This study extends the literature on the (in)effectiveness of quality accreditation by examining how standards adopted by an accrediting or research agency, such as the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business International (AACSB), can be manipulated by academic units, such as collegiate schools of business. We present a hierarchical differential game between a collegiate business school and its accrediting agency to advance the hypothesis that strategic or opportunistic behavior occurs where heterogeneity in academic achievement exists, as represented by an uneven distribution of academic achievement resulting either from the presence of both unproductive and highly productive faculty or periods of high academic productivity followed by other periods of low academic productivity. Statistical explorations utilizing data from senior management faculty affiliated with both the highest-ranking and lowest-ranking colleges and universities in the U.S. are suggestive of the presence of incentives facing some U.S. business schools to behave strategically or opportunistically in terms of quality accreditation.
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Faria, João Ricardo and Mixon, Franklin G. Jr.
"Opportunism vs. Excellence in Academia: Quality Accreditation of Collegiate Business Schools,"
American Business Review: Vol. 25:
1, Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.newhaven.edu/americanbusinessreview/vol25/iss1/2