an act of

terrorism (cases where there might be some overlap of general crime, political violence, or organized crime), these incidents were excluded. Any duplicates were also excluded.

Coding

The dataset contains multiple variable types. Dichotomous variables were structured such that a variable of "0" always indicates a "no" value. This has resulted in the values of many variables being shifted up by 1. For example, "Gender" is coded as 1=Female, and 2 = Male. A value of -99 indicates the project team was unable to find information in a public source. A value coded as -88 indicates that for a specific observation, that value is not applicable.

Variable Descriptions

This study aims to test multiple hypotheses. Independent variables in one model may act as dependents in another. In an effort to be both comprehensive and provide the reader with a clear understanding of what variables are to be tested and how they were measured and coded, all variables appear in the table below.

Table 1

Summary List of PIRUS variables to be analyzed

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Date of Exposure This is usually time of incident or arrest, or earliest mention of individual in sources, so long as these are related to the plot/radicalization of the individual.	Date
Radicalization Duration What was the duration of time between the first evidence of radicalization (either radicalization of beliefs or radicalization of behaviors, whichever occurs first) and exposure (when the plot/threat first came to public attention)?	Categorical 1 = Short (less than a year) 2 = Medium (between one and five years) 3 = Long (more than five years)
Behaviors Trajectory Did the individual's behaviors radicalize incrementally over an extended period of time? Or, were there key moments of transition in the radicalization of the individual's behaviors?	Dichotomous 1 = Gradual 2 = Key Moments
Beliefs Trajectory Did the individual's beliefs radicalize gradually over an extended period of time? Or, were key events or moments temporally linked to changes in the individual's radical beliefs?	Dichotomous 1 = Gradual 2 = Key Moments
Radical Beliefs Maximum extent of radicalization apparent in the individual's behaviors.	Ordinal 0 = Ideological system but no evidence of belief in radical versions of ideology 1 = Evidence of exposure to radical ideology 2 = Pursues further information on radical ideology 3 = Full knowledge of tenets of radical ideology 4 = Shares many of the beliefs of radical ideology 5 = Deep commitment to radical ideological beliefs -99 = Unknown
Radicalization Islamist Did the individual become radicalized as part of an Islamist or jihadist movement?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes
Radicalization Far Right Did the individual become radicalized as part of a right-wing movement?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes
Radicalization Far Left Did the individual become radicalized as part of a left-wing movement?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Radicalization Single Issue Did the individual become radicalized over a single issue?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes
Ideological Subcategory Subcategory of ideological extremism	Categorical, Multiple Select 1 = Militia/gun rights 2 = White supremacist/KKK/Neo-Nazi 3 = Xenophobic/Anti-immigrant 4 = Anti-government/Sovereign Citizens movement 5 = Christian Identity 6 = Animal rights/Environmentalist 7 = New Left (primarily 1960's student movements/anti-Vietnam War) 8 = Black Nationalist/Black Separatist 9 = Anti-capitalist/Communist/ anti-Imperialist 10 = Anarchist 11 = Islamist 12 = Puerto Rican independence/Puerto Rican nationalist 13 = Irish Republican Army 14 = Cult/idiosyncratic 15 = Anti-abortion 16 = Jewish Defense League 17 = Anti-gay 18 = Other 19 = Male supremacist
Internet Use Plot If the individual's extremist activity involved a violent plot, did the individual use the internet for communications or logistics while preparing for and undertaking the plot? This includes using the internet to communicate with group members or other extremists, threatening targets, researching the target and tactics, and ordering supplies. Note: this does *not* include radicalizing through the internet, which is addressed in another question.	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes
Internet Radicalization What role did the internet play in the individual's radicalization?	Ordinal 0 = No known role of the internet in individual's radicalization 1 = Internet played a role but was not the primary means of radicalization (e.g. internet resources were used to reaffirm or advance pre-existing radical beliefs) 2 = Internet was the primary means of radicalization for the individual (e.g. initial exposure to ideology and subsequent radicalization occurred online

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Media Radicalization What role did media besides the internet (books, movies, television shows, radio) play in the individual's radicalization?	Ordinal 0 = No known role of media in individual's radicalization 1 = Media played a role but was not the primary means of radicalization (e.g. media resources were used to reaffirm or advance pre-existing radical beliefs) 2 = Media was the primary means of radicalization for the individual (e.g. initial exposure to ideology and subsequent radicalization occurred through media)
Social Media Is there evidence that online social media played a role in the individual's radicalization and/or mobilization? Online social media is defined as any form of electronic communication through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content, such as videos and images. This variable is distinct from **Internet_Radicalization** in that it emphasizes online user-to-user communication, rather than passively viewing content hosted by an online domain.	Categorical 0 = No 1 = Yes, it played a role but was not the primary means of radicalization or mobilization 2 = Yes, it was the primary means of radicalization for the individual (e.g., initial exposure to ideology and subsequent radicalization occurred over online social media)
Social Media Frequency If there is evidence that online social media played a role in the individual's radicalization and/or mobilization, on average how often did the individual engage in social media-related activity related to radicalization and/or mobilization?	Ordinal 1 = Rarely (about once a month or less) 2 = Sporadically (about 2-3 times per month) 3 = Occasionally (about once a week) 4 = Frequently (about once a day) 5 = Continually (multiple times per day) -99 = Unknown -88 = Not Applicable (radicalization/mobilization occurred before 2005)

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Social Media Activities If there is evidence that online social media played a role in the individual's radicalization and/or mobilization, which types of social media-related activities did the individual participate in?	Categorical, Multiple Entry 1 = Consuming content (passive) 2 = Disseminating content (i.e., sharing, spreading existing content) 3 = Participating in extremist dialogue (i.e., creating unsophisticated content) 4 = Creating propaganda/content (e.g., creating extremist manifestos, propaganda videos, etc.) 5 = Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology (no communication on specific travel plans or plot) 6 = Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel 7 = Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack -99 = Unknown -88 = Not Applicable (radicalization/mobilization occurred before 2005)
Violent Did the individual actively participate in ideologically motivated operations/actions that resulted in causalities/injuries or clearly intended to result in causalities/injuries (but failed), or were they charged with conspiracy to kill or injure but were interdicted in the plotting phase? Examples of violent operations/plots include murder, assault, armed robbery, kidnapping, bombing, and arson (but not if they purposely avoid human causalities). Examples of nonviolent ideologically motivated operations/actions include property destruction/vandalism, illegal protest, armed standoffs that were defused without injury, receiving "terrorist" training but not acting on it, inciting others to violence but no direct action themselves, threatening violent actions without operational progress toward a plot, possession of illegal weapons without operational plans for violence, and "paper terrorism" tactics (e.g. filing false liens, tax fraud, etc.).	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Previous Criminal Activity Prior to their radicalization, does the individual have a history of involvement in non-ideologically motivated criminal activities?	Ordinal 0 = No previous criminal activity 1 = Previous (non-violent) minor criminal activity (e.g., convicted of a misdemeanor crime) 2 = Previous (non-violent) serious criminal activity (e.g., convicted of a felony crime) 3 = Previous violent crime
Previous Criminal Activity Type If an individual has a history of non-ideologically motivated crime prior to their radicalization, which of the following activities was he/she involved in?	Categorical, Multiple Entry 1 = Homicide 2 = Forcible Rape 3 = Robbery 4 = Aggravated Assault 5 = Burglary 6 = Larceny-Theft 7 = Motor Vehicle Theft 8 = Arson 9 = Simple Assault 10 = Fraud 11 = Forgery 12 = Embezzlement 13 = Driving Under the Influence (DUI)/Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) 14 = Prostitution 15 = Vandalism 16 = Drug related (e.g., selling/distributing drugs, cultivating drugs, but not simply drug use). 17 = Parole violation 18 = Unlawful possession, transportation, or use of a firearm 19 = Domestic violence/spousal abuse 20 = Other -99 = Unknown -88 = N/A (never engaged in criminal activity)
Group Membership Was the individual in a group? If the individual is both a member of a formal extremist organization and an above-ground political movement or activist group	Categorical 0 = Not a member of a group 1 = Member of an above-ground political movement or activist group (e.g., Operation Rescue, Earth First!) 2 = Member of an informal group of fellow extremists (e.g., a 'homegrown' cell or informal militia) 3 = Member of a formal extremist organization or an extremist movement (e.g., Weather Underground, Animal Liberation Front, al-Qaeda)

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Clique Was the individual part of a clique? A clique is defined as a close-knit, insular, and exclusive group of people containing at least two individuals. A clique can exist within a larger group—e.g. a clique of operatives within al-Qaeda—and separately from an organized group, such as a clique of friends that plans a terrorist attack.	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes
Extent of Plot If the individual's extremist activity involved a violent plot, to what extent did the plot progress? I.e., how far did the planning and execution proceed?	Ordinal 0 = No plot 1 = Nebulous plot (general ideas only, threats made to targets in the absence of planning or preparation) 2 = Attempted acquisition of materials for plot 3 = Acquisition and possession of materials for plot 4 = Attempted and failed execution of plot 5 = Successful execution of plot -99 = Unknown
US Government Leader Was the individual's radicalization connected to specific actions by the United States government or particular US leaders?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes -99 = Unknown
Foreign Government Leader Was the individual's radicalization connected to specific actions by a foreign government or particular foreign leaders?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes -99 = Unknown
Event Influence Which, if any, of the following events evidently (according to sources) precipitated or accelerated the individual's radicalization?	Categorical, Multiple Entry 0 = None 1 = September 11 terrorist attacks 2 = Vietnam War 3 = Cold War 4 = First Gulf War 5 = Afghanistan/Iraq War 6 = Ruby Ridge/Waco 7 = Arab Spring/Syrian Civil War 8 = Other -99 = Unknown

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Angry US	Dichotomous
Were there signs that the individual was angry with US society, or did not accept the moral validity of the American social value system? Such signs could include public statements opposing specific policies (e.g. late-term abortions), burning or desecrating symbolic items (e.g. an American flag or bible), or posting inflammatory anti-U.S. messages in online forums.	0 = No 1 = Yes -99 = Unknown
Platonic Troubles	Dichotomous
Did subject typically have difficulty finding or maintaining non-romantic relationships?	0 = No 1 = Yes
Relationship Troubles	Dichotomous
Did subject typically have difficulty finding or maintaining romantic relationships?	0 = No 1 = Yes
Kicked Out	Dichotomous
Was subject ever known to be marginalized, ostracized, or dismissed from any social, cultural, religious, or political groups or organizations?	0 = No 1 = Yes
Employment Status	Categorical
What was the subject's employment status at the time of exposure?	1 = Employed 2 = Self-employed 3 = Unemployed, looking for work 4 = Unemployed, not looking for work 5 = Student 6 = Retired -99 = Unknown
Work History	Categorical
What is the individual's work history prior to their date of exposure?	1 = Long-term Unemployed 2 = Underemployed (i.e. less than full-time) 3 = Serially Employed (i.e. jumped from job to job) 4 = Regularly Employed (i.e. held the same job for a long period or followed an upward and/or conventional career path in the given profession) -99 = Unknown -88 = N/A
Social Standing	Categorical
Did the individual experience a diminution of social standing prior to radicalization? Examples include being excluded from informal social groups, public embarrassment, or losing the respect of close friends, family, or acquaintances.	0 = No 1 = Yes, but timing vis-à-vis radicalization is unknown 2 = Yes, but a long time before radicalization 3 = Yes, shortly prior to radicalization -99 = Unknown

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Military Was the individual ever in the U.S. military?	Categorical 0 = No 1 = Yes, inactive at time of radicalization, unknown deployment 2 = Yes, inactive at time of radicalization, never deployed 3 = Yes, inactive at time of radicalization but previously deployed 4 = Yes, active at time of radicalization, unknown if ever deployed 5 = Yes, active at time of radicalization but never deployed to an active combat zone 6 = Yes, active at time of radicalization and had been deployed to an active combat zone -99 = Unknown
Foreign Military Was the individual ever in a foreign military (i.e., non-U.S.) service?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes -99 = Unknown
Social Stratum Childhood In what social stratum did this individual fall in childhood?	Ordinal 1 = Low (e.g. receives welfare, lives close to the poverty line, regularly unemployed or at best works a blue collar job, lives in subsidized housing) 2 = Middle (e.g. does not receive welfare, lives in lower-middle or middle class neighborhood, has steady professional employment, owns or holds a mortgage on a house, has college degree) 3 = High (e.g. works a high-income, white-collar job, lives and owns a house in a middle or upper class neighborhood, can afford luxury items, has college degree or is self-employed as a successful entrepreneur) -99 = Unknown

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Social Stratum Adulthood	Ordinal
In what social stratum did this individual fall in adulthood?	1 = Low (e.g. receives welfare, lives close to the poverty line, regularly unemployed or at best works a blue collar job, lives in subsidized housing) 2 = Middle (e.g. does not receive welfare, lives in lower-middle or middle class neighborhood, has steady professional employment, owns or holds a mortgage on a house, has college degree) 3 = High (e.g. works a high-income, white-collar job, lives and owns a house in a middle or upper class neighborhood, can afford luxury items, has college degree or is self-employed as a successful entrepreneur) -99 = Unknown -88 = Not Applicable (if exposure occurred before the individual turned 18 years old)
Aspirations	Categorical
Did the individual have clear educational or career aspirations?	0 = No 1 = Yes, but did not attempt to achieve them (e.g., talked about becoming a lawyer but never enrolled in college) 2 = Yes, had aspirations, but failed to achieve them 3 = Yes, achieved aspirations prior to public exposure -99 = Unknown
Psychological	Dichotomous
Is there evidence presented in the sources that the individual had a history of mental illness?	0 = No 1 = Yes, according to public/popular speculation 2 = Yes, professionally diagnosed
Trauma	Categorical
Prior to radicalization, was subject ever exposed to any traumatic event in which he witnessed an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of others, where his response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror?	0 = No 1 = Yes, but timing vis-à-vis radicalization is unknown 2 = Yes, but a long time before radicalization 3 = Yes, shortly before radicalization -99 = Unknown
Education Change	Categorical
If the individual was a student, were there any changes in academic performance around the time of involvement in extremist activities?	0 = No 1 = Yes, it improved 2 = Yes, it worsened -99 = Unknown -88 = Not Applicable (individual was not a student)

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Performance Change Were there any changes in the individual's work performance (e.g. started arriving late, not showing up, or unsatisfactory performance) around the time of radicalization (e.g. shortly before radicalization, during radicalization, or shortly after radicalization)?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes -88 = Not Applicable (the individual was unemployed) -99 = Unknown
Alcohol or Drug Abuse Is there evidence presented in the sources that the individual had a history of alcohol or drug abuse?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes
Immigrant Generation Was the individual a first or second-generation immigrant? First generation immigrants refer to individuals born outside the United States. Second generation immigrants refer to individuals who were born in the United States, but whose parents were born outside the United States.	Categorical 0 = Not a first or second-generation immigrant (3+ generations in the United States) 1 = First generation 2 = Second generation -99 = Unknown
Age (at time of exposure)	Continuous
Student Was the individual a student at the time of radicalization of beliefs or behaviors?	Dichotomous 0 = No 1 = Yes -99 = Unknown
Gender What is in the individual's gender?	Dichotomous 1 = Female 2 = Male -99 = Unknown
Marital Status What was the individual's marital status at the date of exposure?	Categorical 1 = Single (never married) 2 = Married (religious or civil marriage qualifies) 3 = Divorced or Separated 4 = Widowed -99 = Unknown
Children Number of children at date of exposure	Continuous

Item in PIRUS and Description	Coding in PIRUS
Religious Background What was the religion practiced / exposed to prior to becoming radicalized?	Categorical 1 = Sunni Islam 2 = Shi'a Islam 3 = Sufi Islam 4 = Other Islam (including schismatic Muslims such as Ahmadis) 5 = Unspecified Islam (e.g. the source only mentioned the individual was a Muslim) 6 = Evangelical Protestant Christianity (e.g., Baptist, Pentecostal) 7 = Mainline Protestant Christianity (e.g., Lutheran, Presbyterian) 8 = Catholic Christianity 9 = Orthodox Christianity 10 = Other Christianity (including schismatic Christians such as Jehovah's Witnesses) 11 = Unspecified Christianity (e.g. the source only mentioned the individual was a Christian) 12 = Jewish 13 = Buddhist 14 = Hindu 15 = New religion (such as Scientology and New Age communities, including new religions that claim an ancient source, such as Odinism and Satanism) 16 = Agnostic (accepts existence of a deity, but no religious beliefs) 17 = Atheist (actively rejects existence of a deity) 18 = Other -99 = Unknown

CHAPTER IV: Results

Subjects

Table 2

Subject Demographics

Variable	(N)	(%)	Mean	Median	Mode
Age	1989	100	34.32	31	26
Gender					
Male	1783	89.6	-	-	-
Female	206	10.4	-	-	-
Immigrant Generation					
3rd+ Generation	1618	85.7	-	-	-
2nd Generation	70	3.5	-	-	-
1st Generation	201	10.6			
Marital Status					
Single, Never Married	662	54.6	-	-	-
Married	428	35.3	-	-	-
Divorced or separated	110	9.1	-	-	-
Widowed	12	1	-	-	-
Children					
No Children	623	58.7	-	-	-
1-2 Children	293	27.6	-	-	-
3-4 Children	93	8.8	-	-	-
5-6 Children	30	2.8	-	-	-
7 or more Children	7	2.3	-	-	-
Ideology					
Islamist	413	20.8	-	-	-
Far Right	925	46.5	-	-	-
Far Left	312	15.7	-	-	-
Single Issue	339	17	-	-	-
Education					
Did not finish high school	121	15	-	-	-
High school diploma	192	23.9	-	-	-
Vocational School	20	2.5	-	-	-
Some college	204	25.4	-	-	-
Bachelor's degree	168	20.9	-	-	-
Some Master's Schooling or Master's degree	51	6.5	-	-	-
Doctoral or Professional degree	48	6	-	-	-

Variable	(N)	(%)	Mean	Median	Mode
Employment Status					
Employed	484	51.6	-	-	-
Self-employed	145	15.5	-	-	-
Student	109	11.6	-	-	-
Unemployed, looking for work	78	8.3	-	-	-
Unemployed, not looking for work	103	11	-	-	-
Retired	19	2	-	-	-
Socioeconomic Stratum					
Low	241	25.1	-	-	-
Middle	613	64	-	-	-
High	108	11	-	-	-

This study includes individuals radicalized in the United States that came to public attention either in the preparatory stage of an attack or post commission of an attack on U.S. soil. A total of 1989 cases were included in this dataset. Inclusion for study ranged from the years 1970-2018, the last year for which data was collected at the time of analysis. Individuals radicalized in the U.S. came from every state in the Union, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The states with the most prevalent representation in the dataset include California, New York, Texas, and Florida, respectively. This statistically follows general population patterns within the U.S. Ages of radicalized individuals ranged from as young as 10 to as old as 88. The mean age of the sample was 34.32, with a median of 31 and a mode of 26. The sample is overwhelmingly male, at 89.6% (n = 1783), while only 10.4% were female (n = 206). The majority of the sample (85.7%) represented individuals whose families have been in the United States three generations or more (n = 1618), while 10.6% were first generation immigrants (n = 201), and 3.5% were second generation immigrants (n = 70). Of those where a marital status was indicated (n = 1212), 54.6% were single, never married (n = 662), 35.3% were married (n = 428), 9.1% were divorced or separated (n = 110), and 1% (n = 12) were widowed. Additionally, of those where information on children was obtained (n = 1062), 58.7% (n = 623) had no children,

27.6% had 1-2 children (n = 293), 8.8% had 3-4 children (n = 93), 2.8% had 5-6 children (n = 30), and 2.3% had 7 or more children (n = 23).

Of the four primary umbrella ideologies, 20.8% (n = 413) were reported as having radicalized Islamist ideologies, 46.5% were reported as having radicalized Far Right ideologies (n = 925), 15.7% were reported as having radicalized Far Left ideologies (n = 312) and 17% were reported as having radicalized Single Issue ideologies (n = 339). Where a specific religious background could be identified (n = 688), 17.2% were identified as Sunni Islamic (n = 118) and 16.4% were identified as "unspecified Islam," where a source only mentioned the individual was a Muslim. Other Islamic sects (Shi'a, Sufi, and Ahmadis) were less than 2% (n = 12). Evangelical Protestants (e.g., Baptist, Pentecostal) represented 5.8% (n = 40), Mainline Protestants (e.g., Lutheran, Presbyterian) represented 4.4% (n = 30), Catholics represented 8.3% (n = 57), and Unspecified Christianity represented 20.1% (n = 138). Additionally, 9.7% were identified as Jewish (n = 67) and 10% were identified as a new religion (n = 69). New religions included Scientology, New Age communities, and new religions that claim an ancient source, such as Odinism or Satanism. Less than 5% represented other religions.

Turning to education and economics, where information on education could be obtained (n = 804), 15% did not finish high school (n = 121). Another 23.9% held a high school diploma (n = 192). A small percentage (2.5%) attended or completed vocational school (n = 20). About a quarter (25.4%) of the sample had at least some college education (n = 204), while 20.9% held a college degree (n = 168). About 6.5% had either some Master's schooling or a Master's degree (n = 51) and another 6% had either some Doctoral/Professional degree schooling or a Doctoral/Professional degree (n = 48). Additionally, where information on employment could be obtained (n = 938), 51.6% were employed at the time of exposure (n = 484). A further 15.5%

were self-employed (n = 145) and 11.6% were students (n = 109). Nearly 10% were unemployed at the time of exposure, with 8.3% (n = 78) looking for work and 11% (n = 103) not looking for work. Only 2% were identified as retired (n = 19). Furthermore, where socioeconomic stratum could be identified (n = 1027), 25.1% were identified as "low" (n = 241), indicating someone who receives welfare, lives close to the poverty line, is regularly unemployed or at best works a blue-collar job and/or lives in subsidized housing. Nearly 64% were identified as "middle" (n = 613), indicative of someone who does not receive welfare, lives in a lower-middle- or middle-class neighborhood, has steady professional employment, owns or holds a mortgage on a house and/or has a college degree. Lastly, just over 11% (n = 108) were identified as "high," indicative of someone who works a high-income, white-collar job, lives and owns a house in a middle- or upper-class neighborhood, can afford luxury items, has a college degree or is self-employed as a successful entrepreneur.

Hypothesis Testing

H_1: There is a shift in sub-ideologies within the right wing. White supremacy will consistently remain the largest sub-ideology, but anti-immigrant specific ideology will increase over time.

To test this hypothesis the date of exposure was coded into a new variable with five factors corresponding to each decade starting from the 1970s. Sub-ideologies of the four umbrella ideologies (Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, and Single Issue) were recoded and compressed into a new variable in an effort to reduce the possibility of low cell counts where some sub-ideologies might have only had a handful of occurrences in a given decade. Between 1970-1979, a total of 193 individuals in the sample (9.7%) were exposed either in the plot stage or attack stage. Between 1980-1989, a total of 248 individuals in the sample (12.5%) were exposed. Between

1990-1999, there were 302 (15.2%) radicalized individuals exposed. Between 2000-2009, 467 (23.5%) were exposed, and between 2010-2018, 779 (39.2%) radicalized individuals were exposed. This last decade, despite the truncated data collection, contained the most radicalized individuals in the previous 40 years.

Table 3

Radicalization Exposure by Decade

Decade of Exposure	(N)	(%)
1970 – 1979	193	9.7
1980 – 1989	248	12.5
1990 – 1999	302	15.2
2000 – 2009	467	23.5
2010 – 2018	779	39.2

Within sub-ideologies, the most commonly reported sub-ideology was White Supremacy/KKK/Neo-Nazi beliefs (n = 569, 28.6%). The second most reported ideology Islamist (n = 413, 20.8%), and the third most reported was Anti-government/Sovereign Citizens (n = 201, 10.1%). Rounding out the top five were Animal Rights/Environmentalist (n= 149, 7.5%) and Anti-Abortionists (n = 130, 6.5%) respectively. Where a second sub-ideology could be identified (in addition to the first), Anti-government/Sovereign Citizens was most common (n = 77, 31.6%), followed by Xenophobic/Anti-immigrant (n = 39, 16%), and Christian Identity (n = 35, 14.3%).

Table 4

Frequencies of Radicalized Sub-Ideologies

Sub-ideology	(N)	(%)
Primary Sub-ideology		
White Supremacy/KKK/Neo-Nazi Beliefs	569	28.6
Islamist	413	20.8
Anti-government/Sovereign Citizen	201	10.1
Animal/Environmental Rights	149	7.9
Anti-abortionists	130	6.5
Secondary Sub-ideology		
Anti-government/Sovereign Citizen	77	31.6
Xenophobic/Anti-immigrant	39	16
Christian Identity	35	14.3

To test whether anti-immigrant specific ideologies have been increasing over time, a chi-square analysis was performed using the dates of exposure by decade and a compressed form of the sub-ideology variable. A significant result was found (X^2 [32, N = 1989] = 938.10, p < .001). See Table 5 for further details.

Table 5

A Crosstabulation of the Decade of Exposure with Radicalized Sub-Ideology

Exposure Decade	Sub-ideology								
	Militia/ Gun Rights	White Supremacist/ KKK/Neo-Nazi	Xenophobic/ Anti-immigrant	Anti-Government/ Sovereign Citizen	Christian Identity	Leftist Ideologies	Islamist	Single Issue	Other
1970-1979	0	25	1	5	1	94	0	1	66
	(-2.8)	(-4.1)	(-2.0)	(-3.3)	(-.2)	(11.7)	(-6.3)	(-3.7)	(11.3)
1980-1989	4	99	0	7	2	31	0	44	61
	(-1.8)	(3.3)	(-2.8)	(-3.6)	(.3)	(-1.2)	(-7.2)	(5.5)	(7.9)
1990-1999	28	98	1	61	5	36	5	57	11
	(4.7)	(1.2)	(-2.7)	(5.5)	(2.2)	(-1.6)	(-7.3)	(6.7)	(-3.2)
2000-2009	19	139	4	35	3	78	156	16	17
	(.2)	(.5)	(-2.7)	(-1.8)	(.0)	(.6)	(6.0)	(-3.5)	(-4.0)
2010-2018	27	208	55	93	2	71	252	40	31
	(-.6)	(-1.0)	(6.4)	(1.6)	(-1.4)	(-4.6)	(7.1)	(-2.8)	(-4.9)
Total	78	569	61	201	13	310	413	158	186

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 938.10, df = 32, $p < .000$; Cramer's V = .343, $p < .000$

As predicted, white supremacy did remain the most common right-wing sub-ideology of all the right-wing ideologies. This was consistent over every decade studied. More importantly, there does appear to be an ebb-and-flow of sub-ideologies beyond the core faction of white supremacy. While nascent in the 1970s and 1980s, the xenophobic/anti-immigrant ideology had increased to 55 (7.1%) by the 2010s as a primary sub-ideology and to 31 (30.7%) as a secondary sub-ideology. This effect was also noted for the anti-government/sovereign citizen sub-ideology as well for every decade except for the 2000s from 5 (2.6%) in the 1970s to 93 (12%) in the 2010s. A possible effect of patriotic sentiment may have been at play in the wake of September 11th, 2001. Militia/gun rights extremists and Christian Identity extremists did not show the same pattern of increase.

H_2: The number of anti-government extremists present in a given time is positively related to a Democrat presidency.

To test this hypothesis ideological sub-categories were compressed to a dichotomous variable where 0 = Not anti-government/sovereign citizen/militia and 1 = anti-government/sovereign citizen/militia. A new dummy variable was created to determine the political party of the president at the time of each case where 0 = not a Democrat president and 1 = Democrat president. Between 1970 and 2018, there were three Democrat presidents spanning a total of 20 years and six Republican presidents spanning a total of 29 years. During that time, 842 recorded attacks or would-be attacks in the sample occurred under a Democrat presidency, while 1147 occurred under a Republican presidency. Out of all the sub ideologies, a total of 320 (16.1%) were labeled as anti-government, militia related, or sovereign citizen motivated.

To determine if a relationship exists between a democratic presidency and anti-government ideological extremists a loglinear analysis between the new antigovernment ideology variable, the Democrat president variable, and exposure decade was performed. The loglinear analysis is a more

advanced form of the chi-square, which permits an analysis of more than two variables at a time and can observe interaction effects between all variables in the model. This three-way loglinear test indicates a significant result that retains all effects. The likelihood ratio of the model was X^2 (0) = 0, p = 1. The likelihood ratio here maintains a non-significant test statistic which indicates that the expected values generated by the model are a good fit of the data. This indicates that the highest order interaction (exposure decade x anti-government ideology x Democrat president) was significant (X^2 [4, N = 1989] = 23.33, p < .001). See Table 6 for further details.

Table 6

Counts of Anti-Government Ideology with Presence of a Democrat President and Exposure Decade

Exposure Decade	Democrat Presidency	Ideology	
		Non-Antigovernment Ideology	Anti-Government/Militia/Sovereign Citizens
1970 - 1979	Not Dem President	152 (7.7%)	4 (.2%)
	Dem President	36 (1.8%)	1 (.1%)
1980 – 1989	Not Dem President	188 (9.5%)	25 (1.3%)
	Dem President	35 (1.8%)	- (.0%)
1990 – 1999	Not Dem President	53 (2.7%)	5. (.3%)
	Dem President	152 (7.7%)	92 (4.7%)
2000 – 2009	Not Dem President	331 (16.7%)	42 (2.1%)
	Dem President	77 (3.9%)	17 (.9%)
2010 – 2018	Not Dem President	298 (15%)	49 (2.5%)
	Dem President	347 (17.5%)	85 (4.3%)

To break this effect down, a separate chi-square was performed between anti-government ideology and a Democrat presidency. Results indicate a significant association, X^2 (1, N = 1989) = 54.07, p < .001 (see Table 7). The odds ratio indicates that the odds of an anti-government motivated attack or planned attack is 2.46 times higher under a Democratic presidency than not. The hypothesis is supported.

Table 7

A Crosstabulation of Anti-Government Ideology and a Democrat Presidency

	Democrat Presidency	
Ideology	Non-Democrat President	Democrat President
Non-Antigovernment Ideologies	1022 (1.9)	647 (-2.2)
Anti-government/Militia/ Sovereign Citizen	125 (-4.4)	195 (5.1)
Totals	1147	842

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 54.07, *df* = 1, *N = 1989*, p < .001; *phi* = .165. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

H_3: The duration of the radicalization period is getting shorter with each decade since 1970 for all extremist ideologies.

Initial review of the data for the duration variable indicates a total of 815 cases in which information could be found. 157 cases (7.9%) were marked as having a short radicalization period (less than a year). 348 cases (17.5%) were marked as having a medium radicalization duration period (between 1 and 5 years). There were 310 cases (15.6%) marked as having a long duration period (more than 5 years). For the variable *Beliefs_Trajectory*, information was found for 776 cases, where 550 (27.7%) indicate their radicalized beliefs occurred in a gradual process, while 226 cases (11.4%) indicate radicalization occurred over the course of some key moments or

events. For the variable *Behaviors_Trajectory*, information was found for 873 cases, where 529 (26.6%) indicate radicalization behaviors occurred over a gradual process, while 343 cases (17.2%) indicate their behavioral radicalization over the course of some key moments or events.

Initial testing of this hypothesis was performed using ordinal regression analysis whereby the *Radicalization_Duration* variable acted as the dependent variable and *Exposure_Decade, Beliefs_Trajectory,* and *Behaviors_Trajectory* acted as predictors. Initial results of the Test of Parallel Lines (also referred to as the "proportionality of odds" assumption) here indicate a significant *p*-value (X^2 [9, $N = 540$] = 25.02, $p = .003$), which means a violation of the assumption and a poorly fitted model. A review of the ordinal regression's Goodness-of-Fit test was also performed to avoid the possibility of a Type II error. The Deviance test (X^2 [113, $N = 540$] = 154.09, $p = .006$) also indicated poor model fit and a violation of assumptions. In observing the cell counts for the different variable levels, several levels had counts of less than 5 which may be the cause of the assumption violations. To correct for this issue, the *Beliefs* and *Behaviors* variables were removed from the test and a simple Pearson chi-square analysis was performed between *Exposure_Decade* and *Radicalization_Duration.* Results here were significant (X^2 [8, $N = 815$] = 27.76, $p = .001$). The Gamma test of association was also run to determine the association between the decade of exposure and the radicalization duration period. There was a weak, negative correlation (-.148, $p = .001$). The Gamma test is used in cases of ordinal level variables. Though results for the test here are significant, they do not necessarily indicate support for the hypothesis that the radicalization period is getting shorter. When looking at the standardized residuals, duration does not appear to be getting shorter. These results would indicate an acceptance of the null hypothesis, however further scrutiny is needed in the future (see Table 8).

Table 8

A Crosstabulation of the Decade of Exposure with Duration of Radicalization

Exposure Decade	Duration Period		
	Short (less than a year)	Medium (Between 1 and 5 years)	Long (more than 5 years)
1970-1979	11 (-1.1)	39 (.9)	29 (-.2)
1980-1989	18 (.4)	28 (-1.4)	39 (1.2)
1990-1999	18 (-.7)	32 (-2.2)	61 (2.9)
2000-2009	39 (-.5)	99 (.4)	84 (0)
2010-2018	71 (1.2)	151 (1.3)	97 (-2.2)
Total	157	348	310

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 27.76, $df = 8$, $p < .001$; Gamma = -.148, $p < .001$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

H_4: There has been an increase in extremists from lower socioeconomic strata over time.

For this hypothesis, socioeconomic status (SES) was observed for both childhood and adulthood where the data was available. There was a total of 962 observed cases for SES in adulthood and a total of 458 cases for SES in childhood. Of those SES cases in adulthood, 241 (12.1%) were low (indicating they received welfare, lived close to the poverty line, were regularly unemployed or at best worked in a blue-collar job, and/or lived in subsidized housing). There were 613 (30.8%) in the middle strata (indicating they did not receive welfare, lived in lower-middle class or middle-class neighborhood, had steady professional employment, owned or held a mortgage, and/or had a college degree). Lastly, 108 cases (5.4%) fell in the high SES category (indicating they worked a high-income, white-collar job, lived or owned a house in a middle or upper-class neighborhood, could afford luxury items, held a college degree or is successfully self-employed).

These two economic variables were tested separately with the *Exposure_Decade* variable using chi-square analyses to determine if any relationships existed. The chi-square test using SES in adulthood and the decade of exposure did not yield any significant results (X^2 [8, N = 962] = 11.96, p = .153).

Table 9

A Crosstabulation of the Decade of Exposure with Socioeconomic Status in Adulthood

	Economic Strata in Adulthood		
Exposure Decade	Low	Middle	High
1970-1979	17	51	10
	(-.6)	(29)	(-.4)
1980-1989	17	60	16
	(-1.3)	(.1)	(1.7)
1990-1999	34	89	15
	(-.1)	(.1)	(-.1)
2000-2009	51	153	30
	(-1.0)	(.3)	(.7)
2010-2018	122	260	37
	(1.7)	(-.4)	(-1.5)
Total	241	613	108

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 11.96, df = 8, p = .153; Gamma = -.135, p = .004. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The chi-square test using SES in childhood and the decade of exposure did show significant results (X^2 [8, N = 458] = 16.58, p = .035), however only those from the high SES group between 1970-1979 showed a significant result (z = 2.7). These results suggest acceptance of the null hypothesis. See Table 10 for further details.

Table 10

A Crosstabulation of the Decade of Exposure with Socioeconomic Status in Childhood

	Economic Strata in Childhood		
Exposure Decade	Low	Middle	High
1970-1979	10	26	16
	(-.4)	(-1.2)	(2.7)
1980-1989	11	22	3
	(1.2)	(-.1)	(-1.1)
1990-1999	13	37	7
	(.2)	(.2)	(-.7)
2000-2009	17	77	20
	(-1.5)	(.7)	(.5)
2010-2018	48	125	26
	(.8)	(.0)	(-.9)
Total	99	287	72

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 16.58, $df = 8$, $p = .035$; Gamma = -.87, $p = .212$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

Though results do not indicate that the number of extremists from lower economic strata are increasing over time at the level of significance, one important thing to note that was found in the data between SES in adulthood and the decade of exposure was that the total number of extremists between 2000-2009 and 2010-2018 increased by just over 75%. Nearly all of that increase occurred in the low and middle economic strata. Those from the low economic stratum represented an increase from 21.8% of the cases in the decade 2000-2009 to 29.1% between 2010-2018. The percentage of those in the middle decreased slightly from 65.4% between 2000-2009 to 62.1% between 2010-2018. This percentage amount in the middle has remained relatively constant in the low to mid-60s across decades. Lastly, those in the high stratum, as an overall percentage of the decade, decreased into the single digits for the first time, across the period of data collection. It moved from 12.8% between 2000-2009 to 8.8% between 2010-2018. It is possible that if the data for 2019 and 2020 became available, results might indicate alternative findings.

H_5: Over time, the amount of education held by the extremist has increased.

For this hypothesis a chi-square analysis was performed between educational attainment and the exposure decade. The original variable for education attainment contained a total of 804 cases split into 11 categories. Results for this chi-square were significant (X^2 (40, N = 804) = 68.94, p = .003). The Gamma test of association was performed to test the relationship between these variables. A weak, negative relationship was found (-.128, p = .001). Results for this chi-square were discarded however, due to a violation of assumptions for the chi-square through low cell counts. After re-coding the education variable to a compressed six factors instead of 11, the chi-square was run again, and a significant result was found (X^2 [20, N = 804] = 47.38, p < .001). The Gamma test of association showed a weak, negative relationship (-.137, p = .001).

Table 11

A Crosstabulation of the Decade of Exposure with Education

	Level of Education					
Exposure Decade	Less than a High School Diploma	High School Diploma	Some College or College Degree	Some Vocational School or Vocational School Degree	Some Graduate School or Master's Degree	Some Doctoral/ Professional School or Doctoral / Professional Degree
1970-1979	6 (-1.6)	13 (-1.2)	43 (1.4)	0 (-1.4)	6 (.6)	7 (1.2)
1980-1989	13 (1.3)	6 (-2.2)	25 (-.5)	4 (2.1)	3 (-.4)	9 (2.9)
1990-1999	13 (1.3)	20 (-.4)	42 (.0)	2 (-.2)	7 (.5)	7 (.7)
2000-2009	34 (.8)	43 (-.6)	89 (-.2)	2 (-1.3)	13 (.1)	16 (1.2)
2010-2018	55 (-.3)	110 (2.0)	173 (-.2)	12 (.8)	22 (-.4)	9 (-2.9)
Total	121	192	372	20	51	48

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 47.38, *df* = 20, p < .001; Gamma Test of Association = -.137, p = .001. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

Exploring this result via the individual cells provided some fascinating insights. The overall percentage of individuals with some college or a college degree at their respective times of exposure were over represented (over 40% of those exposed in each decade) when compared to the general population of the United States, where 28% have a high school diploma as their highest educational achievements as of 2023, 15% had completed some college and 23% had a bachelor's degree as their highest degree (U.S. Census, 2023). In the 1990s, only 20% of the general U.S. population held a college degree. In 2015, this increased to just over 30% (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). Between 2010 and 2019, those 25 or older with a college degree or higher moved from 29% to 36% (U.S. Census, 2020). While college attainment appears relatively similar decade-to-decade (though higher than the general population), having a high school diploma at the time of radicalization on a decade-by-decade basis has increased from 6.8% in the 1970s to 28.9% in the 2010s. Given these results, though a significant result was achieved, indicating that there is a relationship between education and exposure decade, this seems mostly concentrated in the high school diploma; therefore, the null is accepted.

H_6: The more education held, the higher the likelihood for a successful attack.

A chi-square test was run between education and the extent of the attack plot. No significant results were found between the two variables ($X^2(25, N = 802) = 30.83, p = .195$). No additional variables were used to test for interaction effects since initial results held no significance. For H_6, the null hypothesis is accepted. See Table 12 for cell details.

Table 12

A Crosstabulation of Education and Plot Progression

Plot Progression	Level of Education					
	Less than a High School Diploma	High School Diploma	Some College or College Degree	Some Vocational School or Vocational School Degree	Some Graduate School or Master's Degree	Some Doctoral/ Professional School or Doctoral / Professional Degree
No Plot	44 (-1.8)	90 (-.1)	179 (.2)	9 (-.2)	32 (1.6)	26 (.7)
Nebulous Plot	5 (.0)	12 (1.5)	12 (-.8)	3 (2.4)	0 (-1.4)	1 (-.7)
Attempted Acquisition of materials for plot	7 (1.6)	5 (-.5)	11 (-.3)	1 (.4)	0 (-1.3)	2 (.4)
Acquisition and possession of materials for plot	11 (-.3)	22 (.7)	37 (.1)	2 (.0)	2 (-1.3)	5 (.1)
Attempted and failed execution of plot	11 (.8)	14 (.1)	23 (-.7)	1 (-.4)	5 (.7)	3 (-.2)
Successful execution of plot	43 (1.5)	48 (-.8)	109 (.4)	4 (-.7)	12 (-.6)	11 (-.7)
Total	121	191	371	20	51	48

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 47.38, $df = 20$, $p < .001$; Gamma Test of Association = -.137, p = .001. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

H_7: The data will support the Obama era report of an increase in radicalization of former military, particularly by the right-wing.

Of the total 1989 cases available for analysis, 1140 had no form of military service on record, while 213 (10.7%) indicated some type of service record in the United States. There were 636 cases where no data on a military record in the United States could be found. There is a

significant relationship between military service and ideology (X^2 [3, N = 1353] = 42.73, p < .001) wherein those with ideologies on the far-right comprised 58.7% of those with service records (n = 125). Single issue ideologies made up the next largest ideology of those who served (16.9%, n = 36), followed by Islamist ideologies (15.5%, n = 33), while ideologies on the far-left contained the fewest (8.9%, n = 19).

Table 13

A Crosstabulation of Ideology and Military Service

	Military service	
Ideology	No	Yes
Islamist	334 (1.4)	33 (-3.3)
Far Right	428 (-1.8)	125 (4.1)
Far Left	212 (1.2)	19 (-2.9)
Single Issue	166 (-.3)	36 (.7)
Total	1140	213

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 42.72, df = 3, p < .000; Cramer's V = .178.
Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

There is also a significant relationship between military service and the decade of exposure (X^2 [4, N = 1353] = 10.77, p = .029), where individuals with service records grew considerably each decade. In the 1970s, only 8.9% (n = 19) of cases from that decade held military records. In the 1980s that grew to 11.7% (n = 25), followed by 17.8% (n = 38) in the 1990s, 21.6% (n = 46) in the 2000s, and 39.9% (n = 85) in the 2010s.

Table 14

A Crosstabulation of Decade of Exposure and Military Service

	Military service	
Exposure Decade	No	Yes
1970 - 1979	101 (.0)	19 .0
1980 – 1989	96 (-.6)	25 (1.4)
1990 – 1999	131 (-1.0)	38 (2.2)
2000 – 2009	263 (.2)	46 (-.4)
2010 - 2018	549 (.6)	85 (-1.5)
Total	1140	213

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 10.77, $df = 4$, $p < .029$; *phi* = .089. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

Additionally, while Far Left and Single Issue ideologies decreased after the 1980s, the Far Right has seen a steady increase in numbers on a decade-by-decade basis since the 1970s, except for the 2000s, where they stayed relatively unchanged to their 1990s numbers. In the 1970s, the Far Right represented only 16.6% (n = 32) of the four umbrella ideologies. The ideology appears to have peaked in the 1990s, representing 64.2% of cases (n = 194). It fell some in the 2000s and 2010s but still represents the overwhelming majority of cases in the 2010s (49.7%, n = 387). Islamist ideologies only really became quantifiable in the 2000s, representing 33.6% (n = 157) and 32.3% (n = 252) of cases in the 2010s. When adding military service into this model of ideology by decade, there is an uptick of individuals with military history on the far-right ideological spectrum in the 1990s (n = 29), a slight downtrend in the 2000s (n = 27), followed by a larger upswing in the 2010s (n = 51). Another point found in the data includes those individuals with

Islamist ideologies also experienced an upward trend in military service, both in the 2000s (n = 11) and in the 2010s (n = 22). A three-way loglinear analysis however, revealed no specific interactional relationship between the decade of exposure, military experience, and ideology, meaning the highest-order interaction was not significant (X^2 [12, N = 1353] = 13.31, p =.346).

Table 15

Counts and Residuals of Military Service by Ideology and Exposure Decade

		Ideology				
Exposure Decade	Military Service	Islamist	Far Right	Far Left	Single Issue	Total
1970 - 1979	No	0	11	56	34	101
		(.0)	(-.595)	(-.473)	(.496)	
	Yes	0	6	9	4	19
		(.0)	(1.101)	(1.58)	(-1.065)	
1980 – 1989	No	0	41	15	40	96
		(.0)	(-.003)	(-.374)	(-.170)	
	Yes	0	12	3	10	25
		(.0)	(.006)	(1.249)	(.365)	
1990 – 1999	No	5	71	23	32	131
		(.211)	(-.727)	(.012)	(-.009)	
	Yes	0	29	2	7	38
		(.0)	(1.345)	(-.09)	(.019)	
2000 – 2009	No	119	72	55	17	263
		(.063)	(-.528)	(.372)	(-.437)	
	Yes	11	27	2	6	46
		(-.202)	(.977)	(-1.242)	(.939)	
2010 – 2018	No	210	233	63	43	549
		(-.078)	(.890)	(.312)	(.041)	
	Yes	22	51	3	9	85
		(.249)	(-1.647)	(-1.042)	(-.088)	
Total		367	553	231	202	1353

Note: Pearson Chi-square = 13.31, p = .346. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

This result should come with some reasonable caveats. The Obama era report indicated this trend beginning in the aftermath of veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, starting in the mid-to-late 2000s. That data is borne out in the division by decade and ideology. Non-significance here may be an issue of low cell count and additional time. These overall results do point to a general

support of the hypothesis and rejection of the null, but with caution and future research needed relative to the particular ideology with which those military personnel are drawn to.

H_8: Older extremists are more likely to report alcohol and drug related problems.

An independent samples t-test was run between age and drug or alcohol use in the sample. Age was measured as a continuous variable, while drug or alcohol use was coded as 0 for no evidence of drug or alcohol use (where no information could be found, the coders also labeled this as 0), and 1 for evidence of alcohol or drug use. A total of 229 cases were labeled with evidence of drug or alcohol use. There were 1760 cases labeled as no evidence of drug or alcohol use. No significant results were found to indicate any relationship between age and alcohol or drug use (t = 1.07, df = 1919, p = .283). Figure 1 below illustrates where cases fell on the age spectrum.

Figure 1

Evidence of Drug or Alcohol Use by Age at Radicalization



Where drug and alcohol cases are represented by the green dots, one can see clustering between the ages 18 and approximately 31, after which there is noticeable spread downward. The clustering falls within the general age bracket of where most radicalized individuals are found. With no significant results found, no further testing between these two variables was conducted as the null hypothesis is accepted.

H_9: There will be a preference as to the means with which someone radicalized for those with a mental illness, compared to those without.

For this hypothesis, a series of chi-squares were performed to test mental illness against the multiple forms of radicalization preferences. Of the 1989 cases, 1729 are marked as 0 for

evidence of a mental illness, indicating there was either no sign of, or no information available that would indicate the individual had a mental illness or mental health problem. There were 128 cases (6.4%) marked with a 1, indicating evidence based on public or popular speculation, and 132 cases (6.6%) marked with a 2, indicating a professional diagnosis. Chi squares were performed with the mental illness variable coded in this tri-factor coding scheme, and they were performed with the mental illness recoded as dichotomous where factors 1 and 2 were recoded into a single factor (n=260) representing signs of mental illness.

Of the five types of radicalization methods analyzed against mental illness when tri-factor coded, only social media proved to be significant (X^2 [4, N = 592] = 12.56, p = .014). Media (X^2 [4, N = 580] = 8.08, p = .089), internet (X^2 [4, N = 667] = 8.79, p = .066), cliques, (X^2 [2, N = 402] = .32, p = .850), and prison (X^2 [6, N = 147] = 6.70, p = .349) were all non-significant. When compressing the mental illness variable into a dichotomous coding scheme, both social media (X^2 [2, N = 592] = 9.32, p = .009) and internet (X^2 [2, N = 667] = 8.48, p = *.014*) were significant, while the other means of radicalization methods remained non-significant (see Table 16).

Table 16

A Series of Crosstabulations Between Mental Illness and Method of Radicalization

Radicalization Method	Presence of Mental Illness		*df*	X^2	*p*
	No	Yes			
Media			2	4.04	.132
No known role	221	48			
	(.1)	(-.2)			
Non-primary role	218	45			
	(.2)	(-.5)			
Primary role	34	14			
	(-.8)	(1.7)			
Total	473	107			
Internet			2	8.48	.014*
No known role	127	15			
	(1.1)	(-2.3)			
Non-primary role	316	87			
	(-.6)	(1.2)			
Primary role	97	25			
	(-.2)	(.4)			
Total	540	127			
Social Media			2	9.32	.009**
No known role	198	30			
	(1.0)	(-2.0)			
Non-primary role	232	65			
	(-.5)	(1.1)			
Primary role	49	18			
	(-.7)	(1.5)			
Total	479	113			
Prison			3	5.91	.116
No, individual reached full radicalization before prison	38	7			
	(.3)	(-.6)			
Yes, but radicalization began before prison	34	6			
	(.3)	(-.7)			
Yes, but full radicalization reached after prison	34	15			
	(-.9)	(1.7)			
Yes, radicalization began and reached max level in prison	12	1			
	(.5)	(-1.0)			
Total	118	29			
Clique			1	.258	.612
No, radicalization began prior to clique membership	229	19			
	(.1)	(-.3)			
Yes, onset of radicalization coincided with clique membership	140	14			
	(-.1)	(.4)			
Total	369	33			

Note: *$p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

These results suggest at least some preference toward online methods of radicalization over traditional media and in-person methods of radicalization for individuals with signs of mental illness.

H_{10}: There has been an increase in the recruitment to terrorist groups and/or extremist ideologies from individuals with criminal records.

In this sample of radicalized individuals, 496 were labeled as having some type of previous criminal activity, while 693 were marked as having no previous criminal activity. A total of 800 cases were marked as missing. Of those where previous criminal activity was indicated, 134 were for non-violent minor criminal activity (misdemeanors), 111 were for non-violent serious criminal activities (felonies), and 251 for a previous violent crime. Nearly 60% of those with a record of a previous violent crime (n = 147), were radicalized on the far right.

For the purposes of this hypothesis, because I am testing only the presence of a previous criminal history and not the type of criminal history, the previous criminal record variable was recoded to be dichotomous, where 0 equals no previous criminal activity, and 1 equals previous criminal activity. To first test this hypothesis, chi-squares were performed between previous criminal activity and each of the radicalized ideologies. All four ideologies were significantly associated with criminal activity (Islamist radicalization, $X^2(1, N = 1189) = 8.73$, $p = .003$; far right, X^2 $(1, N = 1189) = 62.41$, $p < .001$; far left, X^2 $(1, N = 1189) = 16.09$, $p < .001$; single issue, X^2 $(1, N = 1189) = 11.90$, $p = .001$). See Table 17 for further details.

A chi-square was also used to determine the relationship between exposure decade and previous criminal activity by radicalized individuals. This too, showed a significant relationship (X^2 $[4, N = 1189] = 22.82$, $p < .001$). Moving from representing 19.8% (n = 16) of those

radicalized in the 1970s, to representing 45.1% (n = 279) in the 2010s, there is a clear movement toward more radicalized individuals with criminal records. Given these results, the hypothesis is supported and the null is rejected.

Table 17

A Series of Crosstabulations Between Ideology and Previous Criminal History

Ideology	Previous Criminal Activity		*df*	X^2	*p*	Totals
	No	Yes				
Islamist			1	8.73	.003	
No	483	384				867
	(-1.0)	(1.2)				
Yes	210	112				322
	(1.6)	(-1.9)				
Far Right			1	62.41	.000	
No	452	209				661
	(3.4)	(-4.0)				
Yes	241	287				528
	(-3.8)	(4.5)				
Far Left			1	16.09	.000	
No	563	445				1008
	(-1.0)	(1.2)				
Yes	130	51				181
	(2.4)	(-2.8)				
Single Issue			1	11.90	.001	
No	581	450				1031
	(-.8)	(1.0)				
Yes	112	46				158
	(2.1)	(-2.5)				

Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

Table 18

A Crosstabulation of Decade of Exposure and Previous Criminal History

	Previous Criminal History	
Exposure Decade	No	Yes
1970 - 1979	65	16
	(2.6)	(-3.1)
1980 – 1989	64	32
	(1.1)	(-1.3)
1990 – 1999	80	53
	(.3)	(-.3)
2000 – 2009	145	116
	(-.6)	(.7)
2010 - 2018	339	279
	(-1.1)	(1.3)
Total	693	496

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 22.82, $df = 4$, $p < .001$; Cramer's $V = .139$.
Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

$H_{11:}$ Older users will be more passive consumers of radicalized content on social media.

To test this hypothesis an ordinal logistic regression was used where social media activities acted as the dependent, ordinal level variable, and age acted as the independent variable. Since social media activities is a multiple entry variable, with a maximum of seven possible entries, in order to obtain the most representative amount of data, these multiple entries were condensed in hierarchical fashion, wherein in only the highest order of activity was coded for entry into a newly computed social media activity variable. Social media activities were only recorded post-2005, and as such there are a total of 353 cases where entries related to social media activities were available. Most of these individuals (n = 299) were passive consumers of social media. Only 36 cases used social media for the highest level order recorded, directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate a domestic attack. Results of the ordinal logistic regression showed no significant results between the social media activity

performed and age (X^2 (317, N = 352) =292.58, p = .834. Poor model fit, and low cell count for this may have played a role in these results so to be certain, these variables were rerun using an Analysis of Variance. This method proved useful, given the categorical grouping nature of the social media activities variable. There was a significant effect between type of social media activities engaged in and age, F(6, 345) = 3.31, p = .004. Due to the missing data and likely unequal distribution within the social media variable, equal variances were not assumed (Levine's [6, 345] = 2.96, p = .008) and Welch's F was used as confirmation of a significant result, F(6, 109) = 4.30, p = .001. Tamhane's T2 post hoc test was run and shows significant age differences between those who participate in extremist dialogue online and those who directly communicate with members of extremist groups online for the purposes of facilitating foreign travel (p = .021). Additionally, there were significant age differences between those who create propaganda/content (M = 35.76) online and those both directly communicating with members of extremist groups (M = 27.69, p = .017) and those directly communicating with members of extremist groups for the purposes of facilitating foreign travel (M = 25.87, p = .001). Given these results, and observations obtained from Figures 2 and 3, the null hypothesis is rejected, suggesting there is some relationship between the type of activities engaged in online and the age of the radicalized individual, however these results should be interpreted with caution with more data and scrutiny.

Figure 2

Mean Age of Radicalized Individual by Type of Social Media Activity



Figure 3

A Boxplot of Radicalized Individuals' Age by Type of Social Media Activity



H_{12}: There is a higher likelihood of a catalyzing event preceding an attack or attempted attack for those with a mental illness compared to those without.

To test this hypothesis, a series of chi squares were performed, analyzing the presence of mental illness against several potential catalyzing factors. Accounting for mental illness in the data is limited in the original collection to what was available at the time within the parameters of the collectors open-source information. A total of 260 (13.1%) cases indicates the presence of a mental illness history. All other cases (n = 1729, 86.9%) either had no indicators of mental illness or information could not be found via the original open-source materials.

The first of these chi square tests examined whether there was any association between the presence of mental illness and specific historical events. These events included September 11th, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the First Gulf War, the Afghanistan/Iraq War, Ruby Ridge/Waco, the Arab Spring/Syrian Civil War or Other. Data was available for 983 cases where information could be found (49.4%). No significant results were found (X^2 (8, N = 983) = 9.83, p = .277).

Table 19

A Crosstabulation Between Historical Events and Mental Illness

Event	Signs of Mental Illness		
	No	Yes	Totals
None	546	103	649
	(.1)	(-.2)	
September 11th	45	10	55
	(-.2)	(.4)	
Vietnam War	44	2	46
	(.9)	(-2.0)	
Cold War	1	0	1
	(.2)	(-.4)	
First Gulf War	4	1	5
	(-.1)	(.2)	
Afghanistan/Iraq War	28	6	34
	(-.1)	(.2)	
Ruby Ridge/Waco	19	1	20
	(.5)	(-1.2)	
Arab Spring/Syrian	23	6	29
Civil War	(-.3)	(.6)	
Other	114	30	144
	(-.6)	(1.4)	
Totals	824	159	983

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 9.83, *df* = 8, *p* = .277. Numbers in parentheses indicate standardized residuals.

The second of these chi squares tested whether there was an association between the presence of mental illness and if there were signs the individual was angry with U.S. society or "did not accept the moral validity of American social value system," (PIRUS, 2018) Signs of

inclusion on this variable could include public statements opposing specific polices (e.g., late-term abortions), burning or desecrating symbolic items like flags or bibles, or posting inflammatory anti-U.S. messages in online forums. The variable was measured as dichotomous. There were a total of 1214 (61%) cases where information for this variable could be found. Results of the chi square were significant (X^2 (1, N = 1214) = 5.895, p = .015) indicating there is an association between mental illness and anger toward America's social value system. Implications of this finding are discussed in Chapter four.

Table 20

A Crosstabulation of Mental Illness and Anger Toward U.S. Society

Signs of mental illness	Anger toward society		Totals
	No	Yes	
No	317	702	1019
	(-.8)	(.6)	
Yes	78	117	195
	(1.8)	(-1.3)	
Totals	395	819	1214

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 5.89, *df* = 1, *p* = .015; Phi = -.70. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The third chi square tested whether there was an association between the presence of mental illness and exposure to a traumatic experience or event. The parameters of this variable describe it as exposure to "any traumatic event in which he witnessed an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of others, where his response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror," (PIRUS, 2018). This trauma variable was measured categorically, where 0 equals no, 1 equals yes, but timing vis-à-vis radicalization is unknown, 2 equals yes, but a long time before radicalization, and 3 equals yes, shortly before radicalization. Data was available for 477 (24%) of cases. Results of the chi square

were significant (X^2 (3, N = 477) = 33.66, p < .001), indicating a moderate association (Cramer's V = .266, p < .001) between presence of a mental illness and experiencing trauma among individuals radicalized. Implications are further discussed in Chapter four.

Table 21

A Crosstabulation of Mental Illness and Trauma

Signs of mental illness	Traumatic Experience or Event				Totals
	No	Yes, but timing unknown	Yes, long before radicalization	Yes, shortly before radicalization	
No	259 (1.6)	35 (-1.9)	38 (-1.4)	30 (-.3)	362
Yes	50 (-2.8)	28 (3.3)	25 (2.5)	12 (.6)	115
Totals	309	63	63	42	477

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 33.66, *df* = 3, p < .001; Cramer's V = .266. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The fourth chi square tested whether there was an association between mental illness and the individual ever being known to be marginalized, ostracized, or dismissed from any social, cultural, religious, or political groups or organizations. The variable was measured dichotomously, and data was available for 438 cases (22%). Results of the chi square were significant, (X^2 (1, N = 438) = 16.25, p < .001) indicating a weak association (Phi = .193, p < .001) between individuals with mental illness and those who experienced marginalization.

Table 22

A Crosstabulation of Mental Illness and Societal Marginalization

Signs of mental illness	Marginalization		Totals
	No	Yes	
No	280	64	344
	(.9)	(-1.6)	
Yes	58	36	94
	(-1.7)	(3.1)	
Totals	338	100	438

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 16.25, $df = 1$, $p < .001$; Phi = .193.
Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The fifth chi square tested whether there was an association between mental illness and experiencing abuse as an adult. Unfortunately, there were very few cases with available information indicating signs of abuse (n =15) meaning any results from the chi square should be evaluated with caution. Results were significant (X^2 [3, N = 1959] = 7.866, p = .049), indicating a weak association between mental illness and abuse experienced as an adult (Cramer's V = .063, p =.049). While significant, these results only just cross the threshold for significance and given the low case numbers, should be interpreted with caution.

Table 23

A Crosstabulation of Mental Illness and Experiencing Abuse as an Adult

Signs of mental illness	Abuse				Totals
	No	Yes, by non-family	Yes, by family	Yes, by family and non-family	
No	1694 (.1)	6 (-.9)	2 (.2)	2 (-.4)	1704
Yes	250 (-.2)	4 (2.4)	0 (-.5)	1 (1.)	255
Totals	1944	10	2	3	1959

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 7.86, $df = 3$, $p < .049$; Cramer's $V = .063$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The sixth chi-square tested whether there was an association between mental illness and change in academic performance. Academic performance was measured on three factors, where 0 equaled no change, 1 equaled yes, it improved, and 2 equaled yes, it worsened. There were a total of 79 cases (4.0%) in which information could be found on educational change. No significant results were found (X^2 [2, $N = 79$] = .34, $p = .840$), suggesting there is no association between mental illness and sudden educational performance changes.

Table 24

A Crosstabulation of Mental Illness and Change in Academic Performance Around the Time of Radicalization

Signs of mental illness	Academic Performance			Totals
	No Change	Improved	Worsened	
No	31 (.1)	6 (-.2)	28 (.0)	65
Yes	6 (-.2)	2 (.5)	6 (.0)	14
Totals	37	8	34	79

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = .34, $df = 2$, $p = .840$; Phi $= .066$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The seventh chi square tested whether there was an association between mental illness and sudden work performance changes around the time of radicalization. This change was measured dichotomously, where 0 equals no and 1 equals yes. There were a total 220 cases (11.1%) where information could be found on work performance changes. No significant results were found (X^2 [2, N = 220] = .015, p = .902), suggesting no association between mental illness and sudden work performance changes.

Table 25

A Crosstabulation of Mental Illness and Changes in Work Performance Around the Time of Radicalization

Signs of mental illness	Work Performance		Totals
	No	Yes	
No	150 (.0)	31 (.0)	181
Yes	32 (.0)	7 (.1)	39
Totals	182	32	220

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = .015, *df* = 1, $p < .902$; Phi = .008. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The eighth chi square tested whether there was an association between the presence of mental illness and if the individual's radicalization was connected to specific actions by the United States government or particular U.S. leaders. Information was available on radicalization related to the U.S. government or U.S. leaders in 1,099 cases (55.3%). No significant results were found (X^2 [1, N = 1099] = 3.68, p = .055) suggesting no association between individuals radicalized who have mental illness and those whose radicalization was connected to actions by the U.S. government or its leaders. The same held true for foreign government leaders, X^2 (1, N = 1137) = .64, p = .422).

Table 26

A Crosstabulation Between Mental Illness and Specific Government Leaders, Domestic and Foreign

Signs of mental illness	U.S. Government Leaders		Foreign government leaders	
	No	Yes	No	Yes
No	540	392	854	107
	(-.5)	(.6)	(-.1)	(.3)
Yes	110	57	160	16
	(1.1)	(-1.4)	(.2)	(-.7)
Totals	650	449	1014	123

Note: Pearson Chi-Square (U.S.) = 3.68, $df = 1$, $p = .055$; Pearson Chi-Square (Foreign) = .64, $df = 1$, $p = .422$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The last chi square tested whether there was an association between mental illness and experiencing a diminution of social standing prior to radicalization. This is represented as being excluded from informal social groups, public embarrassment, or losing the respect of close friends, family, or acquaintances. Information was found for a total of 456 cases (22.9%) withing the dataset. Results of the chi square were significant (X^2 [3, $N = 456$] = 19.84, $p < .001$), indicating a moderate association between mental illness and a loss of social standing prior to radicalization (Cramer's $V = .209$, $p <. 001$).

Table 27

A Crosstabulation of Mental Illness and Diminution of Social Standing Prior to Radicalization

Signs of mental illness	Diminution of social standing				Totals
	No	Yes, but timing unknown	Yes, long before radicalization	Yes, shortly before radicalization	
No	302	28	7	23	360
	(.9)	(-1.6)	(-.8)	(-.5)	
Yes	62	20	5	9	96
	(-1.7)	(3.1)	(1.6)	(.9)	
Totals	364	48	12	32	456

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 19.84, $df = 3$, $p < .001$; Cramer's $V = .209$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

This series of chi-squares indicate that there is some support for the hypothesis of a catalyzing event preceding an attack or attempted attack. The tests that were significant indicate these events are primarily interpersonal or individualized in nature, such as experiencing a trauma, being marginalized or ostracized, experiencing abuse, experiencing a loss of social power, or feeling a personal moral outrage at the state of the country, rather than larger external events, such as September 11th or specific actions by government leaders.

H_{13}: Individuals on the far right are more likely to engage in violence or violent activity prior to an attack than any other ideology.

To examine this hypothesis, a chi-square test of association was used to establish if any association exists between ideology type and violent previous criminal activity. Previous criminal activity was measured along a 4-item continuum, where 0 equals no previous criminal activity; 1 equals previous non-violent minor criminal activity (misdemeanor); 2 equals previous non-violent serious criminal activity (felony); and 3 equals previous violent crime. Ideologies were coded nominally into one variable to account for the four umbrella ideologies. For this analysis, there were 1189 valid cases (60%, approximately). Results were significant (X^2 (9, N = 1189) = 69.85, p < .001), indicating an association between previous violent criminal activity and ideology (Cramer's V = .142, p < .001).

Table 28

A Crosstabulation Between Previous Criminal History and Radicalized Ideology

Previous criminal history	Ideology			
	Islamist	Far Right	Far Left	Single Issue
No previous criminal activity	210	241	130	112
	(1.6)	(-3.8)	(2.4)	(2.1)
Previous non-violent minor criminal activity	33	69	17	15
	(-.6)	(1.3)	(-.8)	(-.7)
Previous non-violent serious criminal activity	25	71	8	7
	(-.9)	(3.1)	(-2.2)	(-2.0)
Previous Violent Crime	54	147	26	24
	(-1.7)	(3.4)	(-2.0)	(-1.6)
Totals	323	528	181	158

Note: Pearson Chi-square = 69.85, $df = 9$, $p < .001$; Cramer's $V = .140$

On further inspection, it can be noted that approximately 72% (n = 130) of far-left extremists had no previous criminal activity, while the same was true for 70.9% (n = 112) of single-issue extremists. Notably, 65.2% (n = 210) of Islamist extremists had no previous criminal activity, while only 45.6% of far-right extremists (n = 241) could say the same. Furthermore, far-right extremists stood out in all previous criminal activity categories, showing the highest prevalence in the previous violent crime category at 27.8% (n = 147). This is 11.2 percentage points higher than the next highest ideology (Islamist; 16.8%, n = 54). It is also significantly higher than what is represented by far-left extremists (14.4%, n = 26) and single issue (15.2%, n = 24). The results presented here indicate support for the hypothesis and a rejection of the null.

H_{14}: More extensive radicalized beliefs will have a positive relationship with social media interactions.

To test this hypothesis, a loglinear analysis was performed with the variables *Radical_Beliefs, Social_Media_Frequency,* and *Social_Medial_Activities*. The loglinear analysis is an extension of the chi-square and has similar assumptions. The three-way loglinear analysis

produced a final model that retained two of the three effects. The likelihood ratio of this model was X^2 (0) = 0, p = 1. The three-way interaction between radical beliefs, frequency of social media engagement, and the types of social media activities engaged in was not significant (X^2 (120, N = 197) = 64.22, p = 1.00). Of the two-way interactions, radical beliefs did show a significant association with types of social media activities engaged in, X^2 (30, N = 197) = 44.10, p = .047. Additionally, social media frequency (time) did show a significant association with consumption of radicalized content (social media activities), X^2 (24, N = 197) = 50.95, p = .001. Given these results, the analysis does seem to reveal that there is some relationship between the extent of radicalized beliefs and the activities performed when engaging with radicalized/radicalizing social media online. Tables 29 and 30 below represent the cell counts as residuals of the two-way interactions.

Table 29

A Crosstabulation Between Radical Beliefs and Types of Social Media Activities

Social Media Activities	Radical Beliefs					
	Ideological system but no evidence of belief in radical versions of ideology	Evidence of exposure to radical ideology	Pursues further information on radical ideology	Full knowledge of tenets of radical ideology	Shares many of the beliefs of radical ideology	Deep commitment to radical ideological beliefs
Consuming Content	0 (-.3)	2 (-.1)	8 (2.1)	2 (-.4)	1 (-1.6)	8 (.0)
Disseminating Content	0 (-.3)	5 (1.0)	5 (-.3)	7 (1.6)	5 (-.6)	9 (-.8)
Participating in extremist dialogue	1 (1.1)	18 (1.9)	25 (1.0)	14 (.0)	25 (.4)	29 (-2.0)
Creating propaganda/content	0 (-.5)	1 (-2.3)	6 (-1.9)	7 (-.6)	14 (-.1)	41 (2.9)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology	0 (-.3)	2 (-.9)	5 (-.6)	4 (-.3)	12 (1.7)	13 (-.2)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel	0 (-.3)	2 (-.6)	4 (-.6)	4 (.2)	9 (1.2)	10 (-.3)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack	0 (-.3)	4 (.3)	8 (.7)	4 (-.1)	3 (-1.5)	15 (.6)
Totals	1	34	61	42	69	125

Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

Table 30

A Crosstabulation Between Social Media Activities and Frequency of Use

Social Media Activities	Frequency of social media use				
	Rarely (once a month or less)	Sporadically (about 2-3 times per month)	Occasionally (about once a week)	Frequently (about once a day)	Continually (multiple times per day)
Consuming Content	0 (-.5)	0 (-.6)	1 (-.1)	3 (1.2)	0 (-.8)
Disseminating Content	4 (2.6)	3 (1.3)	6 (.5)	1 (-2.2)	3 (.0)
Participating in extremist dialogue	1 (-1.6)	7 (.8)	20 (.5)	23 (-.3)	12 (.3)
Creating propaganda/content	9 (2.9)	4 (-.1)	11 (-.9)	20 (.0)	7 (-.6)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology	0 (-1.2)	1 (-.6)	4 (-.9)	10 (.5)	7 (1.6)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel	0 (-1.2)	2 (.3)	9 (1.4)	7 (-.3)	2 (-.8)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack	0 (-1.3)	0 (-1.5)	7 (-.2)	15 (1.5)	4 (-.2)
Totals	14	17	58	79	35

Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals

H_{15}: Individuals with lower social standing in society will be more engaged with social media.

To test this hypothesis a series of chi-squares were performed to determine if an association exists between social media activities and a series of indicators acting as stand-ins for social standing. The first of these indicators included *Kicked_Out* (n = 438), which represents if a subject was ever known to be marginalized, ostracized, or dismissed from any social, cultural, religious, or political groups or organizations. No association was found (X^2 (6, N = 151) = 6.55, p = .364). The second of these indicators included *Platonic_Troubles* (n = 616), which represents if a subject typically had difficulty finding or maintaining non-romantic relationships. No association was found (X^2 (6, N = 158) = 5.95, p = .428). The third of these indicators was *Relationship_Troubles* (n = 608), which represents if the subject typically had difficulty finding or maintaining romantic relationships. No association was found (X^2 (6, N = 154) = 4.50, p = .609). See Table 32 for further details on these results.

Table 31

A Crosstabulation Between Social Media Activities, Marginalization, Platonic, and Relationship Troubles

Social Media Activities	Marginalization		Platonic Troubles		Relationship Troubles	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Consuming Content	10 (.2)	2 (-.3)	9 (.2)	3 (-.3)	7 (.4)	1 (-.7)
Disseminating Content	9 (-.4)	4 (.8)	7 (-.5)	5 (.8)	8 (-.3)	4 (.6)
Participating in extremist dialogue	33 (-.7)	14 (1.3)	31 (-.9)	20 (1.3)	34 (-.6)	16 (1.0)
Creating propaganda/content	27 (.0)	7 (-.1)	27 (.6)	7 (-.9)	24 (.0)	8 (.0)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology	14 (.6)	1 (-1.2)	12 (.2)	4 (-.3)	16 (.2)	4 (-.4)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel	13 (.6)	1 (-1.1)	13 (.5)	3 (-.8)	15 (.6)	2 (-1.1)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack	13 (.1)	3 (-.2)	13 (.3)	4 (-.4)	12 (.2)	3 (-.4)
Totals	119	32	112	46	116	38

Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The fourth of these indicators was *Standing* (n = 456), a categorical variable representing whether the subject experienced a diminution of social standing prior to radicalization. For example, this could include being excluded from informal social groups, public embarrassment, or losing the

respect of family, friends, or acquaintances. No association was found (X^2 (18, N = 164) = 16.05, p = .589).

Table 32

A Crosstabulation Between Social Media Activities and Social Standing

Social Media Activities	Social Standing			
	No	Yes, but timing is unknown	Yes, long before radicalization	Yes, shortly before radicalization
Consuming Content	9 (.3)	0 (-1.1)	0 (-.6)	1 (.9)
Disseminating Content	11 (-.3)	3 (.9)	1 (.8)	0 (-.8)
Participating in extremist dialogue	40 (-.5)	10 (1.3)	2 (.3)	2 (-.2)
Creating propaganda/content	27 (-.2)	5 (.4)	1 (-.1)	2 (.4)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology	15 (.6)	1 (-.7)	0 (-.7)	0 (-.8)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel	14 (.3)	0 (-1.4)	0 (-.7)	2 (1.6)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack	16 (.4)	1 (-.8)	1 (.6)	0 (-.9)
Totals	132	20	5	7

Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 16.05, *df* = 18, p = .589. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

The fifth of these indicators was work history, a nominal level variable, representing the subject's work history prior to the date of exposure (n = 773). The four categories that comprised the variable included: long-term unemployed, underemployed (i.e., less than full-time), serially

employed (i.e., jumped from job to job), and regularly employed (i.e., held the same job for a long period or followed an upward and/or conventional career path in the given profession) (PIRUS, 2018). Results were significant. The chi-square analysis indicates a moderate association between social media activities and a subject's work history (X^2 (18, N = 167) =31.842, p = .023; *Cramer's* V = .252). In particular, standardized residuals were significant for long-term unemployed individuals who disseminated content (z = 2.1) and directly communicating with members of extremist groups to facilitate a domestic attack (z = 2.0). Given some low cell counts, however, results should be interpreted with caution. See Table 33 for a cell breakdown.

Table 33

A Crosstabulation Between Social Media Activities and Work History

Social Media Activities	Work History			
	Long-term Unemployed	Underemployed	Serially Employed (job hopper)	Regularly Employed
Consuming Content	2 (-.1)	0 (-1.0)	2 (-.3)	7 (.7)
Disseminating Content	7 (2.1)	3 (1.2)	5 (.6)	2 (-2.2)
Participating in extremist dialogue	6 (-1.5)	5 (-.1)	17 (1.2)	29 (.1)
Creating propaganda/ content	7 (.0)	3 (-.1)	7 (-.3)	19 (.3)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology	3 (-.2)	2 (.3)	0 (-2.0)	13 (1.4)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel	6 (2.0)	0 (-1.1)	4 (.5)	4 (-1.1)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack	1 (-1.0)	2 (.7)	2 (-.6)	9 (.8)
Totals	32	15	37	83

The sixth of the indicators was the ordinal level variable for education. This variable was recoded to compress some categories and allow for better power when using the chi-square analysis. The compressed variables include: (1) less than a high school diploma; (2) high school diploma; (3) Some College or College Degree; (4) Some Vocational School or Vocational School Degree; (5) Some Master's School or Master's School Degree and; (6) Some Doctoral/Professional School or Doctoral/Professional Degree. Results were significant and the chi square analysis indicates a moderate association between social media activities and a subject's education (X^2 (30, N = 227) = 46.47, p = .028; *Cramer's V* = .202). In particular, standardized residuals were significant for individuals with some Master's schooling or a Master's degree and directly communicating with members of an extremist group to establish a relationship/acquire information on an extremist group (z = 2.2). Additionally, residuals were also significant for individuals with a professional or doctoral degree and directly communicating with members of an extremist group to facilitate a domestic terror attack (z = 3.7). Low cell counts, despite recoding to reduce this probability were still likely to have an affect on the overall result of this chi-square. See Table 34 for further details.

Table 34

A Crosstabulation Between Social Media Activities and Education

Social Media Activities	Education					
	Less than High School Diploma	High School Diploma	Some College or College Degree	Some Vocational School or Vocational School Degree	Some Master's School or Master's School Degree	Some Doctoral/ Professional School or Doctoral/ Professional Degree
Consuming Content	3 (.5)	2 (-1.0)	10 (1.1)	0 (-.6)	0 (-.9)	0 (-.6)
Disseminating Content	3 (-.5)	7 (.0)	14 (.5)	2 (1.6)	0 (-1.2)	0 (-.8)
Participating in extremist dialogue	7 (-1.4)	28 (1.4)	38 (.1)	2 (-.1)	3 (-.6)	1 (-.8)
Creating propaganda/ content	9 (.9)	7 (-1.4)	20 (-.2)	2 (.8)	4 (1.1)	2 (.8)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology	5 (.6)	6 (-.4)	11 (-.4)	0 (-.8)	4 (2.2)	0 (-.8)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel	2 (-.5)	7 (.8)	9 (.0)	0 (-.7)	1 (.0)	0 (-.7)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack	5 (1.4)	5 (.0)	5 (-1.2)	0 (-.7)	0 (-1.0)	3 (3.7)
Totals	34	62	107	6	12	6

Note: Pearson Chi-square = 46.47, $df = 30$, $p = .028$. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

Lastly, the seventh of these indicators was the ordinal variable for social stratum in adulthood. This is a three-factor variable with categories for low, middle and high. Results were significant and indicate a moderate association between social media activities and social stratum (X^2 (12, N = 227) = 32.45, p = .001, *Cramer's V* = .267). In particular, standardized residuals were significant for individuals of low and middle economic strata and disseminating content (z = 3.5; z = -2.2, respectively).

Table 35

A Crosstabulation Between Social Media Activities and Social Stratum in Adulthood

Social Media Activities	Social Stratum		
	Low	Middle	High
Consuming Content	4	13	0
	(-.5)	(.9)	(-1.3)
Disseminating Content	16	5	1
	(3.5)	(-2.2)	(-.8)
Participating in extremist dialogue	26	47	4
	(.5)	(.2)	(-1.3)
Creating propaganda/ content	13	29	8
	(-.6)	(-.1)	(1/4)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology	3 (-1.3)	15 (.9)	2 (.0)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate foreign travel	5 (-.6)	12 (-.1)	4 (1.4)
Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) to facilitate domestic attack	3 (-1.3)	14 (.6)	3 (.8)
Totals	70	135	22

Note: Pearson Chi-square = 32.45, *df* = 12, p = .001. Numbers in parentheses represent standardized residuals.

These results indicate some moderate support for individuals with lower economic standing (chronically unemployed and lower socioeconomic standing) and engagement with

extremist social media activity. They also indicate that more interpersonal or social aspects of the subjects' lives, such as platonic and relationship troubles, do not show any relationship with engagement in extremist social media activity.

Table 36

Hypothesis Summary Table and Results

Hypothesis	Test Statistic	*df*	*p*	Null Hypothesis
H_1: There is a shift in sub-ideologies within the right wing. White supremacy will consistently remain the largest sub-ideology, but anti-immigrant specific ideology will increase over time.	$X^2 = 938.10$	32	$p < .001$***	Rejected
H_2: The number of anti-government extremists present in a given time is positively related to a Democrat presidency.	$X^2 = 54.07$	1	$p < .001$***	Rejected
H_3: The duration of the radicalization period is getting shorter with each decade since 1970 for all extremist ideologies.	$X^2 = 27.76$	8	$p < .001$***	Accepted
H_4: There has been an increase in extremists from lower socioeconomic strata over time.	$X^2 = 11.96$ (SES, Adulthood) $X^2 = 16.58$ (SES, Childhood)	8 8	$p = .153$ $p = .035$*	Accepted
H_5: Over time, the amount of education held by the extremist has increased.	$X^2 = 47.38$	20	$p < .001$***	Accepted
H_6: The more education held, the higher the likelihood for a successful attack.	$X^2 = 30.83$	25	$p = .195$	Accepted
H_7: The data will support the Obama era report of an increase in radicalization of former military, particularly by the right wing.	$X^2 = 42.74$ (Ideology) $X^2 = 10.79$ (Exposure Decade)	3 4	$p < .001$*** $p = .029$*	Rejected

Hypothesis	Test Statistic	*df*	*p*	Null Hypothesis
$H_{8:}$ Older extremists are more likely to report alcohol and drug related problems.	$t = 1.07$	1919	$p = .283$	Accepted
H_9: There will be a preference as to the means with which someone radicalized for those with a mental illness, compared to those without.	$X^2 = 4.04$ (Media)	2	$p = .132$	Rejected
	$X^2 = 8.48$ (Internet)	2	$p = .014$*	
	$X^2 = 9.32$ (Social Media)	2	$p = .009$**	
	$X^2 = 5.91$ (Prison)	3	$p = .116$	
	$X^2 = .258$ (Cliques)	1	$p = .612$	
H_{10}: There has been an increase in the recruitment to terrorist groups and/or extremist ideologies from individuals with criminal records.	$X^2 = 8.73$ (Islamist)	1	$p = .003$**	Rejected
	$X^2 = 62.41$ (Far Right)	1	$p < .001$***	
	$X^2 = 16.09$ (Far Left)	1	$p < .001$***	
	$X^2 = 11.90$ (Single Issue)	1	$p < .001$***	
	$X^2 = 22.82$ (Exposure Decade)	4	$p < .001$***	
$H_{11:}$ Older users will be more passive consumers of radicalized content on social media.	$X^2 = 292.58$	317	$p = .834$	Rejected
	$F = 4.30$	6, 109	$p = .001$	

Hypothesis	Test Statistic	*df*	*p*	Null Hypothesis
H_{12}: There is a higher likelihood of a catalyzing event preceding an attack or attempted attack for those with a mental illness compared to those without.	$X^2 = 9.84$ (Historical Events)	8	$p = .277$	Rejected
	$X^2 = 5.89$ (Anger toward U.S. Value System)	1	$p = .015$*	
	$X^2 = 33.66$ (Traumatic Event)	3	$p < .001$***	
	X^2 (1) = 16.25 (Societal Marginalization)	1	$p < .001$***	
	$X^2 = 7.86$ (Abuse in Adulthood)	3	$p = .049$*	
	$X^2 = .34$ (Academic Performance)	2	$p = .840$	
	$X^2 = .015$ (Performance Work Changes)	2	$p = .902$	
	$X^2 = 3.68$, $p = .055$ (Specific Government Actions - Domestic)	1	$p = .055$	
	$X^2 = .64$, $p = .422$ (Specific Government Actions - Foreign)	1	$p = .422$	
	$X^2 = 19.84$ (Diminution in Social Standing)	3	$p < .001$***	
H_{13}: Individuals on the far right are more likely to engage in violence or violent activity prior to an attack than any other ideology.	$X^2 = 71.46$	9	$p < .001$***	Rejected
H_{14}: More extensive radicalized beliefs will have a positive relationship with social media interactions.	$X^2 = 44.09$ (Radicalized Beliefs)	30	$p = .047$*	Rejected
	$X^2 = 50.95$ (Frequency)	24	$p < .001$***	

Hypothesis	Test Statistic	*df*	*p*	Null Hypothesis
H_{15}: Individuals with lower social standing in society will be more engaged with social media.	$X^2 = 6.55$ (Marginalization)	6	$p = .364$	Partial Acceptance
	$X^2 = 5.95$ (Platonic Troubles)	6	$p = .428$	
	$X^2 = 4.50$ (Romantic Troubles)	6	$p = .609$	
	$X^2 = 16.05$ (Diminution in Social Standing)	18	$p = .589$	
	$X^2 = 31.84$ (Work History)	18	$p = .023$*	
	$X^2 = 46.47$ (Education)	30	$p = .028$*	
	$X^2 = 32.45$ (SES, Adulthood)	12	$p = .001$***	

Note: * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

Missing Data

Missing data is a substantial issue in the PIRUS dataset. During the initial phase of data collection, the researchers created a systemic approach to handling missing data. When information was not presented in the open sources they utilized, coders treated the information as missing, even when a strong argument could be made for a "No" or "0" value. In these cases, coders assigned missing value codes of "-99" or "-88" if the observation was not logically possible. Only where confirmation was possible where the accurate variable value is "No" or "0" did the researchers code it so (Jensen et al., 2016). This conservative approach reduces the potential of coding values as absent however, it also produces high rates of missingness for many variables and makes statistical inferences more challenging.

While missing data is a challenge in the PIRUS dataset, the amount of missing data can lead a researcher to erroneous conclusions if not accounted for in some capacity. When first considering what missing data technique to use, the first determination made is at what level the

data is missing and then what patterns (if any) exist to the missingness. Missing data can occur at two levels: unit level or item level. Unit level non-responsiveness happens when no information is collected on a respondent, while item non-responsiveness occurs when incomplete information is collected from a respondent. For example, a respondent misses a question on a survey, or in the case of open-source collection, a variables a researcher in collecting data on is not available in the sourced documents. When considering item level missing data, which this study is doing, the general consensus indicates three types of missing data that can occur: missing at random (MAR), missing completely at random (MCAR), and missing not at random (MNAR), (Dong & Peng, 2013). MAR is defined by Rubin (1976), as a condition where the probability that the data are missing depends on the observed but not on the missing, when the observed is controlled for, while MCAR is defined by the probability of missingness being not dependent on observed or missing data, and MNAR is defined by the probability of missingness being dependent on unobserved data even after controlling for the observed.

The researchers who created the PIRUS dataset were acutely aware of the missing data that comes with relying on publicly available sources to collect information on private or sensitive matters. Additionally, given that the dataset consists of a representative sample and not the entire set of 40 years of domestic terror history, the amount of missing data is likely higher as a result, something the researchers themselves admit (Jensen, et al., 2016). While the team responsible for PIRUS did all they could to collect as much information as possible and perform missing data analysis in their studies of the data, including several forms of multiple imputation and expectation maximization, with one study even using the MICE technique (Multiple imputation by chained equations; see Jasko et al., 2022), for the purposes of this study, after a lengthy period of review of missing data techniques (see: Rubin, 1976; Pigott, 2001; Schafer & Graham, 2002;

Dong & Peng, 2013), it was determined that using the most conservative approaches of pairwise and listwise deletion would be the best solution for the primarily categorical data. All other methods explored, including imputation and expectation maximization techniques, require at least one variable to consist of interval level data and for that data to satisfy either the MAR or MCAR conditions. It was not clear to this researcher that the data met these assumptions of missing at random, given that some variables collected highly sensitive information which may not have always been made available to public news or collection sources.

CHAPTER V: Discussion

This study's primary goal was to answer two fundamental questions about the domestic terrorist in the United States; (1) have the general offender characteristics of the domestic terrorist changed over time, and (2) What are the typical antecedent activities of the domestic terrorist prior to the commission of a terrorist act. Results from the PIRUS data provide a wealth of information to interpret. While the demographics of radicalized individuals have been one of the most studied areas in recent terrorism literature, according to Wolfowicz et al.'s meta-analysis (2020), many of the studies observed often presented mixed or contradictory results. Furthermore, few studies attempt to compare such individual level characteristics on a larger decade-by-decade scale to determine if previously held results still apply. This study has tried to carry that out to the best of this researcher's abilities. While outcomes of this research will be discussed in this section, results should be taken with caution given the limitations of the data. Limitations of the results and design will be discussed at the end of this chapter, along with implications for future research.

Analysis has revealed that there are several factors that have changed over time. To be more precise, changes appear to come in waves for many variables, reflecting in some cases,

societal changes as well as zeitgeist-style changes in cultural views and targets. For example, among far-right ideologies, the most prevalent sub-ideology is white supremacy, something that is consistent over time; however, this dominance of belief obscures smaller movements that appear to sway with wider movements in the American cultural landscape. The rise of anti-abortion specific attacks in the 1970s and '80s post passage of Roe V. Wade, along with the rise of Fundamentalist and Christian Identity fomented a wave of such attacks, while a rise of Anti-government style attacks was the movement du jeur in the 1990s under the Clinton Administration and again under Obama. Xenophobic style attacks, often obscured by the white supremacy umbrella and the grey lines in which these sub-categories overlap have seen a rise over time as well, perhaps as a result of the cultural and political climates post-September 11th. The implications for both researchers and practitioners in this field therefore indicate paying close attention to cultural sways in political and cultural ideologies that have a history of radicalizing patterns.

Similarly, socioeconomic effects also share some patterns with cultural shifts, which may shed some light on why researchers on this subject have had such mixed results in establishing to what degree socioeconomics factor into terrorism. While socioeconomic status in adulthood did not bear any significant results by decade, it did have a significant result in childhood for the high economic stratum, but only during the 1970s. Additionally, another interesting but not significant finding was that the majority of extremists after 2000 came from low and middle economic strata. Studies on poverty as a factor in terrorism radicalization have generally been conclusive when measuring poverty indexes or proxies directly. Most studies do not show direct relationships between levels of poverty and acts of terrorism. How researchers have established this has varied; some for example, have used GDP, while others used economic development indexes but

generally, results have been similar. This study attempted to use a smaller scale understanding of poverty at a more individualized level, accounting for various individual level factors such as home ownership, chronic unemployment, the affording of luxury goods, receiving government subsidies, and income level to determine if any relationship to economic hardship had changed over time. No such relationship was found, further solidifying that socioeconomics on their own should not be used as a factor determinant in radicalization and that this has held steady over time.

Educational results demonstrated similar shifts, wherein educational attainment among extremists actually declined over time, once being overrepresented in the population, it is now in line with the general population, if not slightly below. More specifically, the attainment of the high school diploma became significant only recently, whereas college and professional degrees went from being overrepresented between the 1970s – '90s to being in line with the general population. Additionally, higher levels of education on their own demonstrated no connections to the likelihood of an attack being successful. This suggests further study is needed to examine how time and cultural shifts around education factor into some of the demographic characteristics found in this population.

Additional items that did display some variations over time included the duration of the radicalization period between 1970 and the 2010s. While there is some support for the hypothesis of the radicalization period getting shorter, the data revealed a steady shortening of the radicalization period between the 1970s and '80s, followed by a sharp lengthening upward in the 1990s and a then a reversion back to the pattern of a shortening radicalization period in the 2000s and 2010s. It is unclear why the pattern emerged in this way or what influencing factors may have

caused this inverted V-shape but future researchers should scrutinize this effect further, perhaps including community demographic shifts and technology.

Similar scrutiny should be paid to the military history of radicalized individuals. While a significant relationship was found between military history and radicalization, particularly within the far-right movement, what is further striking is the steady increase of military personnel radicalizing with each passing decade. Though the total number in the sample of known individuals with military history is small, the increase between the 1970s and the 2010s amounts to 347.37%. This finding follows similar findings from other authors (Jensen, Yates, & Kane, 2022). Notably, researchers from START with expanded data on extremists with military backgrounds found that on average, 17.8 subjects per year in the U.S. with military backgrounds committed ideological crimes, and most of the increases occurred in the years 2017, 2020, and 2021, coinciding with wider issues that galvanized many far-right extremists. These included events like Unite the Right in 2017, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Black Lives Matter protests, and the Capitol Riot on January 6th, 2021 (Jensen, Yates, & Kane, 2022). Their study also found that approximately 15% of individuals who were charged as participants during the Capitol Riot had U.S. military backgrounds. Other studies have scrutinized risk factors found in this group that appear elevated when compared to other radicalized individuals, including traumatic experiences, diminution of social standing, difficulty finding romantic relationships, and ostracism/marginalization (Haugstvedt and Koehler, 2023), suggesting that this group of individuals is particularly vulnerable to radicalized messaging, particularly when they leave the service and have no support system to provide an adequate outlet.

Criminal history also demonstrated some differences over time. Many scholars have observed the crime-terror nexus in recent years (Cuthbertson, 2004; Chermak & Gruenewald,

2015; Ljujic et al., 2017). Prison radicalization has often been a question, particularly in Europe, where Islamic individuals are overrepresented in prison and recruiters often target young and aimless youths who frequently feel like second-class citizens. In the U.S. criminal history has been found to be a factor across ideologies but the factor of time on this demographic was less studied and was less understood. This study indicates that radicalized individuals with criminal backgrounds have increased over time. While causality here cannot be established from this test – that is, whether individuals committed their crimes before or after radicalization, it can be said that criminal histories have become a more important indicator of radicalization or the potential for radicalization over time.

As previous researchers have noted (Gruenewald, 2011; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015) criminal histories are not uncommon and on the far-right ideological spectrum in particular. Almost three-quarters of far-left and single-issue radicalized ideologues showed no criminal history at all. About two-thirds of Islamist extremists could say the same. For those on the far-right however, less than half had no criminal history while also showing the most prevalent evidence toward a proclivity for violent crime in their past. This provides further evidence to support that of all the umbrella ideologies, those on the far-right display more violent criminal histories than those of any other ideology.

When looking at activities prior to terrorist action, one of the items tested for was drug and alcohol related problems. No significant results were found for this. Drugs and alcohol were found to cluster around the most common age bracket most associated with radicalization but not at any significant level. While for this study, no further action was taken on this hypothesis, data was limited for this variable and further analysis could be useful here. Only 229 cases were found with evidence of drug or alcohol use out of over 1900. Previous research has indicated that drug

use can act as a delinquent pathway into radicalization in a similar fashion to traditional crime and gang recruitment (Sandberg, Tutenges, & Ilan, 2023). Some groups will also use drug trafficking as a method of terrorist financing (Hardouin & Weichhardt, 2007), though actual use by the individual appears low. Type of ideology here could also play a role. Religious-based radicalization may shun substances for the individual while having no issue using substances as means to obtain funds for their goals and organization. Future researchers may want to investigate drug and crime related pathways to radicalization.

Individuals with mental illnesses also showed some preference to how they were radicalized, with the internet and social media taking preference over traditional media and in-person methods. These results present an interesting avenue for discussion and exploration. Traditionally, research has not found a relationship between terrorism and mental illness. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2 however, deference in the research was given to the rarest forms of mental illness, including personality disorders and schizophrenia. One potential theory here is that previously, recruitment into more organized groups required person-to-person engagement (see: Weather Underground as one example) or heavy research and the gathering of materials (á la Timothy McVeigh) resulting in a higher bar to entry. Individuals who may have suffered with mental health issues affecting their socialization or social engagement or had otherwise neurodivergent presentations, might have been selected out by recruiters. Corner, Gill, & Mason (2015), refer to this as "selection effects." This barrier is eliminated in the online environment when individuals can find themselves going down any number of rabbit holes and echo chambers that are algorithmically curated based on what was viewed last. The additional anonymity of the online environment also lends itself to the sharing of increasingly extreme opinions and the gathering of online engagement in the form of likes, reposts, and replies. Echo chambers also

have their own self-selection effects where dissent or differing opinions can be quickly and unilaterally removed by anonymous moderators, the use of downvote systems, or outright bans. For those with less social acumen, less neurotypical intelligence, and less critical reading skills in the form of varying mental illnesses, these forms of validation and algorithmic targeting may be just the things to push someone into extremism.

Similarly, mental illness also displayed an association with several types of catalyzing events in the time prior to an attack. America's social value system, previous trauma, experiences of marginalization, abuse, and a loss of social standing all indicated relationships. While we may not know what type of mental health issue(s) these radicalized individuals were dealing with, coping mechanisms, reactions to events that alter pre-conceived world views, and/or events that change the lifestyles one might be used to, as well as the attribution of various grievances, can all make an already vulnerable individual more susceptible to radicalized, black-and-white thinking. Larger, more historical events did not have a significant impact on this group when compared to the more interpersonal level events, suggesting that while larger cultural shifts do have some impact in shaping a wider ideological movement, they do not necessarily impact the individual at the interpersonal level with the same type of effect.

These results should be interpreted with some caution given the difficulty that exists in collecting information on mental illness from open-source materials. It is possible for the number to be underrepresented in the current dataset and for results to be skewed. For example, an FBI study on Lone Offender terrorists found 38% of their sample were ultimately diagnosed with some type of psychiatric disorder either prior to their attack (25%) or after (13%) (Richards, L., Molinaro, P., Wyman, J., & Craun, S., 2019). Results, however, do follow along with other research patterns. Corner, et al. (2016), demonstrated that when observing various mental

illnesses, some do foster intense online relationships, though this alone has not been directly attributed to violence. Additionally, decades of attachment theory research have indicated a host of issues associated with negative attachment styles, and in particular mental inflexibility or rigid thinking (Gawda, 2017; Sefat, et al., 2017). Relationships between mental illness and violence within the scope of terrorism should be approached with caution and care, given the stigmas already surrounding mental illness and the high probability of an individual with a mental illness being more likely to be the victim of a crime than a perpetrator.

Lastly, antecedent activities also included the use of social media. More extensive radicalized beliefs showed significant associations with the frequency of social media use and the consumption of radicalized content, adding further support to the echo chamber effect. The extent of radicalizing beliefs shares a relationship with activities that correspond to seeking out methods to interact with radicalized content, be that through consumption or dissemination. Furthermore, more free time in an individual's day either through poor work history, youth-student status, or increased free time due to serialized unemployment where they have the time to interact and/or engage in radicalizing content on social media and the airing of grievances has a spiralizing effect down an extremist rabbit hole.

Ultimately, the research in this study has shown that many of the factors used to study terrorists and radicalized individuals are not static. Many factors can change or have changed over time, including levels of education, military history, catalyzing events, ideological reasoning, cultural effects, barriers to entry, the time it takes to become radicalized, who is more likely to be consuming radicalizing content, and how. The findings from this study can also aid future researchers of terrorism and law enforcement in understanding how individuals are targeted for

radicalization, as well as what factors are likely to make someone receptive to such messaging. Impacts for future research are discussed in the next section.

Research Limitations and Future Research

While this study aimed to conduct methodologically sound, empirical research on domestic radicalization, it is still limited by the nature of the data used, and the way in which it was collected. The cases collected within the PIRUS dataset are only a sample of radicalized individuals in the United States. The authors of the dataset were clear in their methodology that while they went to every length to ensure a reliable and representative sample was collected, it remains only a sampling of individuals, and one that is collected from open-source information. Open-source data collection has its own drawbacks, including being limited to what information police and other law-based professionals are willing to discuss for public knowledge. Additionally, journalists add another layer of what material to include and how much detail to provide when relying on news articles. These open-source articles are often time sensitive as well, meaning that the further back in time one goes, the more difficult it may be to acquire the information, particularly for the days before the internet was as ubiquitous as it is now. This was one of the reasons for limiting the sample analyzed in this study to the "modern age of terrorism" of 1970 onward. The amount of information provided by open-source materials may have also been different the farther back in time one goes, particularly as it related to more sensitive or less discussed topics, such as mental illness and interpersonal factors. It would have been useful if the original team of researchers included an appendix with the data with a list of sources uses.

Another limitation to the study was the amount of missing data within some of the variables. Missing data is a substantial concern for this dataset, study, and to future use cases of the PIRUS data. Missing data can compromise the integrity of the study despite researchers' best

efforts to account for it. It is not entirely discernible to what degree the missing data can be attributable to poor information gathering on the part of the original open sources, the time and/or cultural taboos in which the act was committed (and as a result not reported on), or as part of the decision-making process of what to include in the dataset per the authors internal methods for inclusion acceptability. The most conservative options were used during the course of this study's research in an effort to ensure data integrity, however some results do come with strong caveats due to the substantial amount of missing data.

In addition to the missing data, this study is further limited by the nature of secondary data and all the caveats that come with using a secondary data source. The research is limited to what was collected by the original researchers and the methods used to code that data. Much of the data collected was coded in a categorical coding scheme which does limit some methods of analysis. Furthermore, the power of the analyses performed needed to be carefully checked on multiple occasions given the amount of missing data and low cell counts this led to.

This data could be improved if a data team performed the extra step of cross-referencing the details of the individuals gathered from open-source texts with court, jail, and judiciary open sources where possible. While the authors of the dataset do indicate they do this to some degree, it is not clear to what extent. Most states, over the last decade, have made efforts to permit docket and court case access to the public for offenders over the age of 18 through some form of an online, searchable database. Federally, cases are also available to view by the public. Details from these dockets could have likely provided more details to the individual cases in the PIRUS dataset. Furthermore, if a data team wanted to try improving the quality of information in the older cases, FOIA requests on already prosecuted and closed cases could permit researchers access to information not available to the open sources that were originally used.

Future research should make efforts to further investigate demographics, particularly aspects related to mental health, criminal history, military history, and their respective relationship to the propensity for radicalization. Researchers need to focus carefully on the mental health component, particularly as generations become increasingly socially isolated and turn to social media for their entertainment and parasocial relationships. While individuals with mental health issues are often a vulnerable population on their own, so too are they more vulnerable to manipulation and misinformation, particularly in an online environment where an algorithm can create an echo chamber effect. Previous research in this area has placed its eyes most frequently on personality, schizophrenia spectrum, and other psychotic disorders while other, more common and less "flashy" disorders are overlooked. In particular, efforts should focus with more nuance on the interactions between mental health, the cognitive opening to radicalization, and the catalyzing events leading to radicalization.

Military history, and in particular the exposure to weapons training, is something the far-right covets for its own militia style groups. We can see this in the data from January 6th, Capitol Hill Siege participants (Milton & Mines, 2021), branches of far-right groups like the Oath Keepers, and even extremists forming their own unsanctioned militias within the larger military apparatus (Goldwasser, 2021). The messaging to this group needs further study for a better understanding of what draws this group into extremism. At one point it appeared as though the messaging appeal of extremist rhetoric came after veterans returned from service, and perhaps did not have a clear post-military direction or became disillusioned in their post-military life. There is some newer evidence however, that some extremists purposely try to join the military to gain that military/weapons expertise and to convert others (Goldwasser, 2021). Information on this time component and the associated messaging should be further studied both to better catch extremists

attempting to join military ranks and to prevent radicalizing rhetoric from appealing to military service members.

Additionally, given the shift in educational trends, the shortening radicalization period, and the increasing echo chamber effects of social media, there is room for further exploration by researchers on this subject. More specifically, researchers should make efforts to examen how more recent cultural dynamics impact the propensity for radicalization, in these post-Trump and post-pandemic years. The duration period for radicalization has shortened over the past 20 years and we can see that large cultural events have an impact through history on this. With the increased use of social media as a source for news and information and the shifts in education, more research could explore the effects of media literacy and critical thinking skills on individuals' ability to discern propaganda and radicalizing content.

The research in this study opens a new window in understanding how radicalized individuals can change, both over time and in their antecedent activities. They are by no means a static group with static demographics. Culture and technology have had and continue to have outsized impacts on factors like ideology, access to radicalizing content, and barriers to entry. Many of the factors that have been tested in the past, such as education, socioeconomics, and criminal history, do bear some fruit, with a multitude of caveats. Many push-pull factors acting in conjunction with feelings of grievance, marginalization, and trauma, with the appropriate cognitive opening, when combined with the access to radicalizing groups or content can create that perfect "soup" that results in an extremist willing to carry out terrorist activities. While this research adds one piece to the larger body of radicalization research, there remains far more to still investigate.

References

Abadie, A. (2004). *Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism.* National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10859

Abrahams, J. (2017). *Ideological Radicalization: a conceptual framework for understanding why youth in major U.S. metropolitan areas are more likely to become radicalized* (07070188) [Master's thesis, Naval Post-Graduate School].

Abudagga, A., Wolfe, S., Carome, M., Phatdouang, A. & Torrey, E. F. (2016). *Individuals with serious mental illnesses in county jails : A survey of jail staff 's perspectives.* Public Citizen's Health Research Group and Treatment Advocacy Center. https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/jail-survey-report-2016.pdf

Agnew, R. (1992). Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency. *Criminology, 30*(1), 47-87.

Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N. & Swagel, P. (1996). Political Instability and economic growth. *Journal of Economic Growth, 1*: 189-211.

Alexander, D. (2020, October 20). *Why young people don't vote, and why 2020 might be different.* Hub: John Hopkins. https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/10/20/mobilizing-youth-votersscott-warren/

Alston, P. (2018). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to the United States of America.* Human Rights Council, United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1629536?ln=en

Aly, A., MacDonald, S., Jarvis, L. & Chen, T. M. (2017). Introduction to the special issue: Terrorist online propaganda and radicalization. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40*(1), 1-9. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157402

Aly, A. & Striegher, J. (2012). Examining the role of religion in radicalization to violent Islamist extremism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35*(1), 849-862. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.720243

Anti-Defamation League [ADL]. (n.d.a). *Black Hebrew Israelites.* *https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/black-hebrew-israelites*

Anti-Defamation League [ADL]. (n.d. b). *Christian Identity.* https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/christian-identity

Anti-Defamation League [ADL]. (n.d. c). *Three Percenters.* https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/three-percenters

Anti-Defamation League [ADL]. (2012). *Don Black/Stormfront.* https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/DonBlack.pdf

Anti-Defamation League. (2019a, April 6). *White supremacists embrace "accelerationism."* *https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-embrace-accelerationism*

Anti-Defamation League. (2019b, December 11). *Jersey City Shooting: What we know.* *https://www.adl.org/blog/jersey-city-shooting-what-we-know*

Atran, S. Combating Al Qaeda's Splinters: Mishandling Suicide Terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly*, *27*(3), 67-90.

Badar, M., Nagata, M., & Tueni, T. (2017). The radical application of the Islamist concept of *takfir. Arab Law Quarterly, 31*(1), 134-162.

Beirich, H. & Potok, M. (2009). Countering anti-immigration extremism: The Southern Poverty Law Center's strategies. *City University of New York Law Review, 12*(2).

Bakker, E. (2006). *Jihadi terrorists in Europe: Their characteristics and the circumstance in which they joined the Jihad, an exploratory study.* Netherlands Institute of International relations.

Bakshy, E., Messing, S. & Adamic, L. (2015). Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. *Science 348*(6239), 1130–32.

Barnes, J. C., Jorgensen, C., Beaver, K. M., Boutwell, B. B., & Wright, J. P. (2015). Arrest prevalence in a national sample of adults: The role of sex and race/ethnicity. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 40(3), 457-465. DOI:10.1007/s12103-014-9273- 3

Batiuk, M. E., Moke, P. & Rountree, P. W. (1997). Crime and rehabilitation: Correctional education as an agent of change. *Justice Quarterly, 14*(1), 167–180.

Beirich, H. (2014). *White homicide worldwide. Stormfront, the leading white supremacist web forum, has another distinction – murder capital of the internet.* Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/white-homicide-worldwide.pdf

Benmelech, E., Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. (2012). Economic conditions and the quality of suicide terrorism. *The Journal of Politics, 74*(1), 113-128.

Bennett, D. (2008). *Immigration and immigrants: Anti-immigrant sentiment.* An essay from nineteenth century U.S. Newspapers, Cengage Learning.

Benson, C. & Bishaw, A. (2019). *Poverty: 2017 and 2018. American Community Survey Briefs.* United States Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/acs/acsbr18-02.pdf

Berger, J.M. (2016). *Without prejudice: What sovereign citizens believe.* George Washington University: Program on Extremism. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/JMB%20Sovereign%20Citizens.pdf

Bermingham, A., Conway, M., McInerney, L., O'Hare, N., & Smeaton, A. F. (2009, July). Combining social network analysis and sentiment analysis to explore the potential for online radicalisation. In *2009 International Conference on Advances in Social Network Analysis and Mining* (pp. 231-236). IEEE.

Bernstein, M.S., Monroy-Hernández, A., Harry, D., André, P., Panovich, K., & Vargas, G.G. (2011). 4chan and /b/: An Analysis of Anonymity and Ephemerality in a Large Online Community. *ICWSM*.

Bialik, K. (2017, November 10). *The changing face of America's veteran population.* Pew Research. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/10/the-changing-face-ofamericas-veteranpopulation/#:~:text=There%20were%20around%2020.4%20million,how%20this%20pop ulation%20is%20changing.

Bjelopera, J. P. (2017). *Domestic terrorism: An overview.* Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf

Blazak, R. (2001). White boys to terrorist men. *American Behavioral Scientist, 44*(6), 982-1000.

Block Jr. R. (2011). What about disillusionment? Exploring the pathways to Black Nationalism. *Political Behavior, 33*(1), 27-51.

Bloom, M. (2005). *Dying to kill: The allure of suicide terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Borgeson, K. (2018). Christian Identity. In: R.M. Valeri & K. Borgenson (Eds.), *Terrorism in America*. (pp. 77-95). Routledge.

Borum, R. (2007). *Psychology of Terrorism: Reference List*. University of South Florida. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA494527.pdf

Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism I: a review of social science theories. *Journal of Strategic Security, 4*(4), 7-36

Bowman, E. (2017, August 20). The women behind the 'alt-right'. *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544134546/the-women-behind-the-alt-right

Bowman-Grieve, L. (2009). Exploring "Stormfront": A virtual community of the radical right. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32,* 989-1007. DOI: 10.1080/10576100903259951

Breslau, N., Davis, G.C., & Schultz, L.R. (2003). Posttraumatic stress disorder and the incidence of nicotine, alcohol, and other drug disorders in persons who have experienced trauma. *Archives of General Psychiatry, 60*(3), 289-294. DOI: 10.1001/archpsyc.60.3.289. PMID: 12622662.

Bright, J. (2016). Explaining the emergence of echo chambers on social media: the role of ideology and extremism. *ArXiv, abs/1609.05003*.

Brooks, L. (2020, February 20). *SPLC Testifies Before Congress on Alarming Incidents of White Supremacy in the Military*. Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/news/2020/02/11/splc-testifies-congress-alarming-incidentswhite-supremacy-military

Brown, D. (2017, August 20). How one man convinced 200 Ku Klux Klan members to give up their robes. *NPR*. Retrieved from: https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544861933/how-oneman-convinced-200-ku-klux-klan-members-to-give-up-their-robes

Brown, R. A. & Shaw, T.C. (2002). Separate nations: Two attitudinal dimensions of Black Nationalism. *The Journal of Politics, 64*(1), 22-44.

Bruce, G. (2013). Definitions of terrorism and social and political effects. *Journal of Military and Veterans' Health, 21*(2), 26-30.

Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2005). The quality of terror. *American Journal of Political Science, 49*(3), 515-530.

Burgoon, B. (2006). On welfare and terror: Social welfare policies and political-economic roots of terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50*(2), 176-203. DOI: 10.1177/0022002705284829

Cagle, S. (2019, August 16). 'Bees, not refugees': The environmentalist roots of anti-immigrant bigotry. *The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/aug/15/anti*

Caspi, D. "Extremist Networks and Lethality: A Mapping of Violent White Supremacist Group Networks and Investigation of Relationship between Network Location and Ideologically Motivated Murder" (Ph.D. diss., John Jay College, City University of New York, 2010.

Chatfield, A. Takeoka., Reddick, C. G. & Brajawidagda, U. (2015). Tweeting propaganda, radicalization and recruitment: Islamic state supporters multi-sided twitter networks. In J. Zhang & Y. Kim (Eds.), Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research: Digital Government and Wicked Problems: Climate Change, Urbanization, and Inequality (pp. 239-249). New York, United States: ACM.

Chermak, S., Freilich, J. & Suttmoeller, M. (2013). The organizational dynamics of far-right hate groups in the United States: Comparing violent to nonviolent organizations. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 36*, 193-218.

Chermak, S. & Gruenewald, J. (2015). Laying a foundation for the criminological examination of right-wing, left-wing, and Al Qaeda-inspired extremism in the United States. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 27*(1), 133-159, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.975646

Code of Federal Regulations. Publ. L. No. 101-509, 103-414. 82 Stat. 204, 108 Stat. 4279. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR-2010-title28-vol1/CFR-2010-title28-vol1sec0-85/summary

Corner, E., & Gill, P. (2015). A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor terrorism. Law and human behavior, 39(1), 23.

Corner, E., Gill, P., & Mason, O. (2015). Mental health disorders and the terrorist: a research note probing selection effects and disorder prevalence. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 39*(6), 560 – 568.

Counterterrorism Division. (2008). *Rage and racism: Skinhead violence on the Far Right.* Federal Bureau of Investigation. https://info.publicintelligence.net/Skinhead_Rage_and_Racism.pdf

Counterterrorism Division. (2008b). *White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel since 9/11. Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessment*. Federal Bureau of Investigation. https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/FBI_WHITE_SUPREMACY-2008ocr.pdf

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate [CTED]. (2019). *Identifying and exploring the nexus between human trafficking, terrorism, and terrorism financing.* United Nations Security Council. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HT-terrorismnexus-CTED-report.pdf

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics, 13*, 379–99.

Crenshaw, M. (1992). Current research on terrorism: The academic perspective. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 15*(1), 1-11.

Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology, 21*(2), 4-5-420.

Crenshaw, M. (2007). Explaining suicide terrorism: A review essay. *Security Studies, 16*(1), 133162.

Crenshaw, M. (2014). Terrorism research: The record. *International Interactions, 40*, 556-567.

Cuthbertson, I. (2004). Prisons and the education of terrorists. *World Policy Journal, 21*(3): 1522.

Dafaure. M. (2020). The "great meme war:" the Alt-right and its multifarious enemies. *New Perspectives on the Anglophone World, 10,* 1-28.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33*(1), 797-814. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423

Dalky H.F. (2012). Perception and coping with stigma of mental illness: Arab families' perspectives. *Issues in Mental Health Nursing*, *33*(7),486-491. DOI:10.3109/01612840.2012.676720

Darby, S. (2017, September). The rise of the Valkyries. *Harper's Magazine, 9.*

https://harpers.org/archive/2017/09/the-rise-of-the-valkyries/

Department of Homeland Security. (2009). *Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment.* Office of Intelligence and Analysis. https://fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf

Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2017). *Joint intelligence bulletin: White supremacist extremist poses persistent threat of lethal violence.* https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3924852/White-SupremacistExtremism-JIB.pdf

DeSilver, D. (2018). For most U.S. workers, real wages have barely budged in decades. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-usworkers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/

Devine, C. (2017, October 31). 'Kill them all' – Russian-linked Facebook accounts called for violence. *CNN Business*. https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/31/media/russia-facebookviolence/index.html

Dewey, C. (2014, September 24). Absolutely everything you need to know to understand 4chan, the Internet's own bogeyman. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/09/25/absolutelyeverything-you-need-to-know-to-understand-4chan-the-internets-own-bogeyman/

Dong, Y. and Peng, C. (2013). Principled missing data methods for researchers. *Springer Plus, 2*(222).

Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F., Kruglanski, A., de Wolf, A., Mann, L. & Feddes, A. (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. *Current Opinion in Psychology, 11*(1), 79-84.

Downs, Kenya (2016, October 21). *FBI warned of white supremacists in law enforcement 10 years ago. Has anything changed?* PBS News Hour. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/fbi-white-supremacists-in-law-enforcement

Economou, M., Kontoangelos, K., Peppou, L., Arvaniti, A., Samakouri, M., Douzenis, A. Papadimitriou, G. (2017). Medical students' attitudes to mental illnesses and to psychiatry before and after the psychiatric clerkship: Training in a specialty and a general hospital. *Psychiatry Research, 258,* 108-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2017.10.009.

Enders, W., Hoover, G. Sandler, T. (2016). The changing nonlinear relationship between income and terrorism. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60*(2), 195-225.

Falk, A. & Zweimüller, J. Kuhn, A. (2011). Unemployment and right-wing extremist crime. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113*(2), 260-285.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1999). *Hate Crime Statistics, 1999.* Retrieved from: https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/1999/hatecrime99.pdf

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2000a). *30 years of terrorism: A special retrospective edition.* U.S. Department of Justice. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/terrorismunited-states-1999-30-years-terrorism-special

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2000b). *Hate Crime Statistics, 2000*. Retrieved from: https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2000/hatecrime00.pdf

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2005). *Terrorism 2002-2005*. U.S. Department of Justice. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2008, December 10). *Rage and racism: Skinhead violence on the far right.* Intelligence Assessment. https://info.publicintelligence.net/Skinhead_Rage_and_Racism.pdf

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2010, December 16). *Domestic terrorism: Anarchist extremism, a primer.* https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/november/anarchist_111610/anarchist_111610

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2011, September 1). *Sovereign citizens: A growing domestic threat to law enforcement.* U.S. Department of Justice. https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/sovereign-citizens-a-growing-domestic-threatto-law-enforcement

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). *Crime in the United States 2012, Arrests by Sex.* [Data Set]. Uniform Crime Reports. https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/42tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_42_arrests_by_sex_2012.xls

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2019). *Homegrown violent extremist mobilization indicators.* U.S. Department of Justice. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/NCTC-FBI-DHS-HVEMobilization-Indicators-Booklet-2019.pdf

Fernandez, M. (2017, August 14). Bombing plot in Oklahoma City is thwarted with arrest, F.B.I. says. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/oklahomavan-bomb-domestic-terrorism.html

Ferrara, E., Wang, W., Varol, O., Flammini, A. & Glaystyan. (2016). Predicting online extremism, content adopters, and interaction reciprocity. *arXiv:1605.00659* DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47874-6_3

Ford, J., & Schroeder, R. (2011). Higher Education and Criminal Offending over the Life Course. *Sociological Spectrum*, *31*(1), 32–58.

Forrest, W. (2014). Cohabitation, relationship quality, and desistence from crime. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 76*(3), 539-556.

Freilich, J. D. & Pridemore, W.A. (2005). A reassessment of state-level covariates of militia groups. *Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23*(4), 527-546.

Fu, H. & Rissanen. (2024, May 30). New International Comparison Program Data Sheds Light on Global Economy and Living Standards. *World Bank Blogs.* New International Comparison Program data sheds light on global economy and living standards (worldbank.org)

Gault, M. (2020, January 7). Something Awful's notorious "fuck you and die" forum shuts down because of Nazis. *Vice.* https://www.vice.com/en/article/qjd8dv/something-awfulsnotorious-fuck-you-and-die-forum-shuts-down-because-of-nazis

Gawda, B. (2017). Fear attachment as a predictor of mental inflexibility. Hypothesis on neutral bases. *NeuroQuantology, 15*(4), 93-100.

Geiger, A. W. (2019, September 11). *Key findings about the online news landscape in America.* Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/11/key-findingsabout-the-online-news-landscape-in-america/

German, M. (2012, May 29). *Manufacturing a "Black Separatist" Threat and Other Dubious Claims: Bias in Newly Released FBI Terrorism Training Materials.* American Civil Liberties Union. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/discriminatoryprofiling/manufacturing-black-separatist-threat-and-other

Gerstenfeld, P.B., Grant, D.R., & Chiang, C. (2003). Hate online: A content analysis of extremist internet sites. *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 3*(1), 29-44.

Gill, P. & Corner, E. (2017). There and back again: The study of mental disorder and terrorist involvement. *American Psychologist, 72*(3), 231-241.

Gill, P., Corner, E., Conway, M., Thornton, A., Bloom, M. & Horgan, J. (2017). Terrorist use of the internet by the numbers. Quantifying behaviors, patterns, and processes. *Criminology & Public Policy, 16*(1), 99-117. DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12249.

Gill, P. Horgan, J. & Deckert, P. (2014). Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone-actor terrorists. *Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59*(2), 425-435.

Giovanni, J. (2015, February 16). Simple Ideas to Counter Terrorism in France. *Newsweek*. https://www.newsweek.com/simple-ideas-counter-terrorism-france-307096

Goldwasser, R. (2021, October 12). Extremism Among Active-Duty Military and Veterans Remains a Clear and Present Danger. Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2021/10/12/extremism-among-active-duty-military-and-veterans-remains-clear-and-present-danger

Gonzales, L., Chan, G., & Yanos, P. T. (2017). Individual and neighborhood predictors of mental illness stigma in New York State. *Stigma Health 2*(3): 175-181. DOI: 10.1037/sah0000043

González, A., Freilich, J. & Chermak, S. (2014). How women engage in homegrown terrorism. *Feminist Criminology, 9*(4), 344-366. DOI: 10.1177/1557085114529809

Gramlich, J. (2021, June 1). *10 facts about Americans and Facebook.* Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/

Greenfeld, L. & Snell, T. (2000). *Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Women Offenders.* Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs. https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/wo.pdf

Grover, T., & Mark, G. (2019, July). Detecting potential warning behaviors of ideological radicalization in an alt-right subreddit. In *Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media*, *13*,193-204.

Gruenewald, J. (2011). A comparative examination of homicides perpetrated by far-right extremists. *Homicide Studies, 15*(2), 177-203.

Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S. & Freilich, J. (2013). Distinguishing "loner" attacks from other domestic extremist violence: A comparison of far-right homicide incident and offender characteristics. *Criminology and Public Policy, 12*(1), 65-91. DOI:10.1111/17459133.12008

Gurr, T. (1973). The revolution. Social-change nexus: Some old theories and new hypotheses. *Comparative Politics, 5*(3), 359-392.

Guzman, G. & Kollar, M. (2023, September). *Income in the United States: 2022. Current Population Reports.* U.S. Census Bureau. p60-279.pdf (census.gov)

Hafez, M. & Mullins, C. (2015). The radicalization puzzle: A theoretical synthesis of empirical approaches to homegrown extremism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38*(1)*,* 958-975.

Hamm, M. & Spaaj, R. (2015). *Lone wolf terrorism in America: Using knowledge of radicalization pathways to forge prevention strategies.* National Criminal Justice Reference Service. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf

Hankes, K. (2017). Eye of the stormer. *Intelligence Report*, Southern Poverty Law Center. Spring Issue. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/eyestormer

Hara, N. & Huang, B. (2011). Online social movements. *Annual review of Information Science and Technology, 45*(1), 489-522.

Hardouin, P. & Weichhardt, R. (2006). Terrorist fund raising through criminal activities. *Journal of Money Laundering Control, 9*(3), 303-308.

Haugstvedt, H. & Koehler, D. (2023) Armed and explosive? An explorative statistical analysis of extremist radicalization cases with military background. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 35*(3), 518-532, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2021.1957675

Hine, G., Onaolapo, J., Cristofaro, E., Kourtellis, N., Leontiadis, I., Samaras, R., Stringhini, G., & Blackburn, J. (2017). Kek, cucks, and God Emperor Trump: A measurement study of 4chan's politically incorrect forum and its effect on the web. *Proceedings of the*

International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, 11(1). https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03452

Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism.* Columbia University Press.

Hoewe, J. (2012). The othering of terrorists: Elite U.S. newspapers' use of the word terrorist and the subsequent mention of religion. In S. R. De Buitrago (Ed.), *Portraying the Other in International Relations: Cases of Othering, Their Dynamics and the Potential for transformation* (pp. 91-106). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Holt, T. Freilich, J., Chermak, S. & McCauley, C. (2015). Political radicalization on the Internet: Extremist content, government control, and the power of victim and jihad videos. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 8*(2), 107-120. DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2015.1065101

Horgan, J. (2003). The search for the terrorist. In Silke, A. (Ed), *Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences*. (pp. 3-27).

Horgan, J. (2008). From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618*(1), 80–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317539

Horgan, J. (2008b). Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism. *AAPSS, 618*(July): 80-94.

Horowitz, J. M., Brown, A. & Cox, K. (2019). Race in America 2019. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/race-in-america-2019/

Hsu, S. & Weiner, R. (2021, June 10). Alleged supporters of right-wing Three Percenters group charged in new Jan. 6 Capitol riot conspiracy. *The Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/three-percenters-charged-conspiracycapitol-riot/2021/06/10/f84091e6-c9ec-11eb-81b1-34796c7393af_story.html

Hudson, R. (1999). *The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why?* Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=3801

Hutchinson, S. & O'Malley, P. (2007). A crime-terror nexus? Thinking on some of the links between terrorism and criminality. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30*(1), 1095-1107. DOI: 10.1080/10576100701670870.

Iyengar, S. & Hahn, K.S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. *Journal of Communication* 59, 19–39.

Iyengar, C. & Westwood, S. (2014). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American Journal of Political Science, 59*(3): 690-707.

Jasko, K., La Free, G. & Kruglanski, A. (2017). Quest for significance and violent extremism: The case of domestic radicalization. *Political Psychology, 38*(5): 815-831.

Jasko, K., LaFree, G., Piazza, J. & Becker, M. (2022). A comparison of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and the world. *PNAS, 119* (30), e2122593119.

Jensen, M. & LaFree, G. (2016). *Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR).* National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016.pdf

Jensen, M., Safer-Lictenstein, A., James, P. & LaFree, G. (2020). The link between prior criminal record and violent political extremism in the United States. In: Weisburd D., Savona E., Hasisi B., Calderoni F. (Eds.), *Understanding Recruitment to Organized Crime and Terrorism* (pp. 121-146). Springer.

Jensen, M., Yates, E., & Kane, S. (2022). *Radicalization in the ranks: an assessment of the scope and nature of criminal extremism in the United States Military*. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/radicalization-ranks

Johnson, D. (2017, August 21). I warned of right-wing violence in 2009. Republicans objected. I was right. *The Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/21/i-warned-of-rightwing-violence-in-2009-it-caused-an-uproar-i-was-right/

Johnson, S. (2019). Understanding the violent personality: antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, & sociopathy explored. *Forensic Research & Criminology International Journal, 7*(2), 76-88.

Kalpakis G., Tsikrika T., Gialampoukidis I., Papadopoulos S., Vrochidis S., Kompatsiaris I. (2018). Analysis of suspended terrorism-related content on social media. In: G. Leventakis & M. Haberfeld (Eds.), *Community-Oriented Policing and Technological Innovations. Springer Briefs in Criminology*. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-89294-8_11

Kelchen, R. (2016). An analysis of student fees: the roles of states and institutions. *The Review of Higher Education, 39*(4), 597-619.

Karlsen, R., Steen-Johnsen, Wollbæk, D., & Enjolras, B. (2017). Echo chamber and trench warfare dynamics in online debates. *European Journal of Communication, 32*(3), 257273.

Kelly, R. (1998). Moral disengagement and the role of ideology in the displacement and diffusion of responsibility among terrorists. In J. Kamerman (Ed.), *Negotiating Responsibility in the Criminal Justice System* (pp. 113-134). Southern Illinois University Press.

Kerodal, A., Freilich, J., Chermak, S. & Suttmoeller, M. (2015). A test of Sprinzak's split delegitimization's theory of the life course of far-right organizational behavior.

International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 39(4), 307-329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2014.973053

King, M. & Taylor, D. (2011). The radicalization of homegrown Jihadists: A review of theoretical models and social psychological evidence. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 23*(4), 602-622. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.587064

Kirby, A. (2007). The London bombers as "self-starters": A case study in indigenous radicalization and the emergence of autonomous cliques. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30*(1), 415-428.

Klausen J. (2015). Tweeting the *Jihad*: Social media networks of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38*(1), 1-22.

Klausen, J. (2016). *A Behavioral Study of the Radicalization Trajectories of American "Homegrown" Al Qaeda-Inspired Terrorist Offenders.* National Institute of Justice. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250417.pdf

Klausen, J., Campion, S., Needle, N., Nguyen G., & Libretti, R. (2016). Toward a behavioral model of "homegrown" radicalization trajectories. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 39(1), 67-83, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1099995

Klausen, J. Marks, C. & Zaman, T. (2016b). Finding online extremists in social networks. *arXiv:1610.06242*, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.06242.pdf

Klausen, J., Morrill, T., & Libretti, R. (2016c). The terrorist age-crime curve: An analysis of American Islamist terrorist offenders and age-specific propensity for participation in violent and nonviolent incidents. *Social Science Quarterly, 97*(1), DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12249

Krueger, A. & Malečková, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17*(4), 119-144.

Kruglanski, A., Xiaoyan, C., Dechesne, M., Fishman, S. & Orehek, E. (2009). Fully committed: Suicide bombers motivation and the quest for personal significance. *Political Psychology, 30*(3): 331-357.

Lai, B. (2007). Draining the swamp: An empirical examination of the production of international terrorism. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 24*(4), 297-310.

Lakhani, S. (2020) Extreme criminals: reconstructing ideas of criminality through extremist narratives. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 43*(3), 208-223.

Lankford, A. (2016). Detecting mental health problems and suicide motives among terrorists and mass shooters. *Criminal Behavior and Mental Health, 26*(5), 315-312.

Lee, J. (2012, October 23). How we talk online: A history of online forums, from cavemen days to the present. *Muo*. Available here: https://www.muo.com/tag/how-we-talk-online-ahistory-of-online-forums-from-cavemen-days-to-the-present/

Lerner M.J. & Montada L. (1998) An overview. In: L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds), *Responses to Victimizations and Belief in a Just World. Critical Issues in Social Justice*. Springer, Boston, MA. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6418-5_1

Levin, B. (2002). Cyberhate: A legal and historical analysis of extremists' use of computer networks in America. *American Behavioral Scientist, 45*(6), 966-988.

Lien, Y., Lin, H., Tsai, C. Lien, Y., & Wu, T. (2019). Changes in attitudes toward mental illness in healthcare professionals and students. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16*(23), doi:10.3390/ijerph16234655

Lin, L. Stamm, K., & Christidis, P. (2018). *Demographics of the U.S. Psychology Workforce: Findings from the 2007-16 American Community Survey.* American Psychology Association Center for Workforce Studies. https://www.apa.org/workforce/publications/16-demographics/report.pdf

Ljujic, V., van Prooijen, J. W. & Weerman, F. (2017). Beyond the crime-terror nexus: socioeconomic status, violent crimes, and terrorism. *Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice, 3*(3), 158-172.

Loadenthal, M. (2018). Leftist political violence: From terrorism to social protest. In: R.M. Valeri & K. Borgenson (Eds.), *Terrorism in America*. (pp. 36 – 74). Routledge.

Lucas, R. (2021, April 10). Who are the Oath Keepers? Militia group, founder scrutinized in Capitol riot probe. *NPR.* https://www.npr.org/2021/04/10/985428402/who-are-the-oathkeepers-militia-group-founder-scrutinized-in-capitol-riot-probe

Lyons, H. A., & Harbinson, H. J. (1986). A comparison of political and non-political murderers in Northern Ireland. *Medicine, Science and Law, 26*(1)*,* 193-198.

Makuch, B. & Lamoureux, M. (2019, September 17). Neo-Nazis are glorifying Osama Bin Laden. *Vice.* https://www.vice.com/en/article/bjwv4a/neo-nazis-are-glorifying-osamabin-laden

Mandel, D. R. (2001). Radicalization: What does it mean? In T. Pick & A. Speckhard (Eds.), *Home-grown terrorism: understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalization among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe*. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Marks, Z. (2016). *Conflict and poverty.* GSDRC Professional Development Reading Pack no. 52. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. https://gsdrc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Poverty-and-conflict_RP.pdf

Mathew, B., Dutt, R., Goyal, P., & Mukherjee, A. (2019). *Spread of hate speech on social media.* Proceedings of the 10th Association for Computing Machinery Conference on Web Science, Boston, MA, United States.

McCauley, C. & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 20*(3), 415-433. DOI: 10.1080/09546550802073367

McGarrity, M. (2019, May 8). *Confronting the Rose of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland.* Federal Bureau of Investigation. https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-therise-of-domestic-terrorism-in-the-homeland

McGilloway, A., Ghosh, P. & Buhi, K. (2015). A systematic review of pathways to and processes associated with radicalization and extremism amongst Muslims in Western societies. *International Review of Psychiatry, 27*(1): 39-50.

McVicar, M. (2013). "Let them have Dominion": "Dominion theology" and the construction of religious extremism in the U.S. Media. *The Journal of Religion and Popular Culture, 25*(1), 120-145.

Melucci, A. (1995). The Process of Collective Identity. Published in: *Social Movements and Culture.* Eds: Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans. University of Minnesota Press.

Milton, D. & Mines, A. (2021). *"This is War:" Examining Military Experience Among the Capitol Hill Siege Participants.* Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: George Washington University. https://extremism.gwu.edu/military-experience-among-capitol-hill-siege

Minkenberg, M. (2017). The rise of the radical right in Eastern Europe: Between Mainstreaming and Radicalization. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 18,*(1), 27-35.

Mitchell, A., Jurkowitz, M. Oliphant, J.B. & Shearer, E. (2020, July 30). *Americans who mainly get their news of social media are less engaged, less knowledgeable.* Pew Research Center: Journalism & Media. https://www.journalism.org/2020/07/30/u-s-adults-whomostly-rely-on-social-media-for-political-news-are-often-less-knowledgeable-aboutcurrent-events/

Moghadam, A. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second Intifada. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26* (2), 65-92.

Moghaddam, F. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration. *American Psychologist, 60*(2), 161-169.

Montano, A. N. & Barfield, B. (2017) Attitudes toward mental illness: A study among law enforcement officers in the south and southwest United States. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Undergraduate Research, 6*(1).

Morrison, M. A. (2000). Changing perceptions of mental illness and the emergence of expansive mental health party legislation. *South Dakota Law Review, 45(1),* 8-32.

Moskalenko, S. & McCauley, C. (2011). The psychology of lone-wolf terrorism. *Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 24*(1), 115-126.

Mozur, P. (2018, October 15). A genocide incited on Facebook, with posts from Myanmar's Military. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html

Müller, K. & Schwarz, C. (2020). Fanning the flames of hate: Social media and hate crime.

Journal of European Economic Association, jvaa045. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa045

Narrow, W. E., Regier, D. A., Rae, D. S., Manderscheid, R. W. & Locke, B. Z. (1993). Use of services by persons with mental and addictive disorders. Findings from the National Institute of Mental Health Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program. *Archives of General Psychiatry, 50*, 95–107

National Archives. (n.d.). *Records of the Secretary of Defense (RG 330). https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-330-defense-secretary*

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland. (2012, June 23). *Terrorist organization profile: Army of God. https://web.archive.org/web/20120623065521/http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=28*

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. (2015). *Financial Crimes Perpetrated by far-right extremists in the United States: 1990-2013. Research Brief*. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ECDB_FinancialCrimesSchemesPerpetratedbyFarRightExtremists_June2015.pdf

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. (2018). *Pre-radicalization criminal activity of United States extremists. Research Brief.* https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_PreRadCriminalActivityofUSExtremists_Jan2018.pdf

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. (2019). The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. (2020). Profiles of Individuals Radicalized in the United States (PIRUS) [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-individual-radicalization-unitedstates-pirus.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START]. (2020b). PIRUS – Frequently asked questions. https://www.start.umd.edu/pirus-frequently-askedquestions#q2

Nesser, P. (2004). *Jihad in Europe. Exploring the motivations for Salafi-Jihadi terrorism in Europe post-millennium*. Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo.

Newman, E. (2006). Exploring the "root causes" of terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29*(8), 749-772. DOI: 10.1080/10576100600704069

Neumann, P. (2013). The trouble with radicalization. *International Affairs, 89*, 873-893.

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2017). *Domestic terrorism: 2015-Present. Targets and methods.* https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/analysis/domestic-terrorism-2015-present

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2017b). *Domestic Terrorism: 2015-Present Group Comparison.* https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/591b3ebbebbd1ae30ecac316/1494957768812/Domestic+Terrorism+-+2015-Present+-+Group+vs+Group+Comparison.pdf

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2018a). *Domestic terrorism in the U.S., 2017.* https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/5b2d58210e2e72a175e8aa2a/1529698339356/Domestic+Terrorism+in+the+US+2017.pdf

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2018b). Terrorism threat assessment 2018. https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/analysis/2018-terrorismthreat-assessment

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2019a). *Domestic terrorism in the U.S., 2018*. https://www.scribd.com/document/421231343/DomesticTerrorism-in-2018-pdf#from_embed

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2019b). *Environmental extremists.* https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/5d03b50051e3d80001a84431/1560524033222/Environmental+Extremists.pdf

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2019c). *White supremacist extremists exploit jihadist tactics.* https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/analysis/white-supremacist-extremists-exploitjihadist-tactics

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2020a). 2020 *Terrorism Threat Assessment*. https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/analysis/2020-terrorism-threatassessment?rq=2020%20terrorism%20threat%20assessment

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2020b). *Anarchist Extremists.* https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/5e6803ecd1a1de78a34c0d91/1583875052810/Anarchist+Extremists.pdf

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2020c). *Animal Rights Extremists.* https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/5ea72c7864cc3c7968743401/1588014200837/Animal+Rights+Extremists.pdf

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2020d). *Domestic*

Terrorism in 2019. https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/analysis/domestic-terrorism-in2019

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2020e). *Militia Extremists.* https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/5ea72857d8d2eb7279082836/1588013144818/Militia+Extremists.pdf

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness [NJOHSP]. (2024). *2024 Threat Assessment.* https://www.njohsp.gov/threat-landscape/threat-assessment

Nguyen, C. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. *Episteme, 17*(2), 141-161.

NPR. (2014, February 15). The secret operation to bring Nazi scientists to America. *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/2014/02/15/275877755/the-secret-operation-to-bring-nazi-scientiststo-america

Ortiz-Ospina, E. (2017, February 23). *Extreme poverty in rich countries: what we know and what we don't know.* Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty-in-richcountries-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont-know

Pape R. (2005). *Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism*. Random House.

Pearce, K. I. (1977). Police Negotiations: A New Role for the Community Psychiatrist. *Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal, 22*(4), 171-175

Pearlstein, R. M. (1991). *The mind of the political terrorist.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Pearson, G. (2020). Sources on social media: Information context collapse and volume of content as predictors of source blindness. *New Media & Society.* DOI:10.1177/1461444820910505

Perliger, A. (2012). Challengers from the Sidelines. Understanding America's Violent Far-Right. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/ChallengersFromtheSidelines.pdf

Pew Research Center. (2021, April 7). *Social media fact sheet.* https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/

Phadke, S. & Mitra, T (2020). Many faced hate: A cross platform study of content framing and information sharing by online hate groups. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1–13. DOI: 10.1145/3313831.3376456

Piazza, J. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. *Journal of Peace Research, 48*(3), 339-353.

Piazza, J. (2017). The determinants of domestic right-wing terrorism in the USA: Economic grievance, societal change and political resentment. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 34*(1), 52-80.

Pigott, T.D. (2001). A review of methods for missing data. *Educational Research and Evaluation, 7*(4), 353-383.

Pilkington, E. (2017, September 5). Hookworm, a disease of extreme poverty, is thriving in the US south. Why? *The Guardian.* https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/05/hookworm-lowndes-county-alabama-water-waste-treatment-poverty

Pitcavage, M. (2019). *Murder and extremism in the United States in 2018.* Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism. https://www.adl.org/media/12480/download

Powell, K. (2018). Framing Islam/creating fear: An analysis of U.S. media coverage of terrorism from 2011-2016. *Religions, 9*(9), 257.

Pyrooz, D. C., LaFree, G. Decker, S.H. & James, P.A. (2018). Cut from the same cloth? A comparative study of domestic extremists and gang members in the United States. *Justice Quarterly, 35*(1), 1-32.

Quattrociocchi, W., Scala, A. & Sunstein, C. R., (2016) Echo Chambers on Facebook. *SSRN,* http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2795110

Rapoport, D. C. (1971). *Assassination & Terrorism.* Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Reeve, E. (2019, October 31). She went from a liberal non-voter to burning books with white supremacists. Here's why she finally left the movement. *CNN.* https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/30/us/white-supremacist-woman-reeve/index.html

Ribeiro, M., Ottoni, R., West, R., Almeida, V., & Wagner, M. (2019). Auditing radicalization pathways on Youtube. *arXiv:1908.08313*.

Richards, L., Molinaro, P., Wyman, J., & Craun, S. (2019). *Lone offender: A study of lone offender terrorism in the United States (1972-2015).* National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime and Behavioral Analysis Unit, FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fbireleases-lone-offender-terrorism-report-111319

Romano, A. (2021, January 7). What we still haven't learned from Gamergate. *Vox.* https://www.vox.com/culture/2020/1/20/20808875/gamergate-lessons-cultural-impactchanges-harassment-laws

Rubin, D.B. (1976). Inference and missing data. *Biometrika, 63*(3), 581-590. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/biomet/63.3.581

Russell, C. A. & Miller, B. H. (1977). Profile of a terrorist. *Terrorism: An International Journal, 1*(1), 17-34.

Ryan, C. & Bauman, K. (2016). *Educational Attainment in the United States: 2015.* United States Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p20578.pdf

Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Salazar, P.J. (2018). The alt-right as a community of discourse. *Javnost: The Public, 25*(1-2), 135-143.

Sampson, R. & Laub, J. (1992). Crime and deviance in the life course. *Annual Review of Sociology, 18*(1), 63-84.

Sandberg, S., Tutenges, S., & Ilan, J. (2023). The street-jihadi spectrum: marginality, radicalization and resistance to extremism. *European Journal of Criminology.* https://doi.org/10.1177/14773708231182520

Sandler, T (2011). New frontiers of terrorism research: an introduction. *Journal of Peace Research, 48*(3), 279-286.

Sankin, A. & Carless, W. (2018, March 16). The hate report: Get to know the Three Percenters. *Reveal News.* https://revealnews.org/blog/hate-report-get-to-know-the-three-percenters/

Savage, C. (2019, August 7). What could a domestic terrorism law do? *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/

Schafer, J.L., & Graham, J.W. (2002). Missing data: our view of the state of the art. *Psychological Methods, 7*(2), 147-177.

Sefat, E.S., Rostami, M., Younesi, S. J., & Fathi, F. (2017). Deterministic thinking and mental health: A review article. *British Journal of Education, Society & Behavioral Science, 19*(2), 1-10.

Selke. W. (1980). The impact of higher education on crime orientations. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 8*(3), 175-184.

Semega, J. Kollar, M., Creamer, J. &Mohanty, A. (2020). *Income and Poverty in the United States: 2018*. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau.

Semyonov, M. Raijman, R., & Gorodeisky, A. (2006). The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European Societies, 1988-2000." *American Sociological Review, 71*(3): 426-449.

Shane, S. (2016). The enduring influence of Anwar al-Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State. *CTC Sentinel, 9*(7), 15-19.

Shane, S. (2017, November 17). In 'watershed moment,' YouTube blocks extremist cleric's message. *New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/politics/youtubeterrorism-anwar-al-awlaki.html

Shaw, E. D. (1986). Political terrorists: Dangers of diagnosis and an alternative to the psychopathology model. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 8*(1), 359–68.

Shearer, E. (2018, December 10). *Social media outpaces print newspapers in the U.S. as a news source.* Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/socialmedia-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/

Shearer, E. & Matsa, K. E. (2018, September 10). *News use across social media platforms 2018.* Pew Research Center. https://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-socialmedia-platforms-2018/

Silber, M & Bhatt, A. (2007). *Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat*. New York City Police Department.

Silke, A. (2003). Becoming a terrorist. In Silke, A. (Ed), *Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences*. (pp. 29-53) John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Silke, A. (2007). The impact of 9/11 of research on terrorism. In Ranstorp, M. (Ed), *Mapping terrorism research*. (pp. 76-93). Routledge.

Silke, A. (2008). Holy warriors: Exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi radicalization. *European Journal of Criminology, 5*(1), 99-123.

Simi, P. Bubolz, B. & Hardman, A. (2013). Military experience, identity discrepancies, and far right terrorism: An exploratory analysis. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36*(1), 654-671.

Simi, P. Windisch, S. & Sporer, K. (2016). *Recruitment and Radicalization among U.S. Far Right Terrorists.* College Park, MD: START.

Smeaton, A., Bermingham, A., Conway, M., McInerney, L. & O'Hare, N. (2009). Combining social network analysis and sentiment analysis to explore the potential for online radicalization. *IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining*, 231-236. DOI: 10.1109/ASONAM.2009.31

Smith, A. G. (2018). *How radicalization to terrorism occurs in the United States: What research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us.* National Institute of Justice. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250171.pdf

Smith, B. & Damphousse. K. (2002). *American terrorism study: Patterns of behavior, investigation and prosecution of American terrorists, final report.* National Criminal Justice Reference Service. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/193420.pdf

Smith, B., Damphousse. K. & Roberts, P. (2006). *Pre-incident indicators of terrorist incidents: The identification of behavioral, geographic, and temporal patterns of preparatory conduct.* National Criminal Justice Reference Service. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214217.pdf

Smith, B., Gruenewald, J., Roberts, P. & Damphousse, K. (2015). The emergence of lone wolf terrorism: patterns of behavior and implications for intervention. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Today, 20*, 91-110.

Smith, B. Snow, D., Fitzpatrick, K., Damphousse, K. Roberts, P., Tan, A. Brooks, A., Klein, B. (2016). *Identity and framing theory, precursor activity, and the radicalization process.*

National Criminal Justice Reference Service. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf

Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]. (n.d. a). *Alt-Right.* https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/ideology/alt-right

Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]. (n.d. b). *White Nationalist*. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/white-nationalist

Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]. (n.d. c). *Louis Farrakhan.* https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/louis-farrakhan

Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]. (n.d. d) *Stormfront.* https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/group/stormfront

Southern Poverty Law Center. (2012). *Skinheads in America.* https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/Skinheads_in_America_0.pdf

Steffensmeier, D. & Allan, E. (1996). Gender and crime: Toward a gendered theory of female offending. *Annual Review of Sociology, 22*(1996), 459-487.

Stephens, P. (2001). Blood, not soil: Anna Bramwell and the myth of "Hitler's Green Party." *Organization & Environment, 14*(2), 173-187.

Stern, J. (2003). *Terror in the name of God: Why religious militants kill.* New York: Ecco/Harper Collins.

Stinson, F., Dawson, D., Goldstein, R., Chou, S. P., Huang, B., Smith, S., Ruan, W. J., Pulay, A., Saha, T., Pickering, R., & Grant, B. (2008). Prevalence, Correlates, Disability, and Comorbidity of DSM-IV Narcissistic Personality Disorder: Results from the Wave 2 National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions. *Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 69*(7), 1033-1045.

Suneson, G. (2019, July 7). These are the 25 richest countries in the world. *USA Today.* https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/07/07/richest-countries-in-theworld/39630693/

Timberg, C. & Dwoskin, E. (2020, September 30). Trump's debate comments give an online boost to a group social media companies have long struggled against. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/30/trump-debate-rightwingcelebration/

Thompson, R. (2011). Radicalization and the use of social media. *Journal of Strategic Security, 4*(4), 167-190.

Thomson, V. L. S., Bazile, A. & Akbar, M. (2004). African Americans' perceptions of psychotherapy and psychotherapists. *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 35*(1): 19-26. DOI: 10.1037/0735-7028.35.1.19

Thornicroft, G. & Rose, D. & Kassam, A. (2007). Discrimination in health care against people with mental illness. *International review of psychiatry, 19*(2), 113-22. DOI: 10.1080/09540260701278937.

United States Census. (2017). *American Housing Survey.* [Dataset]. https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00000&s_year=2017&s_tablename=TABLE10&s_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=5&s_filtergroup1=1&s_filtergroup2=1

United States Census. (2018). *American Community Survey.* [Dataset]. https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?t=Educational%20Attainment%3AIncome%20and%20Earnings&tid=ACSDT1Y2018.B20004

United States Census. (2020). *Median age at first marriage: 1890 to present.* U.S. Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/timeseries/demo/families-and-households/ms-2.pdf

United States Census. (2023). *U.S. Census Bureau Releases New Educational Attainment Data.* https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/educational-attainment-data.html.

United States Code: Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations, Publ. L. No. 95-456, 104-132, 107-56, 108-458, 111-16, 123 Stat. 1608 (2010). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2010-title18/USCODE-2010title18-partI-chap113B-sec2339B

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2017). *Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts.* Report to Congressional Requesters. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-300.pdf

Van der Gaag, R. (2019). The crime-immigration nexus: Cultural alignment and structural influences in self-reported serious youth delinquent offending among migrant and native youth. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 35*(4), 431-460.

Varaine, S. (2020). Revisiting the economics and terrorism nexus: Collective deprivation, ideology and domestic radicalization in the U.S. (1948-2016). *Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 36*(1), 667-699.

Vermani M, Marcus M, Katzman MA (2011) Rates of detection of mood and anxiety disorders in primary care: A descriptive, cross-sectional study. *Primary Care Companion for CNS Disorders 13*(1), 1–10.

Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *49*(1), 3-42.

Victoroff, J. Adelman, J. & Matthews, M. (2012). Psychological factors associated with support for suicide bombing in the Muslim diaspora. *Political Psychology, 33*(6), 791-809.

Violent Islamist extremism: The European experience, 110th Cong. (2007) (Marc Sageman). https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=28350

von Behr, I., Reding, A., Edwards, C. & Gribbon, L. (2013). *Radicalization in the digital era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism.* Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pd f

Wacquant, L. (1999). Suitable enemies: Foreigners and immigrants in the prisons of Europe. *Punishment & Society, 1*(2), 215-222.

Wakefield, K. (2016). Using fan passion to predict attendance, media consumption and social media behaviors. *Journal of Sport Management, 30*(3), 229-247.

Wakefield, R. & Wakefield, K. (2016). Social media network behavior: A study of user passion and affect. *The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 25*(2), 140-156.

Wilkinson, P. (1976). *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response.* London: Frank Cass.

Wilner, A. & Dubouloz, C. (2010). Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization. *Global Change, Peace & Security, 22*(1), 33-51, DOI: 10.1080/14781150903487956.

Wilson, X. (2021, February 11). Man admits he hit Newark Planned Parenthood with a Molotov cocktail. *Delaware Online. https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2021/02/11/local-planned-parenthoodfirebomber-pleads-guilty/6723090002/*

Wolfowicz, M., Litmanovitz, Y., Weisburd, D. & Hasisi, B. (2020). A field-wide systematic review and meta-analysis of putative risk and protective factors for radicalization outcomes. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 36*, 407-447. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-019-09439-4

World Bank. (2020). *GDP (Current US$)*[Dataset] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true

Wright, C. J. (2018). Islamist Terror in America. In: R.M. Valeri & K. Borgenson (Eds.), *Terrorism in America*. (pp. 96-117). Routledge.

Zannettou, S., Bradlyn, B., Cristofaro, E., Kwak, H., Sirivianos, M., Stringhini, G. & Blackburn, J. (2018). What is Gab? A bastion of free speech or an alt-right echo chamber? arXiv:1802.05287. DOI: 10.1145/3184558.3191531